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Direct Investment (OFDI) into Africa has been on the rise. China is now the leading 
investor in greenfield investments regarding capital expenditure overtaking the United 
States in 2016 (Klasa Adrienne 2017).  
The literature (Cheung et al. 2012; Shan et al. 2018; Drogendijk and Blomkvist 2013; 
Kolstad and Wiig 2011; Haglund 2008) RQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDGRHVQRWDFFRXQW
IRUDQLPSRUWDQW3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\3(GLPHQVLRQRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDWKDW
is needed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the location decision of 
Chinese Multinational Enterprises (CMNEs) in Africa. This PE dimension refers to 
the significant influence of the Chinese government in the FDI location choice of 
CMNEs in its role as the owner of large Chinese SOMNEs ± and the provider of 
development aid ± closely integrated with FDI based on a policy of non-interference. 
This study accounts for this PE dimension in two ways ± by separating investments 
carried out by Chinese state-owned multinational enterprises (SOMNEs) and 
Privately-Owned Multinational Enterprises (POMNEs) ± and by examining the 
moderating effect of Chinese development aid on the institutional determinants of 
Chinese FDI in Africa.  
Methodologically, the study adopts a deductive research approach by using 
quantitative methods. We collect and analyse quantitative data for the period 2003-
2015 and linking our results to hypotheses that developed in the conceptual 
framework. We find that institutional quality deters Chinese OFDI while institutional 
distance does not deter Chinese OFDI. We also find that regulative quality deters 
Chinese OFDI while regulative distance does not deter Chinese OFDI. 
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After splitting our sample into investments carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs, we find that Chinese SOMNEs are more attracted to low institutional 
quality than Chinese POMNEs while low regulative quality attracts Chinese SOMNEs 
but does not matter for Chinese POMNEs. The results for our institutional distance 
variables show that Chinese SOMNEs are more attracted to high institutional distance 
than Chinese POMNEs. A high regulative distance attracts Chinese SOMNEs but does 
not matter for Chinese POMNEs. We find evidence of a moderating effect of Chinese 
aid on the relationship between institutional quality, institutional distance regulative 
quality and regulative distance on Chinese OFDI into Africa. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction  
The internationalisation of multinational enterprises from emerging markets (EMNEs) 
has captured the interest of management scholars (Aharoni 2014; Sun et al. 2017; Peng 
et al. 2008; Luo & Tung 2007; Buckley et al. 2018). The most significant outward 
LQYHVWRU DPRQJ WKHVH HFRQRPLHV LV7KH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD from now on 
China) (UNCTAD 2017). This growth in OFDI from China is mostly due to the 
encouragement and support for OFDI by the Chinese government since the launch of 
LWVµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\(Luo, Xue and Han 2010). 
However, nested within this growth in Chinese OFDI is a relatively novel phenomenon 
± the growth in Chinese FDI flows into Africa. According to the 2017 Africa 
Investment Report, China is currently the biggest investor in greenfield investments 
followed by the United States with the majority of the investments carried out by 
Chinese State Owned MultiQDWLRQDO(QWHUSULVHV6201(V&KLQD¶VQHZVWDWXVDVWKH
second largest economy in the world indicates a predominantly economic relationship 
with Africa. The consequence of this economic relationship has been an increase in 
Chinese OFDI (Drogendijk and Blomkvist 2013) into the continent, prompting 
suggestions that China could eventually become the engine for African development 
that developed economies have hesitated to become (Besada, Wang and Whalley 
2008). However, the growth in Chinese OFDI into Africa has escaped any detailed 
empirical analysis by International Business (IB) scholars on the drivers of this 
increase in investments by Chinese Multinational Enterprises (CMNEs) (Drogendijk 
and Blomkvist 2013; Shan et al. 2018). Moreover, the few studies that have attempted 
to investigate the drivers of Chinese OFDI into Africa fail to account for a critical PE 
dimension that is necessary for a comprehensive explanation of this novel 
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SKHQRPHQRQ %\ WKH 3( GLPHQVLRQ RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR Africa, we mean the 
VLJQLILFDQWLQIOXHQFHRIWKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHORFDWLRQRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR
Africa ± through its ownership of SOMNEs and the provider of development aid ±
closely integrated with FDI projects.  
The uniqueness of the PE approach of this study rests on the inclusion of development 
aid to capture the influence of the Chinese government in the FDI location decision of 
Chinese MNEs. This approach builds on existing PE perspectives in IB that advocate 
capturing the role of the government in the FDI activities of EMNEs in particular by 
paying particular attention to the FDI motivations of SOMNEs due to their affiliation 
to their home government (Luo, Xue and Han 2010; Shi, Hoskisson and Zhang 2016; 
Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Rudy, Miller and Wang 2016). This approach pays particular 
attention to the effect the home institutional environment plays ± through the 
significant role of the government in the economy. By also focusing on the role of 
Chinese development aid, this study highlights the important role of political relations 
between the home and host country of the MNE as a source of political advantage ± 
acquired through the provision of development aid backed by a policy of non-
interference.   
The provision of development aid that is strategically integrated with FDI projects 
based on a policy of non-interference suggest thaW&KLQD¶VFRQWHPSRUDU\HQJDJHPHQW
with Africa goes beyond simple investment flows (Mario Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009; 
Sanfilippo 2010) ± representing an alternative development paradigm for Africa 
DGYRFDWHGE\&KLQDNQRZQDVWKHµ%HLMLQJ&RQVHQVXV¶(Large  2008). Thus, overall, 
this study makes two core contributions. The first contribution is the separation of 
OFDI carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs and the second core contribution 
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is capturing the effect Chinese development aid plays in the location decision of 
CMNEs in Africa.   
Thus, in this study, we seek to provide a comprehensive explanation of the growth in 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDE\LQYHVWLJDWLQJWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V
OFDI into Africa and integrating the PE perspective in this explanation. The 
theoretical approach of choice of our study is the New Institutional Economics (NIEs) 
approach to IB (Grosse & Treviño  2005; Meyer et al.  2009; Peng et al. 2008) because 
this approach offers a partial explanation to our phenomenon that as explained later 
traditional IB theories fail to. However, we still need a cross-fertilisation of the 
institutional approach and PE perspectives to explain our phenomenon fully. We 
H[SODLQ WKH OLPLWDWLRQV RI WUDGLWLRQDO ,% WKHRULHV LQ H[SODLQLQJ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR
Africa later.   
1.2. Research Problem   
7KHJURZWKLQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDFRLQFLGHVZLWKWKHULVHRIDQinstitution-based 
view explaining the growth in Chinese OFDI and the rise of the CMNE (Peng, Wang 
and Jiang 2008). This view suggests that the growth in Chinese OFDI is contingent 
upon the nature of the home institutional environment from which Chinese firms 
originate (Yang & Stoltenberg 2014; Wu & Chen  2014). This home institutional 
environment is characterised by significant government ownership of business, 
encouragement, and support of domestic firms to engage in OFDI activities that can 
have an impact on the internationalisation strategies of CMNEs (Luo, Xue and Han 
2010).   
The above institution-based view focuses on the home-country institutional 
environment in China. However, the institutional quality of African countries is also 
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important from a theoretical perspective. Before engaging in FDI activities, MNEs 
need to take into consideration the institutional quality of their target host locations 
and the home-host country institutional distance (Buchanan et al. 2012; Fukumi & 
Nishijima 2010; van Hoorn & Maseland 2016; Bae & Salomon 2010). The former 
tends to affect the transactions cost of operations for MNEs (Meyer 2001; Peng, Wang 
and Jiang 2008) while the latter increases the liability of foreignness for the investing 
firm (Kostova & Zaheer 1999; Kostova & Roth 2002).  
The majority of African countries can be characterised as having a low institutional 
quality (Asiedu 2006). However, despite this relatively low institutional quality 
&KLQD¶V2)',KDVEHHQ LQFUHDVLQJ (Drogendijk and Blomkvist 2013; Cheung et al. 
2012). CMNEs are more willing to invest in countries that are traditionally considered 
to be too risky and not favoured by DCMNEs. For instance, Chinese investments are 
known to be prevalent in African countries recovering from decades of civil war such 
as Angola (Power and Cristina 2012) and countries under economic sanctions imposed 
by the West due to human rights abuses like the Sudan and Zimbabwe (Patey 2007; 
Eisenman 2005).  
The above investment pattern by CMNEs in Africa poses a challenge to the NIEs 
approach to IB. From a NIEs perspective (North 1990) firms are more likely to locate 
their FDI activities in countries with high institutional quality (Grosse & Trevino 2005; 
Ali et al. 2010) or even adjust their entry strategies when entering markets with low 
institutional quality (Meyer et al. 2009) 7KXV WKH JURZWK LQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR
African countries with low institutional quality presents a theoretical challenge from a 
NIEs standpoint. This challenge raises the need to investigate the extent to which the 
KRVWFRXQWU\LQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\LPSDFWVRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDMoreover, the 
dominance of Chinese SOMNEs with significant backing from the Chinese 
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government raises the question whether the impact of host country institutional quality 
differs between FDI carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs.   
. Furthermore, the increased nexus between FDI and aid ± provided by the Chinese 
government with no conditions on the development of domestic institutional capacity 
points to a high degree of influence by the Chinese government in the FDI location 
choice of CMNEs. Thus, there is a need for the integration of a PE perspective in the 
DQDO\VLVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
1.3. Research Aim and Questions  
This study aims to H[DPLQHWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQ$IULFD
± focusing on the roles of host country institutional quality and institutional distance ± 
and adopting a PE approach. The level of institutional quality of a country tends to 
have an impact on the level of inward investment it receives (Buchanan et al. 2012; 
Globerman & Shapiro 2002; Meyer & Nguyen 2005). Everything being equal, 
countries with higher institutional quality attract higher levels of inward FDI while 
those with low institutional quality attract low levels of inward FDI (Globerman & 
Shapiro 2002). This difference is because countries with strong institutional 
frameworks reduce transactions costs for both foreign and domestic firms (Meyer and 
Peng 2005; Meyer 2001). However, African countries characterised by low 
institutional quality haven been attracting high levels of FDI from China. Thus, in this 
study, we seek to investigate what impact if any the institutional quality of African 
countries have on FDI from China. Thus, we formulate the first research question of 
this study as follows:  
1) What is the impact of the host-FRXQWU\LQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\RQ&KLQD¶V




Secondly, MNEs are not only discouraged by low institutional quality but are also 
deterred by the dissimilarity between home and host countries as they prefer to invest 
in locations with similar levels of institutional quality (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 
2013; Cezar and Escobar 2015). In this study, we also seek to investigate the impact 
of the dissimilarities of the home and host country institutional quality (institutional 
GLVWDQFHRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD The institutional distance between the home 
and host-country dictates the degree of liability of foreignness (LOF) (Eden and Miller 
2004) and the degree of institutional pressure exerted on the MNE to conform to its 
external environment, i.e. obtain legitimacy (Xu & Shenkar 2002).  Thus, we formulate 
our second research question as: 
2) How does the institutional distance between China and the host-country 
DIIHFW&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$Irica?  
 
Chinese SOMNEs differ from their counterparts in the private sector regarding their 
motivations for FDI (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Duanmu 2012). Due to their soft-budget 
constraints and political support from the home government, Chinese SOMNEs are 
more likely to be less risk-averse than Chinese POMNEs when planning to enter 
foreign markets (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Amighini et al. 2013). Also, in a bid to 
enhance their legitimacy, Chinese SOMNEs are more likely to adapt their foreign entry 
strategies than their private counterparts due to the high levels of distrust of foreign 
SOMNEs in countries with highly developed institutions (Meyer et al., 2014). Thus, 
based on the potential differences in investment motivations between Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs, we split our investigation into FDI carried out by Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs.  
The above approach enables us to examine how the institutional quality of host-
country and the institutional distance between the home and host-country impacts the 
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FDI location decision of Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. Based on the above 
discussion, the impact of institutional quality can be different between Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs.  We formulate our third research question in the following 
way:  
3) To what extent does the impact of the host-country institutional quality 
and the institutional distance between China and the host country differ 
between FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs?  
 
1.4. Research Justification and Theoretical Contribution 
In this section, we explain the research justification as well as the theoretical 
contribution of the thesis. We begin by providing a research justification followed by 
the theoretical contribution.  
The investigation of the institutional determinants of CKLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD is 
motivated E\WKHIDVWJURZWKLQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDVLQFHWKHDGYHQWRIWKHµ*R
*OREDO¶SROLF\DQG WKH OLPLWDWLRQVRIH[WDQWDFDGHPLFUHVHDUFKRQ&KLQD¶V2)', LQ
Africa.  
&KLQD¶V2)', LQWR$IULFDKDVEHHQULVLQJDWD IDVW UDWHVLQFH WKHDGYHQWRI WKHµ*R
*OREDO¶SROLF\RI WKH&KLQHVH JRYHUQPHQW (UNCTAD 2017) than in any period of 
Sino-African relations. This growth has captured the attention of scholars and the 
PHGLDDOLNHOHDGLQJWRVXJJHVWLRQVRIDQHZµVFUDPEOH¶ for influence and resources in 
Africa (Frynas and Paulo 2006; Economist 2016)7KLVIDVWJURZWKLQ&KLQD¶V)',LQ
Africa has led to calls for research into the primary drivers of Chinese OFDI into the 
region to better understand the phenomenon (Cheung et al. 2012; Biggeri & Sanfilippo 
2009). Thus, the quick increase in Chinese OFDI into Africa is one of the research 




Another research justification of this study is the limitations of extant research on 
&KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD Large-scale empirical analyses of the determinants of  
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDDUHOLPLWHGand the few studies (e.g. Kolstad & Wiig 2011; 
Drogendijk & Blomkvist 2013; Cheung et al. 2012) that examine this phenomenon fail 
to provide a comprehensive explanation of thH GHWHUPLQDQWV RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR
$IULFD7KHDERYHVWXGLHVDUHOLPLWHGLQWKUHHZD\V)LUVWO\UHVHDUFKRQ&KLQD¶V2)',
has shown that Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs carry out FDI activities for different 
reasons (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Huang & Renyong 2014). However current research 
RQ WKH GULYHUV RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD GRHV QRW DFFRXQW IRU VXFK SRWHQWLDO
differences in investment motivations between Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs 
investing in Africa. The lack of a separation between FDI carried out by Chinese 
SOMNEs, and POMNEs has led to calls for research on the location decision of 
Chinese SOMNEs in comparison to POMNEs in Africa (Drogendijk and Blomkvist 
2013). Although the majority of Chinese firms carrying out FDI activities in Africa 
can be categorised as SOMNEs, the number of projects by Chinese POMNEs have 
also been on the rise (Gu 2009). Thus, a comparison of the investment motivations of 
both types of firms can shed more light on the location decision of CMNEs in Africa.  
Secondly, from an empirical standpoint, the impact of institutional quality on Chinese 
FDI in Africa has produced mixed results with some suggesting a negative relationship 
(Kolstad and Wiig 2011) while others find a positive relationship (Drogendijk and 
Blomkvist 2013). This discrepancy in results may be related to issues of measurement 
of institutional quality as all studies that examine this phenomenon use different single 
institutional indicators that can yield different results (Ali et al. 2010). Thus, we need 
to account for the full LPSDFWRILQVWLWXWLRQVRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDthrough the 
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use of a measure that encompasses both political and economic institutions as carried 
out in this study.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are currently no studies on the impact of 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOGLVWDQFHRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD. There are no studies that examine 
how institutional distance impacts the location decision of CMNEs in Africa. Thus, 
RQHRIWKHDLPVRIWKLVVWXG\LVWRH[DPLQHWKHHIIHFWRILQVWLWXWLRQDOGLVWDQFHRQ&KLQD¶V
OFDI into Africa. The focus on institutional distance is motivated by evidence that 
MNEs are not only discouraged by weak institutional frameworks but are also 
discouraged by the distance between the institutional environments of their home and 
host countries(Estrin, Baghdasaryan and Meyer 2009; van Hoorn and Maseland 2016; 
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer 2007; Cezar and Escobar 2015).   
Thirdly, D3(GLPHQVLRQRI&KLQD¶V)',LQ$IULFDis lacking in current studies. This 
GLPHQVLRQLVQHFHVVDU\WRSURYLGHDFRPSUHKHQVLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI&KLQD¶V)',LQ
Africa (Cheung et al. 2012). The Chinese government plays a significant role in the 
FDI activities of Chinese firms ± particularly Chinese SOMNEs (Luo, Xue and Han 
2010). Therefore, a separate examination of the investments by Chinese SOMNEs will 
partly account for this PE perspective. However, to adequately account for the PE 
GLPHQVLRQRI&KLQD¶V)',LQ$IULFDWKHUHLVDQHHGWRH[DPLQHWKHPRGHUDWLQJLPSDFW
of Chinese development aid on the investments of CMNEs in Africa (Kolstad and Wiig 
2011). The close integration of aid and FDI projects with no political conditions 
depicts a high level of government involvement that may provide political advantage 
to CMNEs and lead to a high propensity to invest in risky environments. This 
dimension is currently unaccounted for in current studies and is achieved in this study.   
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From a theoretical standpoint, the limitations of existing theoretical perspectives and 
WKHSDXFLW\RIH[WDQWUHVHDUFKRQ&KLQD¶V)',LQ$IULFDPDNHRXUVWXG\LPSRUWDQWDOVR
from a theoretical perspective. Firstly, we cross-fertilise the IB and PE literature in 
Chapter 3 enabling us to build a conceptual framework that combines concepts from 
the IB and PE literature. The PE literature comprises of literature that accommodates 
the role of the Chinese government in contemporary Sino-African relations. Through 
an interdisciplinary approach, our conceptual framework helps provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of the location decision of CMNEs in Africa. Particularly, 
the impact that the overall host country institutional quality regulative quality,  overall 
insWLWXWLRQDOGLVWDQFHDQGUHJXODWLYHGLVWDQFHKDYHRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD7KLV
study suggests that aspects of the PE of Chinese FDI in Africa are a necessary 
dimension that needs to be amalgamated with existing institutional approaches as it 
can help explain the distinctive investment pattern of CMNEs in Africa that defies the 
predictions of the NIEs approach to IB.  
We extend the strictly economic NIEs approach by adding a political cost to the strict 
transactions costs analysis of the location decision of MNEs. We believe that the 
LQIOXHQFHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD± as the owner of Chinese 
SOMNEs and the provider of aid means CMNEs face a lower political cost capable of 
offsetting any transactions costs associated with operating in countries with weak 
institutions. This lower political cost provides CMNEs in Africa with a competitive 
political advantage over other MNEs in Africa, notably DCMNEs.  
In a nutshell, our contribution to theory lies in our alternative theoretical approach - an 
interdisciplinary one, which combines concepts from both the IB and PE literature. 
From an institutional perspective, there exist clear explanations on the aspects that 
guide the decisions of MNEs to engage in value-added activities across borders (see 
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Section 3.4.2). However, the explanation of these approaches does not accommodate 
some of the characteristics of the investments by MNEs from developing economies 
into other developing economies like the investments by CMNEs in African countries.  
1.5. Overview of Thesis  
In this section, we provide an overview of the structure of the thesis as well as a brief 
overview of each chapter.  
The organisation of the thesis can be separated into two main parts ± the theory 
building and theory testing. Firstly, in the theory-building part, we begin with a 
SUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDDVZHOODVDGLVFXVVLRQ
of Sino-African relations in their historical context from an economic and political 
dimension (Chapter 2). Next, we conduct a critical review of current literature (Chapter 
3) that is closely related to the phenomenon of interest in this study ± the institutional 
GHWHUPLQDQWV RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD The literature review is followed by a 
discussion of the conceptual framework of the thesis (Chapter 4).       
The theory testing part of this study starts with the discussion of the chosen 
methodology and research methods of the study (Chapter 5). We use our chosen 
research methodology and methods to test the validity of our conceptual framework 
developed in Chapter 4 through the use of regression analysis by benchmarking 
(Chapter 6) and by moderation analysis (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 provides the conclusion 
of the thesis and recommendations for future research. Overall, this thesis is comprised 
of eight chapters; an overview of each chapter is provided below.  
Chapter 1 ± Introduction 
Chapter 1 begins by highlighting the phenomenon under investigation in this study as 
well as providing an overview of the existing academic literaWXUHRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR
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Africa. The chapter then identified the research gaps, the research problem, research 
aim and questions, research justification and theoretical contribution ± and finally, an 
overview of the thesis is provided together with a brief overview of each chapter.  
Chapter 2 ± 7KH&KDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
&KDSWHUKLJKOLJKWVWKHGLVWLQFWLYHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDKHOSLQJ
to set the stage for a comprehensive literature review. The chapter begins with an 
DQDO\VLVRIWKHFKDQJLQJQDWXUHRI&KLQD¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK$IULFDIURPDKLVWRULFDO
SHUVSHFWLYHIROORZHGE\VRPHVW\OLVHGIDFWVRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDLQWKHHUD
after the launch of thHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\DQGWKH)RUXPIRU&KLQD$IULFD&RRSHUDWLRQ
(FOCAC). 
Chapter 3 ± Literature Review 
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive review of extant literature relevant to the research 
topic of the study. The chapter adopts an interdisciplinary approach by providing a 
comprehensive review of key literature in the areas of NIEs approach to IB, political 
HFRQRP\ SHUVSHFWLYH RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD VWDWH-owned multinational 
enterprises, emerging market multinational enterprises, Chinese multinational 
enterprises, and Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
Chapter 4 ± Conceptual Framework 
Chapter 4 provides the conceptual rationale for the study. Specifically, the chapter 
presents the theoretical background of the proposed conceptual framework by 
adopting an interdisciplinary approach that draws on concepts from the IB and PE 
literature. The chapter provides an explanation of the various concepts and the 
relationship between them. The proposed conceptual framework captures the 
dependent variable and the main independent variables (institutional quality regulative 
quality institutional distance, regulative distance) in addition to the moderating 
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variable of development aid.  The chapter also relates the concepts to Chinese OFDI 
into Africa by formulating various hypotheses to be tested empirically in the theory 
testing chapters of the thesis ± Chapter 6 and 7 
Chapter 5 - Methodology    
Chapter 5 presents and discusses the methodology and method employed to test the hypotheses 
formulated in Chapter 4 empirically. The chapter explains the research context of the study and 
describes the research data utilised in the study. A presentation of all the variables and their 
measures utilised in this thesis are also provided as well as all the various statistical models 
specified.  
Chapter 6 ± %HQFKPDUNLQJWKH'HWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDQDJDLQVW2)',
from Developed and Developing Economies 
Chapter 6 empirically tests the relationships between our dependent (FDI inflows) and 
independent variables ± institutional quality, regulative quality, institutional distance, regulative 
distance. The chapter uses OFDI from developed and developing economies as benchmarks to 
compare OFDI by Chinese investors with OFDI carried out by developed and developing 
economy investors. The chapter also tests the effects of our key institutional variables on OFDI 
carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs as one of the facets of the PE dimension that 
this study seeks to account for in the analysis of the location decision of CMNEs in Africa.  
Chapter 7 ± The Moderating Effect of Chinese Development Aid inflows on 
Institutional Quality and Institutional Distance 
Chapter 7 captures the second facet of the PE dimension accounted for in this study by 
empirically testing the moderating effect of Chinese development aid on the key 
institutional variables ± institutional quality, regulative quality, institutional distance 
and regulative distance.   
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
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Chapter 8 presents a summary of the overall argument of the thesis, a summary of the 
key research findings of the study based on the research questions (Section 1.3) ± and 
the limitations of the study. It presents the overall research contribution of the thesis ± 
and the theoretical and empirical contributions of the study. Based on the findings of 
the study, the chapter provides policy and managerial implications and concludes with 
an outlook for future research ± particularly on the role of political economy in IB 


















2.1. Introduction   
This chapter aims to highlight the distinctive characteristics that make &KLQD¶V2)',
LQWR$IULFDDSHFXOLDUSKHQRPHQRQ:HXQFRYHUWKHSHFXOLDULWLHVRI&KLQD¶V2)',E\
first providing an analysis of the changing nature of Sino-African relations in their 
historical context setting the stage for the stylised facts on the nature RI&KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa in the era after the launch RIWKHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\ The rationale for this 
chapter is based RQWKHQHHGWKHXQGHUVWDQGWKHFRQWH[WRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD
thereby setting the stage for the literature review in Chapter 3 by helping to highlight 
WKH LQVXIILFLHQFLHV LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH RQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD We organise the 
chapter as follows: Section 2.2, examines the changing nature of Sino-African 
relations since the period of self±determination for African countries. Section 2.3 
describes the size of Chinese greenfield investments in Africa including the number of 
FDI projects and capital expenditure. In section 2.4, we discuss the distribution of 
Chinese greenfield investment in Africa by examining the top destination countries for 
FDI. In section 2.5, we examine Chinese OFDI into Africa from an industry level while 
section 2.6 looks at the top Chinese companies investing in Africa. Section 2.7 
provides a summary of the key characteristics of Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
2.2. The Changing Nature of Sino ± African Relations in a Historical Context  
7KLVVHFWLRQDLPVWRSODFH&KLQD¶VUHQHZHGHQJDJHPHQWZLWK$IULFDLQLWVKLVWRULFDO
context. The analysis distinguishes between four different periods depicting the 
evolution of Sino-$IULFDQ UHODWLRQV VLQFH WKH FUHDWLRQ RI WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI
China (PRC) in 1949. The chosen periods reflect both the political and economic 
perspectives of this relationship, particularly the major underlying forces that underpin 
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this relationship. The periods also reflect how the political and economic dimensions 
of this relationship have changed over the past decades as China develops into the 
global power, and the second ODUJHVW HFRQRP\ LW LV WRGD\ &KLQD¶V FRQWHPSRUDU\
relations and engagement with the African continent are widely recognised (Large 
2008).  
+RZHYHULWLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHµGUDJRQ¶KDVQRWMXVWarrived (Jiang 2009; Pritchett 
2010). African countries have more than half a century of interactions with China 
(Achberger  2010) that can be related to certain historical periods. Each period is 
characterised by political, or economic factors that have helped shape the nature of this 
relationship over the past five decades as well as presently: the era of self-
determination, the era of open door policies, the post-Tiananmen Square era and the 
SHULRGDIWHUWKHODXQFKRIWKHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\ 
The final period may be described as the period of the formulation, and implementation 
RIWKHµ*R*OREDO¶VWUDWHJ\IURPWKH\HDUDQGRQZDUGV7KHELUWKRIWKLVSROLF\
marked the rising strength of the Chinese economy, and notably the birth of the CMNE 
± highly competitive, and prepared to engage in value-added activities in various 
locations of the world wherever the opportunities arise. Such an approach to FDI meant 
that African countries despite their highly risky environments for business became a 
popular destination for Chinese capital due to its wealth in energy, and natural 
resources (Jiang 2009). Thus, the beginning of the 21st century witnessed a significant 
re-engagement with Africa both politically, and economically on a scale never seen 
since the time of the Bandung conference of 1955. We elaborate on each of the above 
four periods of the Sino-African relations below showing how the relationship has 
HYROYHGRYHUWKHGHFDGHVWR&KLQD¶Vcurrent re-engagement with Africa.     
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2.2.1. The Era of Self-Determination (1955-1978) 
7KHµZLQGRIFKDQJH¶ WKDWVZHSW through the African continent during the mid-20th 
century witnessed a significant number of African countries attain independence after 
a prolonged period of widespread demand for self-determination across the continent 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012). This demand escalated into independence movements and 
wars for national liberation from decades of colonialism.  
China supported these struggles for independence in Africa (Konings  2007). This 
support was first manifested during the first large-scale Afro-Asian conference in 
Bandung in 1955 of which 29 Asian and African countries were in attendance 
(Muekalia 2004). The Bandung conference marked the first official contacts between 
China and continental Africa. The objective of the conference was to foster economic 
and cultural cooperation between the Asian and African countries while opposing 
imperialism in any form (Ampiah 2007). The conference also sought to inspire 
colonised countries to struggle for national liberation, hence playing a role in the 
promotion of anti-colonial movements in Africa (Muekalia  2004). This cooperation 
was a significant step toward the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement with third 
world countries advocating abstention from Cold War alliances and against 
colonialism (Willetts 1978).  
Post-Bandung, China continued to cultivate ties with African countries by offering 
even military support to African countries in a bid to encourage wars of national 
liberation, though this support tended to focus on African countries that were following 
a socialist path such as Ghana, Guinea, Zambia, and Tanzania (Konings  2007). These 
continued relations with the continent were epitomised by the tour of 10 African 




interference and respect for sovereignty by all other countries. Such open political 
support against colonialism was backed up by some economic projects carried out 
throughout Africa with assistance from the Chinese government (Payne and Veney 
1998).   
The most well-known and perhaps the largest of such projects was the 1860-km 
TAZARA railway, constructed from 1970 to 1975 between Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia, 
and Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania (Monson 2013).QRZQWRWKHORFDOVDVWKHµ8KXUX¶RU
freedom railway, it was constructed with the assistance of the Chinese government 
who offered an interest-free loan of USD500 million (Monson  2009).  It was proving 
difficult for Zambia (a landlocked country) to transport goods mainly copper through 
former Rhodesia which had unilaterally declared independence under Ian Smith 
(Anglin 1980). The other coastal neighbour, Angola was going through a violent 
struggle for independence from the Portuguese (Le Billion 2001). The provision of 
economic assistance through the financing of large-scale projects by the Chinese 
government like the TAZARA railway project had a political underpinning (Sautman 
and Hairong 2007). As most African countries gained independence, China sought 
SROLWLFDOOHJLWLPDF\E\JDLQLQJGLSORPDWLFUHFRJQLWLRQIURPRWKHUQDWLRQVLQWKHµWKLUG
worOG¶ (Jackson 1995; Adie 1962). This realignment, with newly independent 
countries in Africa, had symbolic consequences for legitimacy and diplomatic 
recognition for China.  
One of the significant outcomes of this alignment with the µWKLUG ZRUOG¶ ZDV WKH
UHFRJQLWLRQDQGUHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKH3HRSOHV5HSXEOLFRI&KLQDWR&KLQD¶VVHDWLQ
the United Nations Security Council in 1971 at the expense of the Republic of China 
today known as Taiwan (Wei 1982)7KLV UHFRJQLWLRQRI7KH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI
China in the United Nations had much to do with the votes of 26 African countries in 
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the United Nations (Wei 1982), thus marking the event as perhaps the most significant 
in Sino-African relations. This event was even more significant for the newly 
independent African countries who often on the periphery of world politics, now 
influenced decisions on the world stage following their newly independent status. 
However, Sino-African relations during this period was predominantly political than 
economic (Cornelissen and Taylor 2000). 
2.2.2. µ2SHQ'RRU¶3olicies (1978-1991) 
The death of Chairman Mao and the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw 
the beginning of a quiet period in Sino-African relations right up to the late 1980s 
(Muekalia, 2004). Politically, the African continent had changed dramatically as the 
majority of African countries but for a few had gained independence (Nugent 2012). 
Thus, the calls for revolutionary struggles against colonialism were rather muted. In 
China, development efforts were concentrated inwards as Deng initiated wide-ranging 
market-oriented UHIRUPVZLWKKLVµ2SHQ'RRU¶SROLFLHV(Huan 1986). These policies 
were aimed at reforming the industrial structure at home and to hasten the integration 
of the Chinese economy into the globalised economy, with China joining the World 
Bank and IMF in April 1980 (Jacobson & Oksenberg 1990).  
The period between 1986 to 1991 witnessed the development paradigm shift gradually 
from an import substitution strategy to an export-led growth strategy (Voss et al. 
2008). This export-led growth strategy requires the abundance of natural resources 
notably in energy, to sustain it (Shan and Sun 1998). Thus, one can argue that the 
decision to adopt an export-oriented growth strategy sowed the seeds for ChinD¶V
current re-engagement with Africa. The gradual shift in economic strategy also 
witnessed an endeavour to create a favourable institutional environment to attract 




labour cost playing a significant role in the attraction of foreign investment. Regarding 
OFDI, the few largest and most important Chinese SOEs were awarded preferential 
treatment by the government (Zhang 2003). For example, the target location for the 
OFDI activities during this period was in already developed economies mainly through 
joint ventures which enabled technology cooperation and transfer back to China (Guo 
1984). Such support from the Chinese government depicts early signs of government 
encouragement of OFDI activities, though not yet an official government policy during 
this period.   
2.2.3. Post-Tiananmen Square Era (1991-2000) 
7KLVSHULRGZLWQHVVHGWKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRIWKHµ2SHQ'RRU¶SROLFLHVRI'HQJDQGDSXVK
toward market liberalisation (Voss et al. 2008). There was also a revival of Sino-
African relations following the end of the Cold War and the Tiananmen Square 
incident of June 4th, 1989. The Tiananmen Square incident (Hershkovitz 1993) resulted 
LQ ZLGHVSUHDG FRQGHPQDWLRQ E\ WKH :HVW RI &KLQD¶V VXSSUHVVLRQ RI WKH SURWHVW
movement. In the face of this criticism from the West, African governments were far 
more supportive of Beijing (Taylor 2006). This support made Beijing realise that 
Africa represented a vital faction of support for Beijing during disputes with the West 
(Taylor 2004; Taylor 1998). 
After the Tiananmen Square incident, China focused on revitalising relations with 
individual African countries ranging from political, economic and multilateral 
cooperation on issues of common interests on the world stage (Naidu and Mbazima 
2008). Politically China sought to build individual diplomatic relationships with 
African countries following criticisms from the West during the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen incident (Konings  2007)(FRQRPLFDOO\GXHWR&KLQD¶VQHZliberalisation 
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momentum, OFDI increasingly became an essential WRRO RI &KLQD¶V QHZ SODQ IRU
economic development (Zhang, 2003). The Chinese economy had begun experiencing 
KLJKHFRQRPLFJURZWKDQG&KLQDEHJDQWRDFNQRZOHGJH$IULFD¶VVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQ
sustaining this level of economic growth mainly through its riches in natural resources 
(Patey 2007).  
However, a more significant proportion of OFDI carried out during this period by 
Chinese companies were still of a strategic asset seeking nature in industrialised 
countries like the United States with some natural resource seeking investments in the 
extractive sector in Canada and Australia (Voss et al. 2008). Chinese OFDI into Africa 
began to rise but were still relatively small as compared to the latest fifteen years of 
Sino-African relations according to data from the $OPDQDF RI &KLQD¶V )RUHLJQ
Economic Relations and Trade & Ministry of Commerce 2016. However, it is worth 
noting that towards the end of this period, Africa became a prominent regional location 
for Chinese OFDI ± GULYHQE\WKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\DQGWKH
joining of the WTO in 2001 (Naidu and Mbazima 2008). 
7KHµ*R*OREDO¶3olicy and FOCAC (2000 ± Present) 
 
7KHODXQFKRIWKHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\LQWKH\HDUPDUNHd a turning point in recent 
Sino-African relations. The policy symbolised the growing economic strength of 
China and the CMNE (Zhao 2007) with the latter internationalising not only to 
strengthen their competitive advantage, but also to support, and sustain the economic 
development of Chinese economy (Voss et al. 2008). As a consequence, the 
distribution of Chinese OFDI gradually shifted in favour of developing countries with 
an overall increase of 22% during this sub-period with Africa witnessing the highest 
percentage of this growth (Voss et al. 2008).            
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After a series of high profile visits to Africa by Chinese presidents Yang Shangkun in 
1992, and Jiang Zeming in 1995, 1996, Jiang Zemin wrote a proposal to the president 
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on October 1999 proposing the formation 
of a Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC). This request was enthusiastically 
accepted, and the seminal FOCAC meeting took place in Beijing from 10-12 October 
2000, with some forty-four African countries in attendance in the first gathering of its 
kind in the history of Sino-African relations (Taylor 2010). The second FOCAC 
meeting took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2003 and subsequent 
meetings in Beijing in November 2006, Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt in November 2009, 
Beijing in July 2012 and Johannesburg, South Africa in 2015. The next FOCAC 
conference is scheduled for September 2018 in Beijing1.  
Since its inaugural meeting, some areas of cooperation have repeatedly featured on the 
agenda of these meetings mainly in the domain of economic cooperation. An 
examination of the items on the agenda of all FOCAC meetings so far flags up the 
areas investment, trade, infrastructural development and cooperation in energy and 
resource security as areas that feature persistently on the agenda2. These aspects of 
cooperation show that although Sino-African relations still have a political 
underpinning, it has gradually shifted to a predominantly economic one since the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\DQGWKHLQDXJXUDOFOCAC meeting in 2000 
in Beijing. 7KLVQRWLRQLVDOVREDFNHGXSE\WKHVKDUSULVHLQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD
since the first FOCAC summit in the year 2000 ± necessitating the need to investigate 








this relatively new phenomenon (Drogendijk and Blomkvist 2013; Cheung et al. 
2012).  
However, the granting of loans and high-level cooperation between the Chinese 
governments and SOMNEs on the one hand and African governments on the other 
highlights the nexus between politics and economics in Chinese OFDI into Africa that 
cannot be ignored when examining the drivers of Chinese OFDI into Africa. In the 
IROORZLQJVHFWLRQZHSURYLGHVW\OLVHGIDFWVRQWKHQDWXUHRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD
from the most recent era of Sino-African relations that is, the era since the launch of 
WKHµ*R*OREDO¶Dnd the FOCAC.  
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IUica: Key Trends    
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDKDVEHHQRQWKHULVHVLQFHWKHILUVWPLQLVWHULDOFRQIHUHQFHRI
the FOCAC in the year 2000 (China Statistical Yearbook 2016). Greenfield data from 
FDI Markets3 shows that iQWKH\HDU&KLQD¶V2)',IORZVLQWR$IULFDVWRRGDW
86' ELOOLRQ ,Q  DORQH &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD was valued at 
USD36.143billion. Between 2003 and 2016, a total of 321 FDI projects were carried 
out by Chinese firms (see Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 shows that that the total capital investment of these projects stood at 
USD73.66 billion ± an average investment of USD229.50 million ± creating a total of 
135,104 jobs. From Table 2.1 the most substantial number of projects was announced 
in the year 2016, with a total of 66 projects ± representing a total of USD36.14 billion. 
According to the African Investment Report 2017 published by the Financial Times, 
China overtook the United States as the leading investor in greenfield projects 
                                                          
3
 FDI Markets provides data on greenfield FDI projects only  
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regarding capital expenditure in the year 2016 ± LQGLFDWLQJ&KLQD¶VJURZLQJHFRQRPLF
influence in the region (Klasa Adrienne 2017).  
Table &KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD7UHQGVE\<HDU86'0illions) 2003-2016 
Year Number 
of Projects 
Jobs Created Capital Expenditure 
Total Average Total  Average  
2016 66 38,417 582 36,143.60 547.60 
2015 32 14,073 439 2,651.50 82.90 
2014 35 14,017 400 7,163.90 204.70 
2013 19 5,186 272 617.40 32.50 
2012 38 8,786 231 1,423.40 37.50 
2011 24 6,942 289 1,761.00 73.40 
2010 13 6,643 511 776.30 59.70 
2009 18 5,751 319 3,005.90 167.00 
2008 25 18,383 735 9,059.40 362.40 
2007 14 4,368 312 1,854.20 132.40 
2006 7 3,446 492 2,412.80 344.70 
2005 14 4,473 319 1,048.40 74.90 
2004 5 1,119 223 229.50 45.90 
2003 11 3,500 318 5,513.20 501.20 
Total 321 135,104 420 73,660.50 229.50 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQGDWDIURP)',0DUNHWV 
 
Regarding job creation, the year 2008 has seen the highest average project size of 735 
jobs per project. Such rapid growth in Chinese OFDI into Africa calls for a 
comprehensive explanation of the drivers behind this phenomenon and the 
implications for the continent at large (Drogendijk and Blomkvist 2013).  
It is often suggested in the popular media and academia alike that Chinese OFDI into 
Africa is attracted to countries with very low levels of institutional quality (Haglund 
2008; Patey 2007; Cheung et al. 2012). In the following section, we provide descriptive 
statistics on the top destination countries that attract Chinese OFDI alongside their 
institutional quality scores.   
2.4. Top Destination Countries 
Between 2003 and 2016, Chinese investors carried a total of 192 projects in 34 African 
countries (FDI Markets 2017). However, figure 2.1 shows that the top five destination 
countries ± including South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria account for 
the majority of projects. This distribution suggests that although the African continent 
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has witnessed a sharp increase in Chinese investments over the past decade and a half, 
these projects are highly concentrated in a limited amount of countries.   
South Africa is the top destination country regarding the number of projects accounting 
for up to 30% of all the projects carried out during this period. Regarding capital 
expenditure and jobs created, Table 2.2 shows that Ethiopia has received the highest 
number of total jobs and had the largest project size with 1032 jobs per project. On the 
other hand, Egypt has both the highest total and highest average investment at 
USD23.78 billion overall and USD699.50 million per project.  
Table 2.3 shows the absolute institutional quality and distance regarding institutional 
quality for the top destination countries for Chinese OFDI into Africa. Our measure is 
a composite of all 12 institutional indicators, and institutional distance is the difference 
of the value of absolute institutional quality of China and the destination country. Data 
on institutional indicators are from the International Country Risk Guide 2017 
database. Both Ethiopia and Egypt have an institutional quality score of 48.83 and 
56.71 (out of 100 points) that is below our average institutional quality score of 57.6 
for all destination countries (see Table 2.3). We also observe that the average 
institutional quality score of China is also higher than for both Ethiopia and Egypt 
producing an institutional distance value of 14 and 6.12 respectively. Such institutional 
distance values indicate proximity regarding institutional quality between China and 
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South Africa remains the most developed economy in the African continent and a 
member of the BRICS group of emerging economies. Its relatively stable institutional 
environment in a continent with the majority of countries characterised by weak 
institutional capacity provides the country with a comparative advantage in attracting 
FDI over other countries in the continent (Kolstad and Wiig 2011).  
Table 2.2. Top Destination Countries RI&KLQD¶V)',LQ$IULFD86'0illions) 2003-2016 




Jobs Created Capital 
Expenditure  
Total Average Total  Average  
South Africa 72 58 22,053 306 5,224.40 72.60 
Egypt 34 25 10,678 314 23,782.70 699.50 
Ethiopia 22 20 22,724 1,032 4,044.60 183.80 
Kenya 21 18 4,547 216 1,018.00 48.50 
Nigeria 20 16 8,376 418 4,746.50 237.30 
Zambia 19 15 8,157 429 3,198.80 168.40 
Algeria 15 15 13,859 923 6,126.10 408.40 
Ghana 13 12 2,984 229 1,482.30 114.00 
Morocco 11 10 5,936 539 2,810.50 255.50 
Angola 10 7 4,036 403 3,927.80 392.80 
Other destination countries 84 71 31,913 379 20,168.10 240.10 
Total 321 192 135,104 420 73,660.50 229.50 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQGDWDIURP)',0DUNHWV 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that it attracts the highest number of projects. Moreover, with 
its population of slightly over 55million inhabitants, South Africa has a large market 





Table 2.3. Institutional Quality and Distance of Top Destination Countries 2003 -2016 









China  62.83 4.84 56.4 70 
All Destinations 5.23 57.6 8.78 36.9 76. 
South Africa -3.78 66.61 2.03 63.3 71 
Egypt 6.12 56.71 5.54 48.0 64 
Ethiopia 14 48.83 1.39 47.2 53 
Kenya 9.17 53.66 3.12 49.8 61 
Nigeria 17.54 45.29 1.43 41.5 48 
Zambia 0.02 62.81 1.51 56.5 64 
Algeria 13.57 49.26 1.43 45.4 52 
Ghana -1.37 64.20 2.86 59.0 68 
Morocco -4.17 67.00 6.65 53.4 74 
Angola 5.6 57.23 1.48 52.5 59 
$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQVbased on data from ICRG (2017) 
2.5. Industry Analysis: Business Activity   
From a business activity standpoint, Figure 2.2 indicates that manufacturing is the top 
business activity for Chinese investors in Africa, with almost half of all the projects 
tracked for the period 2003-2016. Table 2.4 shows that manufacturing has also 
generated the highest number of total jobs created. Thus, from an industry perspective, 
the data shows that Chinese OFDI into Africa is diversified across sectors and not 
concentrated on the extractive or resource-oriented sectors. Thus, when analysing the 
motives for Chinese OFDI into Africa, we need to account for the effects, different 
sectors might have on our results. 
Figure 2.2. Number of FDI projects by business activity 2003-2016 
  
Manufacturing, 148

















Regarding capital expenditure, it is the construction sector that has both the highest 
total and highest average investment with a total of USD27.03 billion in capital 
expenditure (Table 2.4). Regarding jobs created, construction also has the largest 
project size creating an average of 1297 jobs per project. Chinese SOMNEs have 
financed and carried out many infrastructure projects across Africa ± including roads, 
ports, rail systems and telecommunication networks. Such relatively high amounts of 
Chinese infrastructure investments in Africa points to a distinctive characteristic of 
Chinese OFDI into Africa ± the close integration of Chinese aid (in the form of 
concessional loans) with FDI projects (Biggeri & Sanfilippo 2009; Sanfilippo 2010). 
This close integration of aid and FDI projects highlights a distinctive characteristic of 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDWKDWIRUPVSDUWRIWKH3(RI&KLQHVH2)',LQWR$IULFDWKDW
RWKHUVWXGLHVRQ&KLQD¶V)',LQ$IULFDGRQRWWDke into account.  
Table 2.4. Chinese FDI Trends in Business Activity (USD Millions) 
Business activity No of 
projects 
Jobs Created Capital expenditure  
Total Average Total  Average  
Manufacturing 148 92,194 622 21,010.90 142.00 
Sales, Marketing & Support 41 739 18 280.40 6.80 
Business Services 20 351 17 199.00 9.90 
Education & Training 16 1,409 88 189.90 11.90 
Extraction 16 10,317 644 6,715.80 419.70 
Logistics, Distribution & Transportation 15 9,906 660 9,604.70 640.30 
Retail 11 450 40 67.90 6.20 
Construction 10 12,971 1,297 27,026.10 2,702.60 
Electricity 9 1,128 125 4,697.30 521.90 
Headquarters 8 848 106 241.10 30.10 
Other business activities 27 4,791 177 3,627.30 134.30 
Total 321 135,104 420 73,660.50 229.50 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶Vcalculations based on data from FDI Markets (2017) 
 
A case in point was the building of a railway linking Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the 
port of Djibouti in October 2016 that provides landlocked Ethiopia with access to the 
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Djibouti seaport of Doraleh4. Another example is the standard gauge railway line 
connecting the port city of Mombasa to Kenyan capital Nairobi ±completed in June 
20175. Finance for the latter project was provided by the Exim Bank of China with no 
conditions on the improvement of domestic institutions ± and carried out by the China 







































                                                          
4
 See a report by $DURQ0DDVKRµ(WKLRSLDVLJQV'MLERXWLUDLOZD\GHDOZLWK&KLQD¶'HFember 2011, 
Reuters News Agency, https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-railway/ethiopia-signs-djibouti-
railway-deal-with-china-idUSL6E7NH07M20111217  
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Table 2.5. Chinese Loans to African Countries 2000-2015 (USD Millions) 






Algeria 0 0 0 9 9 
Angola 6937 8775 22 3491 19224 
Benin 777 0 0 131 908 
Botswana 90 0 0 841 931 
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 
Burundi 47 0 0 52 99 
Cameroon 3632 45 2 43 3723 
Cape Verde 81 0 0 56 137 
CAR 0 0 60 43 104 
Chad 606 0 0 0 606 
Comoros 8 0 0 0 8 
ROC 2433 0 238 165 2836 
Cote d'Ivoire 2449 0 0 72 2521 
Djibouti 1301 0 0 616 1917 
DRC 3067 0 0 20 3088 
Egypt 77 300 0 54 432 
Equatorial Guinea 1121 0 478 23 1622 
Eritrea 488 0 0 16 504 
Ethiopia 7245 655 4165 1003 13067 
Gabon 750 0 0 278 1027 
The Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 
Ghana 1536 1000 469 172 3176 
Guinea 608 0 0 38 646 
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 6319 240 0 290 6849 
Lesotho 0 0 0 8 8 
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 
Madagascar 56 0 0 0 56 
Malawi 239 0 0 0 239 
Mali 903 0 0 79 981 
Mauritius 377 0 0 54 431 
Mauritania 381 0 0 89 470 
Morocco 501 0 0 14 516 
Mozambique 1686 100 0 93 1878 
Namibia 489 0 222 18 729 
Niger 684 0 0 19 703 
Nigeria 2610 0 390 500 3499 
Rwanda 151 0 0 74 224 
Sao Tome & Principe 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 1497 0 0 21 1518 
Seychelles 62 0 0 1 63 
Sierra Leone 48 0 12 0 60 
Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 0 411 0 0 411 
Sudan 4837 0 598 1043 6477 
South Sudan 182 0 0 0 182 
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 
Tanzania 2086 200 0 62 2348 
Togo 570 0 0 14 584 
Tunisia 123 0 0 3 126 
Uganda 2806 0 0 71 2877 
Zambia 1768 176 0 512 2456 
Zimbabwe 1325 40 290 61 1715 




Data on Chinese loans to African countries from the China-Africa Research Initiative 
(CARI) 2016 database shows an upward trend in Chinese loans to Africa since the 
launch of the FOCAC in the year 2000 (see figure 2.3). Table 2.5 shows that the 
Export-Import Bank of China provides the majority of Chinese loans to African 
countries. Out of a total of USD91, 987 billion of Chinese loans granted to African 
countries for the period 2000-2015, USD62, 952 billion was granted by the China 
Exim bank of China known to be behind the financing of large infrastructure projects 
in Africa (Corkin and Burke 2006). 




2.6. Top Investing Companies  
Table 2.6 ranks the top 20 Chinese companies investing in Africa by capital 
expenditure for the period 2003-2016 ± and also categorise these firms into the 
SOMNE and POMNE category. Firstly, the top 20 companies account for a combined 
total of USD60.154 out of a total of USD73.661 billion for all investments for the 
period 2003-2016 meaning that the bulk of Chinese OFDI into Africa is carried out by 
a relatively small number of firms. Secondly, the majority of the top investing 
companies, are Chinese SOMNEs, indicating that although investments by Chinese 
32 
 
POMNEs are on the rise in Africa (Gu 2009), Chinese SOMNEs still carry out the 
majority of investments in Africa.  
The dominant presence of Chinese SOMNEs in Africa might indicate that the 
motivations for Chinese OFDI into Africa might be mainly of a strategic than strictly 
an economic one. It also highlights the influential role the Chinese government plays 
in Chinese OFDI into Africa in its capacity as the owner of Chinese SOMNEs. We 
believe that such a dominant presence of Chinese SOMNEs ± and involvement of the 
Chinese government through its role as the owner of Chinese SOMNEs in Africa 
FRQVWLWXWHDIDFHWRIWKH3(RI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD that needs to be included when 
DQDO\VLQJWKHGULYHUVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD.   
Table 2.6. Top Investing Companies by Capital Expenditure (2003-2016) 
Investing Company SOMNE/POMNE Capital Expenditure  
China Fortune Land Development (CFLD) POMNE 20,000 
China National Petroleum (CNPC) SOMNE 13,786 
CITIC Group SOMNE 3,535 
China State Construction Engineering SOMNE 3,300 
China Petroleum and Chemical (Sinopec) SOMNE 3,079 
China Nonferrous Metals Mining (CNMC) SOMNE 2,570 
Shanghai Electric SOMNE 2,558 
Huawei Technologies POMNE 1,984 
Wuhan Iron and Steel Co Ltd (Wisco) SOMNE 1,314 
Guangzhou Sunda International Trading POMNE 1,027 
Shanghai Safbon Water Service POMNE 1,000 
Sany POMNE 865 
Shandong Iron & Steel Group (Shandong Steel) SOMNE 850 
Beijing Automotive Industry Holding SOMNE 832 
Sinosteel SOMNE 696 
Zhuhai Minghong Group SOMNE 644 
Dongfang Electric (DEC) SOMNE 558 
China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) SOMNE 558 
Jiangsu Lianfa Textile SOMNE 500 
Broad Homes Industrial POMNE 498 
Others   13,507 
Total  73,661 
$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQGDWDLQ)',0DUNHWV 
 
,Q D QXWVKHOO &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD KDV EHHQ JURZLQJ )URP DQ LQGXVWU\
perspective, manufacturing represented the most significant proportion of business 
activity while investments in the construction sector attract the highest portion of 
Chinese investments in capital expenditure terms. From an ownership structure 
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perspective, the top investing companies are large SOMNEs that are usually referred 
WRDVµQDWLRQDOFKDPSLRQV¶DQGWHQGWREHKLJKO\SROLWLFDOO\FRQQHFWHG(Luo, Xue and 
Han 2010; Wang and Hong 2012).  
2.7. Summary of CKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
 
Table 2.7 presents a summary table of the changing nature of Sino-African relations 
in the political and economic domain from a historical perspective. It also shows the 
motivations driving this relationship during different periods within the last five 
decades or so of Sino-African relations. Although current Sino-African relations can 
be categorised as predominantly economic, political forces also play a significant role 
in influencing the current economic relationship. Thus, at present, we can distinguish 
the characteristics Chinese OFDI into Africa into three broad aspects ± the relatively 
low institutional quality of host countries, the close integration of loan with FDI 
projects, and the dominance of Chinese SOMNEs.   
From an FDI perspective, the above characteristics indicate the influence of the 
Chinese government in Chinese OFDI into Africa. Firstly, as the de facto owner of 
Chinese SOMNEs, the Chinese government can influence the OFDI activities of large 
SOMNEs investing in Africa. Due to the likelihood of high government influence, 
such a dominant presence of Chinese SOMNEs in Africa constitute a facet of the PE 
of Chinese OFDI into Africa. The provision of loans for mainly construction related 
projects indicates the influence of the Chinese government on Chinese OFDI in its 
capacity as the provider of these loans. We believe the influence of the Chinese 
government through its provision of loans constitute the second facet of the PE of 
Chinese OFDI into Africa 
34 
 




















Historical Period Political Economic Motivations 
Self-determination 
era (1955-1978) 
9 x Predominantly political as China seeks to 
FUHDWHDµWKLUGZRUOG¶DOOLDQFHWRFRXQWHU




x x The setback in Sino-African relations as 





9 9 Resource seeking and market seeking and 
also desire to forge diplomatic alliance 







9 9 The strengthening of economic ties. 
Politics also plays a role through 
government involvement through the 
dominance of large SOMNEs and 







In this chapter, we aim to provide a critical review of extant literature closely related 
to the research topic of this thesis ± WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa. Considering our interdisciplinary approach of drawing on insights beyond 
the IB field ± notabO\WKH3(RI&KLQD¶V2)',ZHUHODWHRXUSKHQRPHQRQRILQWHUHVW
to a larger body of literature beyond IB. This approach provides us with an opportunity 
to construct a conceptual framework (Chapter 4) that draws on insights from both the 
IB, PE and institutional approaches, thus providing a comprehensive explanation of 
our topic of interest. Our decision to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the 
literature review is due to the distinctive characteristics of Chinese OFDI into Africa 
highlighted in the previous chapter (Chapter 2), i.e., the dominance of Chinese 
SOMNEs, the relatively low institutional quality of host countries and the close 
integration of loans and investments.   
In this chapter, we also critically evaluate the explanatory power of existing theoretical 
approaches in line with our topic of interest by evaluating the extent to which extant 
theoretical perspectives employed in existing UHVHDUFK H[SODLQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR
Africa. This evaluation allows us to highlight the possibilities for the extension of 
existing theoretical approaches and contribute to existing literature relating to our topic 
by showing what has been done and what we think still needs to be done to explain the 
drivers of Chinese OFDI into Africa.     
This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, we discuss briefly the search strategy 
adopted in this study in section 3.2. This strategy is used to identify and obtain closely 
related and relevant literature to our topic of interest. Secondly, we critically review 
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traditional IB theories while also highlighting their limitations to fully explain our 
phenomenon of interest in sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. These sections are 
followed by a review of the literature on the institution-based view of IB and its 
application to research on FDI flows in section 3.5. Next, we review the literature 
H[DPLQLQJWKH3(SHUVSHFWLYHRI&KLQD¶V OFDI into Africa in section 3.6. Then, we 
adopt a general to specific approach by first reviewing the literature focusing on OFDI 
from EMs in general in section 3.8, followed by OFDI from China in section 3.9 and 
finally OFDI from China to Africa specifically in section 3.10.   
3.2. Literature Search Strategy   
The literature review process helps to generate and refine the research ideas of this 
thesis while providing an underpinning on which the research is built. It is a critical 
analysis of what other authors have written (Jankowicz 2005). A critical review of 
closely related and relevant literature was carried out to establish what research has 
been published in our research area, thereby helping further clarify the research 
questions of this thesis (Chapter 1, Section 1.3). It also helps to build propositions 
(Chapter 4) that are statistically tested using data (Chapters 6 and 7). We begin with a 
literature search. Although an early activity of the literature review process, the 
literature search is seen as a continuous activity throughout this study (Hart 2001) as 
this provides access to relevant and up to date literature in our research area.  
In the search strategy adopted in this thesis, a plan was initially developed. A plan aims 
to define the parameters of the literature search to be conducted regarding subject area, 
geographical coverage and the type of literature that is of interest in the conduct of our 
study. Regarding identifying the type of literature we are interested in, we follow the 
recommendations of Saunders et al. (2011) by focusing on primary, secondary and 
tertiary sources. In our review of the relevant literature, we made the highest use of 
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secondary literature (i.e., books and journal articles). Thus, studies closely related to 
our research topic of interest that are referenced in books and journal articles were 
initially identified and obtained for further reading, enabling the refinement of our 
research questions. The majority of the journal articles we review are predominantly 
in the Management field. These articles are published in top Management-related 
DFDGHPLFMRXUQDOVVXFKDVWKHµ-RXUQDORI,QWHUQDWLRQDO%XVLQHVV6WXGLHV¶µ$FDGHP\
RI0DQDJHPHQW-RXUQDO¶µ6WUDWHJLF-RXUQDORI0DQDJHPHQW¶µ-RXUQDORI0DQDJHPHQW
6WXGLHV¶ µ-RXUQDORI:RUOG%XVLQHVV¶ µ$FDGHP\RI0DQDJHPHQW5HYLHZ¶DQG WKH
µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO%XVLQHVV5HYLHZ¶HWF  
The Management field is interdisciplinary and thus utilises a wide range of literature 
in closely related disciplines such as Economics, Finance and Human Resource 
Management (van Baalen and Karsten 2012). Thus, we also review relevant studies in 
these disciplines were appropriate. Furthermore, our interdisciplinary approach to our 
research topic of interest means we also review literature in the field of PE, specifically 
the PE of China-Africa relations. We review closely related and relevant studies 
SUHGRPLQDQWO\SXEOLVKHGLQDFDGHPLFMRXUQDOVVXFKDVµ$IULFDQ$IIDLUV¶ µ5HYLHZRI
African Political Economy¶ µ-RXUQDORI$IULFDQ%XVLQHVV¶ Journal of Modern African 
StudiHV¶DQGWKHµ7KLUG:RUOG4XDUWHUO\¶ The majority of studies published in these 
journals examine contemporary China-Africa relations from a PE approach.  We 
access the above studies mainly through the internet using the university library 
resources, mainly from Business Source Complete as well as Google Scholar. 
The research questions also acted as a guide to our search strategy. The impact of 
institutional quality in explaining the location choice of CMNEs in Africa is one of the 
research questions this study sought to answer. As a result, extant literature focusing 
on the role of institutions as a determinant of FDI location was given priority in the 
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literature search, and thus helped provide the direction of the search for extant 
literature. The growing interest in the institution-based view of IB research coincides 
with the emergence of an increased role in IB  of major EMs such as China and India 
(Meyer et al. 2009). The focus of this dissertation is China, the largest EM regarding 
economic growth (UNCTAD 2017) and the location decision of its MNEs in Africa. 
7KXV NH\ZRUGV OLNH µ&KLQD¶ DQG µ$IULFD¶ DOVR IDFLOLWDWHG WKH OLWHUDWXUH VHDUFK LQ
finding relevant literature.           
3.3. Traditional Theories of FDI 
In this section, we review some of the traditional FDI theories of the existence of 
MNEs and the foreign value-added activities that they own and control. We also 
highlight the limitations of these theories to explain the topic of interest in this study 
± WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD7KHtraditional theories 
of FDI and MNE activity discussed and evaluated in this section include the 
internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson 1976), the eclectic (OLI) paradigm of 
international production (Dunning  1977; Dunning  2001), and the investment 
development path (IDP)  (Dunning  1986).      
The above traditional theories have also come under criticisms from IB scholars calling 
for specific modifications to traditional IB theories in light of the emerging role of 
institutions, and the rise in OFDI from EMs like China (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Stoian 
2013; Buckley et al. 2007; Child & Rodrigues 2005).  
3.3.1. The Internalisation Theory  
Drawing upon the earlier insights of Coase (1937), the internalisation theory (Buckley 
& Casson  1976) seeks to explain why cross-border activities of intermediate products 
are likely to be internalised by MNE hierarchies. The internalisation theory posits that 
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firms are likely to internalise the market for their intermediate products up to the 
margin when they perceive the benefits (from the transactions arising from them) 
exceed those offered by market transactions (Dunning and Lundan 2008). This notion 
of transactions costs has been extended to the analysis of institutions and FDI activities 
of MNEs whereby the impact of institutions is linked to its effect on transactions costs, 
thus making the NIEs approach to IB the theoretical approach of choice of this study 
(Williamson 1981; Williamson 1985; Williamson 2000).      
All in all, the internalisation theory posits that because different stages of production 
are best carried out in different countries due to uneven distribution of factor 
endowments, firms will internalise the markets for intermediate products; when they 
perceive that the net benefits of their collective ownership exceed the option of 
external supply relationships (Buckley and Casson 2009).  
The internalisation theory has been criticised for its inability to predict circumstances 
in which firms might choose to internalise foreign markets,  as the types of market 
failure in intermediate products that shape one type of FDI activity may be different 
from that of another (Dunning & Lundan 2008). This difference indicates that the 
theory focuses more on the internalisation of intermediate product markets rather than 
the value-added activities of firms, attained by the coordination of varied activities 
within a firm (Dunning 2003). As a result, one of the early advocates of the 
internalisation theory himself argues that the theory can be best represented as a 
paradigm than a theory (Buckley 1990). Also, the need for location-specific variables 
in conjunction with the internalisation theory to fully explain the pattern of FDI 
activities gave rise to a holistic paradigm that encapsulates both the internalisation and 
location-specific dimensions in conjunction with the ownership specific variables 
advocated by Hymer (1960; 1976) ± knowns as the OLI paradigm.  
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3.3.2. The Eclectic or OLI Paradigm of International Production  
The eclectic paradigm (Dunning 1977; Dunning 2001) offers a holistic framework for 
analysing the level and pattern of both FDI carried out by the enterprises of a country, 
and that undertaken domestically by foreign firms. The grouping of the various 
explanations of the activities of firms across national boundaries is illustrated in the 
central propositions of the paradigm.   
The Central Propositions of the Eclectic Paradigm  
Dunning & Lundan (2008) suggest the extent and pattern of FDI undertaken by MNEs 
at any given time will be determined by the configuration of three sets of elements:  
x The extent to which firms of one country possess unique non-transferable 
ownership advantages (OAs) relative to firms of other nationalities operating 
in particular markets.  
x The extent to which the firm perceive it to be in its competitive advantage to 
internalise rather than sell the rights to use its OAs to foreign firms.  
x The last dimension of the OLI paradigm assumes that the spatial distribution 
of location bound resources, across countries, can provide a competitive 
advantage to countries that possess them over those that do not at all, or lack 
in sufficient quantities (Rugman and Verbeke 2008). Thus, the more the global 
interests of the firm are served by utilising its OAs in a foreign location with 
compatible location advantages (LAs), then the more likely for the firm to 
engage in OFDI.  
Another framework seeks to capture the above interaction from a country-level 
perspective is the investment development path (IDP).  
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3.3.3. The Investment Development Path  
The investment development path (IDP) (Dunning 1981; Dunning 1986), represents a 
framework that seeks to explain, from the perspective of individual countries, how the 
evolving OAs of firms and LAs of countries interact to explain the level and pattern 
of inward and outward FDI (Dunning & Lundan  2008). The IDP is made up of five 
stages.  
IDP stage 1 
In the first stage of the IDP, the LAs of a country are assumed to be inadequate to 
attract inward FDI (Dunning, Dunning and Narula 2003). However, the possession of 
natural resources is considered the primary LA of the country, and an attraction of 
inward FDI. In this stage, the country is deficient in what Dunning & Narula (1996) 
called created assets such as high human capital, developed institutions, for a 
conducive environment for business to flourish. As a result, there is likely to be very 
little OFDI activity by domestic firms, due to a lack of sufficient OAs.  
IDP stage 2 
In stage 2, inward FDI starts to rise while OFDI activities by domestic firms remain 
low. This increase in inward FDI is due to the growing importance of the size and 
purchasing power of the domestic market (Buckley and Castro 1998). OFDI emerges 
at this stage but is likely to be resource and market seeking investments in other 
developing and adjacent countries (Barry et al. 2003).  
IDP stage 3 
The NOI position of the country increases in stage 3 of the IDP. This increase is due 
to a slow decline in the rate of growth of inward FDI, while the rate of growth of OFDI 
increases. Depending on their size, technological capabilities, and their institutional 
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quality, most countries at this stage will be almost reaching the economic maturity and 
income level of those of developed countries (Verma and Brennan 2011). At this stage, 
there is a transition from export-led to innovation-driven growth as there is now a 
growing stock of created assets in the host country due to an increase in expenditure 
on tertiary education, and innovatory activities (Durán, ÚBEDA Taylor and Ltd 2005).  
IDP stage 4 
In stage 4, the rate of growth of OFDI is now rising faster than inward FDI such that 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VVWRFNRI2)',EHJLQV WRHTXDORUH[FHHG WKH LQZDUG)',VWRFNIURP
foreign firms (Dunning 1981). The sufficient OAs of domestic firms at this stage 
depicts an increasing reliance on their possession of managerial, and organisational 
competencies. Such reliance on their competencies also means an increasing tendency 
to internalise the market of these OAs by engaging in OFDI, rather than externalise 
them to foreign firms. Inward FDI, from another stage 4 country, is likely to be of an 
efficiency-seeking or strategic asset-seeking nature.  
IDP stage 5  
Introduced by Dunning & Narula (1996), stage 5 sees a continuous rise of both inward 
FDI, and OFDI simultaneously. This stage is exemplified by advanced industrialised 
countries such as the US, and Japan. Very few of the OAs of MNEs in these economies 
are drawn from the home country, but rather from their ability to acquire income 
generating assets while exploiting the advantages of governing value-added activities 
across national boundaries.  
In the following section, we discuss the limitations of the traditional IB theories 




3.4. The Limitations of Traditional IB Theories in E[SODLQLQJ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR
Africa  
 
The internationalisation of firms from China has attracted a great deal of research 
interest from Management scholars. This rise in research interest has led to questions 
by scholars on its implications for the above-discussed traditional theories of FDI (e.g., 
Buckley et al. 2007; Child & Rodrigues 2005; Deng 2009). For example, Buckley et 
al. (2007) and Child & Rodrigues, (2005) suggest that traditional IB theories were built 
mainly on the experience of DCMNEs. These scholars argue that imperfect capital 
markets in China have resulted in the availability of capital at below market rates 
PDLQO\WR6201(VZLWKDVVLVWDQFHIURPWKHJRYHUQPHQWUHVXOWLQJLQDµVSHFLDO¶2$
6XFKDµVSHFLDO¶2$LVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLPSDFWRIGRPHVWLFLQVWLWXWLRQDOIDFWRUVLQ(0V
like China not accounted for in traditional IB theories. 
Child & Rodrigues (2005) suggest that traditional IB theories tend to view the 
internationalisation of the firm primarily through an economic rather than a social or 
political lens. However, the authors do not elaborate under what circumstances the 
political dimension determines the direction of Chinese FDI and how it can generate 
advantages towards the competitiveness of CMNEs. It has also been suggested that the 
strong economic connections among the Chinese diaspora otherwise known as guanxi  
(Wang 2000) not only infOXHQFHWKHGLUHFWLRQRI&KLQD¶V2)',EXWLVDOVRDQDGYDQWDJH
to CMNEs that helps reduce transactions cost (Erdener and Shapiro 2005).                   
In Chapter 2 of our study, we highlighted some FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR
Africa. These characteristics include the dominance of Chinese SOMNEs, the 
relatively low institutional quality of host countries that attract Chinese OFDI, and the 
close integration of aid with Chinese FDI. In consideration of these characteristics, we 
explain the reasons why traditional IB theories are unable WRH[SODLQ&KLQD¶V2)',
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into Africa fully. By traditional IB theories we mean the internalisation theory, the OLI 
paradigm and the IDP (Section 3.3). We refer to these theories as traditional IB theories 
because they place particular emphasis on the firm-specific resources of the firm as 
the primary driver of its ability to engage in OFDI (Ramasamy et al. 2012).    
3.4.1. The Dominance of Chinese SOMNEs in Africa 
 
Theoretical adjustments to traditional IB theories are needed to understand the location 
decisions of Chinese SOMNEs (Ramasamy et al. 2012). Traditional IB theories focus 
greatly on the firm itself as an agent that engages in FDI but less on its political and 
institutional embeddedness in the broader society in which it operates (Child and 
Rodrigues 2005). As a result, traditional IB theories tend to view the subject of FDI 
primarily through an economic rather than an institutional or political lens (Child and 
Rodrigues 2005).  
,Q WKH FDVH RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD LW LV GLIILFXOW WR GLVUHJDUG WKH GRPLQDQW
presence and political embeddedness of predominantly Chinese SOMNEs engaging in 
FDI as highlighted in Chapter 2 of our study. Such dominance of Chinese SOMNEs 
might have implications for theory internationalisation strategies as Chinese SOMNEs 
are more likely to engage in OFDI based on political objectives than strictly for 
economic ones due to their high political connections (Liang, Ren, & Sun 2014). 
,QGHHGWKH³*R*OREDO´SROLF\LQitself has a political underpinning based on appeals 
of national interest (Luo et al. 2010). Such political objectives for engaging in FDI in 
Africa are not captured by the primarily economically focused traditional IB theories 
such as the OLI paradigm and the IDP.  
Secondly, Chinese OFDI into Africa is also guided by a political strategy adopted by 
the Chinese government (as the owner of Chinese SOMNEs) in a bid to boost the 
competitiveness, of late-coming CMNEs in Africa. This approach sets aside 
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governance concerns of African countries which have restrained FDI flows from 
OECD countries into Africa in the past (Besada, Wang and Whalley 2008). This 
approach provides a competitive advantage for Chinese SOMNEs in African countries 
that Western MNEs have seemingly deemed too risky (Patey 2007). From the 
perspective of the CMNE in Africa, this represents a government generated OA and a 
novel approach to the internationalisation of the firm not captured by traditional IB 
theories such as the OLI paradigm. For instance, the OLI paradigm posits the firms 
engage in OFDI due to the possession of distinctive OAs that arises from tangible and 
intangible income generating assets (Dunning 2001). However, government-led 
investments carried out by Chinese SOMNEs in African countries runs contrary to the 
notion of the firm-specific capabilities of the firm as the sole driver of FDI.  
The dominance of Chinese SOMNEs in Africa also highlights the unique nature of the 
institutional environment in China. This distinctiveness is due to the role of the home 
institutional environment as a facilitator in the building of necessary OAs by domestic 
firms themselves takes on a whole different meaning in the case of China. This 
difference, perhaps more specific to China, is mainly due to the direct role of 
government in the internationalisation process of Chinese firms (Child & Rodrigues 
2005; Luo et al. 2010). Direct financial support implies the existence of capital market 
distortions whereby capital is available at below market rates to Chinese SOMNEs in 
particular (Buckley et al. 2007; Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti 2011). This aspect of 
Chinese FDI may require a particular application of traditional IB theories like the OLI 
paradigm, which does not accommodate the existence of capital market imperfections 




SOMNEs have been able to engage in FDI in Africa but through government 
assistance.  
Therefore, considering the dominance of Chinese SOMNEs in Africa and the 
significant influence of the Chinese government on Chinese SOMNEs (Liang, Ren and 
Sun 2014), we believe that a PE approach is needed that takes into account the likely 
influence of the Chinese government on the location decision of Chinese SOMNEs in 
Africa.     
3.4.2. The Institutional Environment of African Countries 
 
According to data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 2017 database, 
the majority of African countries have a relatively low institutional quality. Such low 
levels of institutional quality imply a very unfavourable environment for business 
(Ngobo and Fouda 2012), leading to relatively low levels of FDI in comparison to 
other regions in the world (UNCTAD 2017). However, as previously highlighted in 
Chapter 2, the relatively low institutional quality of African countries that attract 
Chinese investments is one of the major FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
 Chinese firms may be prepared to engage in FDI in African countries avoided by 
MNEs from developed economies, considered to be too risky (Alden and Davies 2006) 
because these are the countries with opportunities for investment due to little or no 
competition. The willingness to invest, in such risky environments, is likely related to 
that fact that Chinese SOMNEs, in particular, may be less risk-averse than their 
counterparts from developed economies as a result of government backing both 
politically and economically (Duanmu 2012).  
Another reason for Chinese investments in African countries with very low 
institutional quality is due to the interplay between home and host country institutional 
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factors regarding distance. The institutional quality in China is still relatively low 
compared to that in developed economies. Thus, CMNEs may be attracted to African 
countries with a relatively low distance regarding institutional quality (Chapter 2, 
section 2.3). Thus, we presume there is a need for an integration of institutional 
perspectives not only from a home or host country perspective but the perspective of 
the nexus between home and host country institutional factors when examining 
&KLQDV¶2)', LQWR$IULFD6XFKDSHUVSHFWLYH LV FXUUHQWO\ ODFNLQJ LQ WUDGLWLRQDO ,%
theories such as the internalisation theory and OLI paradigm that does not account for 
the impact of institutions notably from the perspective of the home country of the MNE 
(van Hoorn & Maseland 2016; Meyer et al. 2009; Child & Rodrigues 2005).      
3.4.3. The Close Integration of Aid and FDI 
  
5HVHDUFKKDV VKRZQ WKDW&KLQD¶V2)',E\ ODUJH&01(V LQ$IULFD QRWDEO\ LQ WKH
extractive and construction sectors is predominantly integrated with aid (in the form 
RIORDQVLQSURMHFWVGHVLJQHGWRPHHW&KLQD¶VUHVRXUFHQHHGV(Sanfilippo 2010; Mario 
Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009; Lew and Arvin 2015). In Chapter 2, we highlighted the 
FORVH LQWHJUDWLRQRIDLGDQG)',DVRQHRI WKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)', LQWR
Africa. We show that the construction sector (the sector with investments most likely 
to be integrated with aid) is thHOHDGLQJVHFWRURI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDregarding 
capital expenditure (see Chapter 2, section 2.4). 
,QFRPSDULVRQWR)',IURPRWKHULQYHVWRUVLQ$IULFDWKLVFKDUDFWHULVWLFPDNHV&KLQD¶V
OFDI into Africa distinctive (Sautman and Hairong 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2011). In 
general, investments by DCMNEs have been unbundled from aid (Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2009). Moreover, investments by DCMNEs in the resource sectors have been 
mainly for exports into the global markets, rather than predominantly for domestic 
consumption in the home country of the MNE as is the case with China. The close 
48 
 
integration of aid and FDI indicates a high influence of the Chinese government on 
Chinese OFDI into Africa ± as the provider of the loans to African governments.  
The above peculiar characteristic of the close integration of aid and FDI indicates a 
high degree of influence of the Chinese government in the FDI location decision of 
Chinese MNEs, thus depicting a PE dimension. This influence of the Chinese 
government is through its role as the provider of loans through state-run institutions 
such as the Export-Import Bank of China. Considering the non-conditions based 
approach to development aid of the Chinese government, the strategic integration of 
aid and FDI may mean CMNEs are more willing to invest in African countries with 
very low institutional quality due to the influence of the Chinese government. Such 
influence of the Chinese government through its provision of development aid 
(strategically integrated with FDI) is what constitutes the second facet of the PE 
dimension currently not captured in traditional IB theories. 
Overall, there is the need to think more carefully about the institutional environment 
in which the firm operates (Wang et al. 2012). The internationalisation process of 
CMNEs appears to be significantly influenced by the role of the Chinese government 
DVLPSOLHGE\WKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDKLJKOLJKWHGLQ&KDSWHU
of our study. The failure of traditional IB theories to explain the location decisions of 
MNEs from EMs in particular (Stoian & Mohr 2016; Wang & Hong 2012; Aharoni 
2014), has led to an  Institution-Based View of IB. This view draws on the tenets of 
the New Institutional Economics (NIEs) (North 1990; Williamson 2000) approach to 
IB.  
Although the NIEs approach have the potential to help explain some of the 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',(Wu & Chen 2014; Wang et al. 2012), a PE approach 
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needs to be incorporated to provide a comprehensive understanding of &KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa. This approach accounts for the role of the Chinese government through 
two mediums ± through the dominance of Chinese SOMNEs and the provision of aid 
in the form of loans that are closely integrated with FDI. Thus, the theoretical 
underpinning of our study is from the NIEs institutional approach to IB in 
amalgamation with a PE approach to FDI.   
In the sections below, we first discuss the assumptions of the NIEs approach to IB  
(Liou, Chao and Yang 2016; Peng, Wang and Jiang 2008; Peng 2002) and provide a 
critical review of existing studies that adopt this view.   
Table 3.1. Traditional IB Theories and ExplanatiRQRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
IB Theories ([SODLQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
Internalisation theory No 




3.5. New Institutional Economics  
NIEs (North 1990; North 1991; Williamson 2000) seeks to explain the vastly different 
performances between economies over an extended period. According to the 
influential study of North (1990), such significant differences in the economic 
performance between economies is contingent on the institutional context and 
institutional change in which economic exchange processes take place. Institutions set 
the limits of what is acceptable behaviour, the degree to which it guarantees property 
rights, and provide enforcement mechanisms (North 1990).         
In NIEs WUDGLWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHµWKHUXOHVRIWKHJDPHLQDVRFLHW\RUPRUHIRUPDOO\
WKHKXPDQO\GHYLVHGFRQVWUDLQWVWKDWVKDSHKXPDQLQWHUDFWLRQ¶(North 1990 p.3). These 
constraints do not only shape the interaction of humans who devise them, but also the 
interactions of organisations who utilise the opportunities presented by institutions in 
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shaping the economic performance of economies (North 1990). Thus, efficient and 
strong institutional frameworks reduce uncertainty through the establishment of a 
stable structure, which determines the transactions cost which together with all other 
costs make up the total costs faced by firms (Meyer 2001). These transactions costs 
arise from the existence of imperfect contracting, information asymmetries, asset 
specificity and the propensity of opportunistic behaviour by economic actors 
(Williamson 1985). Hence, when it is highly costly to transact, institutions matter for 
the establishment, and enforcement of property rights, and controlling opportunistic 
behaviour by economic actors.     
In the institutional tradition of NIEs, institutions can be both formal, and informal 
(North 1990). Formal institutions include formal rules and regulations that underpin 
the economic environment of countries such as constitutions, the guaranteeing of 
property rights, and a sound judicial system (Seyoum 2009).  Informal institutions 
cover the cultural aspects of a society such as the belief systems, value and norms in a 
society (Aguilera-Caracuel et al. 2013). The latter is what North (1990) argues is 
mostly responsible for the continued poor economic performance of developing 
countries, who have copied the structure of the formal institutions of developed 
economies but their informal institutions such as values and belief systems, do not 
provide the right recipe for economic development in a capitalist economy.  
Thus, an institutional system is not complete without both formal, and informal 
institutions. 2QHWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDLVWKHUHODWLYHO\ORZHU
institutional quality of the African countries that attract Chinese OFDI. Thus, a 
theoretical approach that focuses on the quality of the institutional environment 
particularly formal (regulative) institutions is crucial to our understanding of the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD In the following section, we 
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review existing research that adopts the NIEs approach to explaining the location 
decision of MNEs.   
3.5.1. The NIEs Approach to IB Research  
 
In this section, we provide a review of extant research on the NIEs approach to IB. The 
NIEs perspective adopts a macroeconomic approach, whereby the MNE views its 
external institutional environment primarily through a cost-economising lens (Coase 
1937; Williamson 1985).  
Institutions matter for MNEs because institutional heterogeneity presents diverse sets 
of opportunities and challenges for MNEs (Wan & Hoskisson 2003). Strong and weak 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNVFDQ³ERWKHQDEOHDQGFRQVWUDLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOEXVLQHVV´(Peng, 
Wang & Jiang 2008, p.927). Thus, countries with weak institutions present uncertainty 
and pose a strategic challenge for the MNE. On the other hand, strong institutions 
matter because they reduce the transactions cost (Williamson 1985) of operations by 
establishing a stable structure to facilitate interactions in an economy (Meyer 2001). 
For instance, DCMNEs planning on entering transition economies may face unclear 
regulatory frameworks, underdeveloped court systems, and corruption (Meyer 2001). 
In this light the MNE has to decide what type of foreign market entry mode to adopt 
and if to enter such a foreign market at all (Henisz 2000; Delios & Henisz 2003). 
Within the IB literature, the role of institutions in explaining the internationalisation 
of MNEs has received a great deal of attention, mainly the impact of institutional 
quality on the FDI activities of MNEs. Several studies (Henisz 2000; Wan & 
Hoskisson 2003; Delios & Henisz 2003; Henisz & Delios 2001; Meyer 2001) suggest 
that MNEs are less likely to locate value-adding activities in countries characterised 
by low institutional quality. Operating in countries with low institutional quality can 
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bring high costs to FDI and present very high levels of uncertainty due to government 
inefficiency and the lack of reliable enforcement mechanisms (Henisz 2000; Meyer 
2001; Wan & Hoskisson 2003; Delios & Henisz 2003). Strong institutions also have a 
positive effect on the overall performance of the firm (Wan & Hoskisson 2003; Ngobo 
& Fouda 2012). Indeed, there exists a considerable amount of evidence suggesting a 
positive relationship between institutional quality and FDI flows. The focus of these 
studies has been primarily on the impact of high institutional quality on FDI flows.   
Globerman & Shapiro (2002) examine the effects of institutional quality 
FRQFHSWXDOLVHG DV µJRYHUQDQFH LQIUDVWUXFWXUH¶ RQ )', LQIORZV for a sample of 
developed and developing economies, and they find that high institutional quality does 
not only attract inward FDI but also creates conditions under which domestic MNEs 
emerge and engage in FDI. Furthermore, the authors find that the benefits of high 
institutional quality are more pronounced in developing countries with low 
institutional quality. As such, developing countries that reform their domestic 
institutions are bound to attract higher levels of FDI (Gastanaga, Nugent and 
Pashamova 1998; Ajide and Raheem 2016). Similarly, focusing on US MNEs, 
Globerman & Shapiro (2002) find that countries with that fail to attain a minimum 
threshold of institutional quality are less likely to receive FDI from the US.    
Studies by Disdier & Mayer (2004) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) on the location 
decisions by French MNEs in developing economies and firms from countries that 
make up the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
respectively find a similar positive relationship between host-country institutional 
quality and inward FDI. Similar to Globerman & Shapiro (2002), Buchanan et al. 
(2012) used an aggregate measure of six governance indicators to examine the effect 
of governance on FDI inflows into a mixture of developed and developing economies 
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and find that high institutional quality attracts FDI. Bevan et al. (2004) examine the 
differential effect of formal (regulative) and informal (normative) institutions in their 
examination of FDI into transition economies in Eastern Europe. The study finds that 
FDI inflows are positively related to high-quality formal institutions, but no such 
evidence was found for informal institutions controlling for the effects of formal 
institutions (Bevan et al. 2004). This result might be because the development of high-
quality formal institutions is associated with the rise of informal institutions.  
Slangen & Beugelsdijk (2010) ILQG D QHJDWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ µLQVWLWXWLRQDO
KD]DUGV¶ ± formal governance deficiencies and the FDI activities by US foreign 
subsidiaries.  However, the negative effect of low institutional quality is contingent on 
whether the type of FDI carried out is vertical ± efficiency and resource-seeking or 
horizontal ± market seeking. The authors argue that weak governance is a more 
significant threat to vertical FDI than to horizontal FDI (Slangen and Beugelsdijk 
2010). This difference is due to the negative effects of weak governance facing vertical 
subsidiaries usually have negative consequences for other MNE subsidiaries. Ali et al. 
(2010) find that certain institutional aspects matter most for FDI in a panel of 107 
developed and developing countries ± property rights, the rule of law and risk of 
expropriation are the most significant in attracting FDI inflows. However, MNEs do 
not make location decisions based on a single institutional factor but a combination of 
several institutional factors (Pajunen 2008). Thus, in this study, we use a composite 
measure of institutional quality that accounts for a broad range of political and 
economic institutions to H[DPLQHWKHRYHUDOOLPSDFWRILQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\RQ&KLQD¶V
OFDI into Africa.   
Another area of focus of the literature has been on the effect of political institutions in 
particular on FDI flows. For example, Delios & Henisz (2003) and Henisz (2000) 
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examined the effect of political institutions in host countries on the FDI location 
decisions of Japanese and a sample of 462 firms from a both developed and developing 
economies in the manufacturing sector respectively. Both studies suggest that 
uncertainty from unstable political environments has a negative effect on the 
international expansion of firms. Busse & Hefeker (2007) examine the role of political 
risk and institutions in 83 developing countries covering 1984 to 2003. The authors 
suggest that political risk and political institutions matter the most in influencing the 
location decision of MNEs. Employing 12 different indicators of political risk, the 
authors find that factors like government stability, the absence of internal and ethnic 
tensions and respect for the rule of law are highly significant for attracting FDI into 
developing economies. The use of single political, institutional indicators to examine 
the effect of a multifaceted aspect of a country like political institutions can lead to a 
variety of results. To capture the full effect of political institutions necessitates the 
combination of a variety of political, institutional factors in a composite index 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010).  
The effect of democratic institutions (Li & Resnick 2003; Adam & Filippaios 2007; 
Harms & Ursprung 2002) has also been an area of focus in the literature. Li & Resnick 
(2003) VXJJHVWWKDWWKHUHH[LVWVDµUHYHUVDORIIRUWXQHV¶DVGHPRFUDWLFLQVWLWXWLRQVFDQ
have a µGRXEOH-HGJHGVZRUG¶HIIHFWRQLQZDUG)',ERRVWLQJDQGDOVRMHRSDUGLVLQJ)',
inflows to developing countries. Democratic institutions in host countries jeopardise 
FDI inflows by limiting the monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies of MNEs while 
providing support for the domestic industry (Li & Resnick 2003). Firms invest abroad 
to take advantage of their ownership-specific advantages that can result in a 
monopolistic market structure in the host economy. More democratic host 
governments presumably encourage inward FDI, to improve the performance of the 
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domestic economy and to benefit their electoral constituencies. Thus, any possibility 
of a decrease in market competition, caused by an MNE entering the market may result 
in an attempt to limit the monopolistic position of the MNE through legislation. 
However, the same democratic institutions impact inward FDI positively through 
ensuring the securement of property rights and reducing the costs of operations for 
MNEs (Li & Resnick 2003).  
Harms & Ursprung (2002) use a composite index of political and civil liberties and 
find that MNEs are attracted to countries with higher levels of civil liberties and 
political rights. On the other hand, Adam & Filippaios (2007) decompose the effect of 
democracy on US FDI into civil and political liberties and find that political liberties 
matter more than civil liberties ± this is mostly due to the efficiency-seeking motive of 
US MNEs advocating the suppression of trade unions and interest groups. Thus, we 
need to understand under which circumstances authoritarian regimes attract FDI. 
Chinese SOMNEs might be attracted to African countries with authoritarian regimes 
due to the stability they provide for their reliance on good political relations between 
the Chinese government and the host country government (Li and Liang 2012).  
Focusing on corruption, other studies (Wei 2000; Habib & Zurawicki 2002) suggest 
that host-country corruption has a negative impact on FDI inflows. However, Cuervo-
Cazurra (2006) find that corruption results not only in a reduction in FDI inflows but 
is also contingent on the origin of the investor. For instance, corruption results in 
relatively lower FDI from countries that have signed the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(Cuervo-Cazurra 2006). This difference in the type of investor suggests that laws 
against bribery abroad can deter the engagement in corruption, by MNEs of signatory 
countries. On the other hand, corruption results in relatively higher FDI from countries 
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with significant levels of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008), thus 
suggesting, that investors who have been exposed to bribery in their home country may 
not be deterred from investing in countries where corruption is widespread.  
Considering the relatively low corruption distance (Duanmu 2011; Karhunen and 
Ledyaeva 2012) between China and most African countries, CMNEs might be more 
equipped in dealing with the high corruption levels in Africa than MNEs from 
developed economies (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). Corruption levels also affect 
firms transactions costs (Husted 1994). The soft budget constraints of Chinese 
SOMNEs in particular (Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti 2011) might act as a buffer for 
the high transactions costs in high corruption countries in Africa compared to firms 
without such preferential access to cheap capital. Thus, although a low dissimilarity 
between the levels of corruption in China and host countries in Africa can be an 
important factor, the role of government in providing cheap capital to CMNEs mean 
CMNEs can cope much better with the associated risks of high transactions costs in 
countries with high levels of corruption in Africa.  
Another area of focus in the literature has been on the multiple external environments 
of the MNE that exert opposing institutional pressures on the MNE (Kostova, Roth & 
Dacin 2008) and various levels of subsidiary interdependence and independence 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal 1999).  
Handling the different institutional pressures exerted on the MNE is contingent on the 
degree of institutional distance between the home-country of the MNE and the various 
host-countries in which it operates (Salomon & Wu 2012; Eden & Miller 2004; Xu & 
Shenkar 2002). Institutional distance is the dissimilarity between the institutional 
environment of the home country of the MNE and that of its host-country (Xu & 
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Shenkar 2002; Ghemawat 2001). Institutional distance comprises of three dimensions 
of institutions ± regulative, normative and cognitive institutions otherwise known as 
WKH³WKUHHSLOODUVRILQVWLWXWLRQV´Scott 1995,  p.51). The regulative institutional pillar 
constitutes the regulative aspects of institutions, such as the setting of highly 
formalised rules, and enforcement mechanisms that organisations must adhere to 
(Scott 1995).  
The normative institutional pillar reflects the values and norms of human and 
organisational behaviour in a country. %\ YDOXHV ZH PHDQ ³FRQFHSWLRQV RI the 
preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of standards to which existing 
VWUXFWXUHVRUEHKDYLRXU FDQEHFRPSDUHGDQGDVVHVVHG´ (Scott 1995,  p.54). Norms 
VSHFLI\³KRZWKLQJVVKRXOGbe done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued 
HQGV´ (Scott 1995,  p.55). The cognitive institutional pillar reflects widely shared 
social conceptions that influence the way a phenomenon is seen and interpreted by 
people in a given country (Kostova & Roth 2002).  
In IB research, institutional distance has been utilised in the study of different aspects 
of MNE activities ± their choice of FDI location (Liou et al. 2016), their entry and 
ownership strategy (Moore et al. 2015; Gaur and Lu 2007), transfer of organisational 
practices (Kostova 1999) and firm performance (Shirodkar and Konara 2017).   
Scholars have examined the effect of institutional distance on the transfer of 
organisational practices from the parent company of the MNE to its foreign 
subsidiaries. For example, Kostova & Roth (2002) suggest that the degree of 
institutional distance between home and host countries does influence the adoption of 
organisational practices from the parent company. They argue that although the 
institutional distance between the home and host country influences the transfer of 
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organisational practices, the values of the recipient subsidiary and the relationship 
between the subsidiary and the parent company influence the transfer of organisational 
practices (Kostova 1999).   
Kostova & Roth (2002) examine how sixty subsidiaries of a privately-owned US MNE 
DGRSW RUJDQLVDWLRQDO SUDFWLFHV XQGHU FRQGLWLRQV RI µLQVWLWXWLRQDO GXDOLW\¶ ± the 
institutional distance and the relationship between the subsidiary and the parent 
company. The authors suggest that external institutional pressures of host countries 
have a significant impact on the degree of internalisation of organisational practices 
by subsidiaries. Conceptually, the authors argue that the larger the institutional 
distance between the home and host countries of the MNE, the higher the institutional 
pressure from the institutional environment of host countries, which consequently 
affects the degree of internalisation of practices transferred from the parent company 
(Kostova & Roth 2002). The primary focus of both Kostova & Roth (2002) and 
Kostova (1999), is the impact of institutional distance on the internal environment of 
the MNE. However, there is a lack of an explanation of how institutional distance 
influences the external environment of the MNE.    
Other studies focus on the effects of institutional distance on the entry and ownership 
strategies of MNE in foreign markets. For instance, Eden & Miller, (2004) examine 
how institutional distance impacts the ownership strategies of MNEs from developed 
economies. They suggest that institutional distance between the home and host 
countries of the MNE determines the degree liability of foreignness (LOF) faced by 
MNEs. According to Eden & Miller (2004), this LOF is as a result of mainly one 
dimension of the institutional environment ± the normative domain. Zaheer (1995) 
examine the exit patterns of twenty-four foreign exchange trading rooms of the MNEs 
from US and Japan and suggest that MNEs could reduce their LOF caused by 
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institutional distance by either importing firm-specific advantages from their parent 
company or by mimicking the organisational practices of local firms. However, this 
study finds that importing firm-specific advantages are preferable to local 
isomorphism in helping to overcome the LOF and compete against local firms.  
Building upon the work of Zaheer (1995), Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) examine 
the exit pattern behaviour of all currency trading rooms worldwide over a twenty year 
period. The authors find that exit patterns for MNEs were similar to those for domestic 
firms during the first two years and after sixteen years of entry. In-between the first 
two years and after sixteen years, MNE exit rates were higher suggesting the existence 
of LOF exists. However, exit rates decline with host country experience and eventually 
disappears. The above studies examine the impact of institutional distance in a 
particular industry (the finance industry) and on MNEs from developed economies 
only. Thus, more studies are needed to examine how institutional distance influences 
the location of decisions of EMNEs.   
Xu & Shenkar (2002) decompose institutional distance into its three domains ± 
regulative, normative and cognitive distances to examine how each domain impacts 
the ownership strategy of MNEs. The authors provide a conceptual argument that 
MNEs will choose low ownership control when there is a large regulative and 
normative institutional distance and high control when the regulative and normative 
distance is small. This notion is based on the difficulties that MNEs face in conforming 
to the host-country institutional environment when confronted with a large home-host 
country institutional distance. Hernández & Nieto (2015) also examine the effect of 
regulative institutional distance on the choice of international entry mode of European 
firms and find that entry into countries with lower levels of regulative institutional 
development than the home-country of the MNE is related to modes of entry that 
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require a lower resource commitment. On the other hand, entry into countries with 
higher levels of regulative institutional development to the home country is related to 
entry modes with higher resource commitments. Both studies are performed on a 
sample of developed economies and do not examine the effects of institutional distance 
on MNE from developing economies.  
However, Liou et al. (2016) find that when faced with a large regulative institutional 
distance MNEs from EMs choose a dominant ownership control while in conditions 
of a large normative institutional distance, these firms prefer a low ownership position 
as such a position alleviate threats to organisational legitimacy. Such a difference 
between regulative and normative institutional differences is due to the desire by 
MNEs from EMs to take advantage of the governance efficiency in countries with 
better developed regulative institutions Luo & Tung (2007).  
A few studies focus on the effect of institutional distance on the FDI location choices 
of MNEs. For example, using inward and outward FDI data on OECD countries,  
Cezar & Escobar (2015) examine the link between institutional distance and FDI. They 
find that a large institutional distance will not only reduce the likelihood that a firm 
will engage in FDI but also the volume of the investment carried out. However, 
Aleksynska & Havrylchyk (2013) find that when choosing to invest in countries with 
worse institutional quality than their home-country, a large institutional distance 
discourages FDI inflows by EMNEs, but the availability of natural resources in the 
host country outweighs the deterring effect of institutional distance. Adopting an 
industry-level perspective, Pogrebnyakov & Maitland (2011) find a positive 
relationship between higher normative distance and the FDI location decision of 
predominantly European mobile operators and a negative relationship between 
cognitive distance and their FDI location decision.      
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Overall, we summarise the findings regarding the literature on the effect of 
institutional quality on FDI flows as follows. Firstly, the vast majority of the above 
studies suggest that however measured, high institutional quality attracts FDI. 
However, there are rare studies that find the opposite effect of institutional quality on 
FDI. In the case of FDI into developing countries, there have been suggestions of an 
µ$IULFDHIIHFW¶(Asiedu 2002; Jaspersen, Aylward and Knox 2000) ± suggesting that 
African countries might be different regarding the effect of political risk on inward 
FDI. For example, Asiedu (2002) focus on the impact of political risk on FDI into 
developing countries and find that in the case of FDI into Africa, there is no significant 
relationship between political risk and FDI. Similarly, Kolstad & Wiig (2011) find no 
difference between Chinese investors and other investors in Africa ± suggesting that 
all investors into the continent are attracted to the low institutional quality of the 
continent for exploitative purposes. These studies show that the evidence of a positive 
link between institutions and FDI flows is not homogenous. Thus, more investigation 
is needed especially in cases when FDI is attracted to countries with low institutional 
quality. This is conducted in this study by investigating whether &KLQD¶V2)',LQWR
Africa is deterred by low institutional quality or attracted to weak institutions in 
African countries.     
The above difference in results may be due to the use of single institutional indicators 
like corruption, democracy and the rule of law to capture the level of institutional 
quality. The use of single indicators in the literature leads us to our second finding of 
the literature on institutional quality and FDI flows, that of measurement. It has been 
suggested that the location decision of MNEs are contingent on a combination of 
several institutional factors and not just the presence or absence of a single institutional 
factor ± as corruption or democracy (Pajunen 2008). MNEs are more likely to base 
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their investment decisions on the overall institutional quality of the host-country (Ali 
et al. 2010).  
As depicted in the above literature on the NIEs approach to IB, several institutional 
indicators have been suggested to affect FDI flows such as democracy, corruption, 
political risk and law and order. 7KXV WKH XVH RI µWKH DYHUDJH RI WKH QXPEHU RI
DVVDVVLQDWLRQV DQG UHYROXWLRQV¶ E\ Asiedu (2002) and the µUXOH RI ODZ¶ LQGH[ E\
Kolstad & Wiig (2011) as a proxy for institutional quality is likely to underestimate 
the effect of institutional quality on FDI. This limitation is due to the multifaceted 
nature of institutions that encompasses overlapping political and economic 
institutions. Thus, as investment decisions are usually based on a comprehensive 
assessment of a combination of a multitude of facets of the institutional environment 
rather than on a single one (Pajunen 2008), a comprehensive measure to capture the 
effect of institutional quality appears to be appropriate as a measure of institutional 
quality. For instance, Angola ranks as one of the top destination countries for FDI in 
Sub-Saharan Africa due to its vast oil reserves but also politically unstable. Thus the 
use of a political risk indicator as a measure of institutional quality would be 
inappropriate as the oil investments might provide sufficient returns on investment to 
compensate for the risk (Asiedu 2002).         
Thirdly, the majority of studies account for mostly investments from developed 
economies into developing economies (e.g. Disdier & Mayer 2004; Globerman & 
Shapiro 2002; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; Bevan & Estrin 2004) with very few studies 
on FDI from developing into other developing economies (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra 2006). 
The growth in interest in the institution-based view of IB activities coincides with the 
rise of OFDI from key EMs (Peng, Wang and Jiang 2008; Wu and Chen 2014), thus 
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providing an interesting research context, in which to assess the explanatory power of 
NIEs approach to IB (Meyer & Peng, 2005).  
The impact of institutional quality might differ between DCMNEs and EMNEs. 
EMNEs operate in conditions of low institutional quality, while DCMNEs operate in 
conditions of high institutional quality (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008). As a 
consequence, investments in countries with low institutional quality such as African 
countries may result in high levels of unfamiliarity to DCMNEs than EMNEs. For 
example, Yeung & Liu (2008) and Morck et al. (2008)  suggest that when investing in 
developing economies, CMNEs may benefit from their experience in operating under 
relatively low institutional quality compared to DCMNEs. Thus, there is also the need 
to investigate the impact of institutional distance that can capture the impact of the 
above relative distance in institutional quality between the home country and host 
country of the firm.  
Overall, the literature focusing on the impact of institutional distance highlights a 
number of findings. Firstly, the notion that institutional distance matters to MNEs is 
well established in the literature as FDI activities decline with higher institutional 
distance. Secondly, the majority of studies (e.g. Kostova & Roth 2002; Eden & Miller 
2004; Zaheer 1995; Hernández & Nieto 2015; Cezar & Escobar 2015) focus on the 
impact of institutional distance on the FDI activities of DCMNEs with limited attention 
given to EMNEs. Thus, there is a growing need to investigate the effect of institutional 
distance of the locations decisions of EMNEs, mainly how the dissimilarity in 
institutional quality between the home and host country influences the location 
decision of EMNEs.   
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The above evidence in the literature that DCMNEs are not only discouraged by low 
institutional quality but also prefer to invest in countries with similar institutions have 
implications for EMNEs. The results for developed economies imply that EMNEs may 
possess an advantage when investing in other developing economies due to relative 
similarities in institutional quality. In this study, we employ the notion of institutional 
distance (regarding institutional quality) on the location choice of CMNEs in Africa 
from a cost economising perspective because the cost-economising perspective of 
NIEs forms the theoretical approach that underpins this study.     
,Q WKH FDVH RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD &KLQHVH ILUPV EDFNHG E\ WKH &KLQHVH
government will not only possess an advantage over their counterparts from developed 
economies but may view the weak institutional environment as an opportunity. Taking 
into account, on the one hand, the differences in how institutional quality matters to 
DCMNEs and EMNEs, and on the other hand the relative focus in the literature on 
DCMNEs, there is a need for more studies on the determinants of OFDI from 
developing economies into other developing economies. This study contributes to the 
literature on South-South FDI by investigating the institutional determinants of 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
Furthermore, the majority of SOMNEs are from EMs such as China and Russia 
(Bruton, Peng and Ahlstrom 2015). In the case of China, SOMNEs often benefit from 
strong political backing from the Chinese government that can be leveraged to reduce 
the risk of expropriation in countries with high political risk (Duanmu 2014). Also, 
scholars suggest that Chinese SOMNEs in particular often enjoy subsidised financial 
resources (Buckley et al. 2007; Child and Rodrigues 2005; Luo, Xue and Han 2010) 
that can compensate for the risk of high transactions costs when operating in countries 
with low institutional quality. As such, the high levels of government involvement in 
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the activities of EMNEs like China depicts a PE dimension that requires attention 
(Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Luo, Xue and Han 2010). We discuss this PE perspective later. 
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3.5.2. The Limitations of the NIEs Approach to IB  
This approach does not assume circumstances whereby MNEs may perceive the 
economic profits or the strategic objective of an investment to be relatively higher than 
any potential transactions costs that could be incurred in investing in a country with 
very low institutional quality. Also, as a result of very low institutional quality, there 
might be not much competition in a particular industry or sector, thus further justifying 
foreign investments in countries with low institutional quality. We argue that the 
JURZWK LQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQ $IULFD LQ UHFHQW \HDUV GHSLFWV DQ RSSRVLWH WUHQG WR WKH
predictions of the NIEs approach to MNE activity. Despite the low institutional quality 
RI WKH HQYLURQPHQW RI PRVW $IULFDQ FRXQWULHV &KLQD¶V 2)', LQ WKH FRQWLQHQW KDV
grown significantly in recent years with China now being the leading investor in 
greenfield investments in Africa ± regarding capital expenditure (Klasa-Adrienne 
2017) 
We arguHWKDWQRWRQO\LVWKHLQFUHDVHLQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWKHUHJLRQSDUWRIDEURDGHU
economic and political strategy by the Chinese state but also that the weak and 
undeveloped institutions in these countries present an opportunity, rather than a 
deterrent to Chinese investments. Institutional disadvantages in China can become an 
advantage for CMNEs when investing in African countries with weak institutions due 
to their experience of operating under such institutional conditions back home 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc 2008).  
We take this argument further by saying that not only are the institutional constraints 
in China an advantage to Chinese firms investing in African countries, the location 
disadvantages ± regarding institutional quality in African countries are now an 
µDGYDQWDJH¶ZKHQSXWLQWRFRQWH[WZLWK&KLQHVH2)',LQWRWKHUHJLRQAlso, in the case 
of Chinese OFDI into Africa, we argue that although institutions matter, how they 
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matter differs from the NIEs orthodoxy. This difference rests on our argument that, 
low institutional quality in African countries are seen as an opportunity to exploit the 
weak institutional environment. Exploratory research in the mining sector in Zambia 
has shown that Chinese investments in the mining sector have an adverse effect on the 
regulatory settings governing mining in Zambia (Haglund 2008).  
7KHKLJKOHYHOVRIJRYHUQPHQWLQIOXHQFHLQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDDVLPSOLHGLQWKH
dominance of Chinese SOMNEs, the provision of loans that are closely integrated with 
FDI (Chapter 2) suggest an important UROH RI WKH 3( SHUVSHFWLYH RI &KLQD¶V
engagement with FDI. We review existing research on the role of PE in the explanation 
RIWKH)',DFWLYLWLHVLQJHQHUDODQGWKH3(SHUVSHFWLYHRI&KLQD¶V2)'I into Africa in 
the following section.    
3.6. ChinD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD$3(3erspective   
Governments can be interested in the investment outcomes of the activities of MNEs, 
thereby influencing the patterns of FDI activities of MNEs (Dunning & Lundan 2008). 
In the IB literature, there have been calls (Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Luo et al. 2010) for 
a cross-fertilisation of insights between the fields of PE and IB in explaining the 
internationalisation patterns of firms from EMs like China. At the centre of this PE 
perspective, is the significant role of the Chinese government in influencing the 
internationalisation activities of CMNEs (Luo, Xue and Han 2010). Based on the 
peculiarities of &KLQD¶V OFDI into Africa (explained in Chapter 2), we believe the need 
for a PE approach is crucial in explaining the phenomenon. Thus, in combination with 
our assessment and above calls for a PE approach, we examine the literature on the PE 




requires borrowing insights from PE through a cross-fertilisation of insights between 
extant IB perspectives, and the PE perspective. IQ&KLQDWKHµVWDWH-FDSLWDOG\QDPLFV¶
is such that the ties between the government and large CMNEs are strong (Mohan & 
Power 2008) ± through the ownership and support of Chinese SOMNEs and the 
bundling of aid and FDI. Thus, in this section, we review studies on Chinese OFDI 
into Africa that adopt a PE perspective. The key perspectives highlighted in the 
literature are ± WKH µ2QH&KLQD¶SROLF\ WKH FKDOOHQJH WR86JOREDOKHJHPRQ\ DQG
lastly the strategic bundling of aid and FDI.  
Extant studies adopting an IB perspective (Kolstad & Wiig 2011; Drogendijk & 
Blomkvist 2013; Cheung et al. 2012; Biggeri & Sanfilippo 2009) examine the 
GHWHUPLQDQWV RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD consider &KLQD¶V UHODtionship with the 
African continent based purely on commerce. They highlight the quest to secure 
HQHUJ\DQGRWKHUQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVDWWKHIRUHIURQWRI%HLMLQJ¶Vre-engagement with 
the continent (Cheung et al. 2012; Kolstad and Wiig 2011; Jiang 2009; Haglund 2008). 
Though this analysis captures a critical dimension of this new phenomenon, it would 
be inaccurate to view Chinese OFDI into Africa from a purely economic dimension 
because such an approach does not offer a comprehensive understanding (Konings 
2007; Alden 2005).  Such an approach ignores a critical GLPHQVLRQRI&KLQD¶V2FDI, 
WKH3(GLPHQVLRQZKHUHE\WKHGHFLVLRQE\WKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWWRµ*R*OREDO¶LQ
itself subsumes a political and geopolitical dimension based on appeals to issues of 
national security and national interests (Luo, Xue & Han, 2010).  
3.67KHµ2QH&KLQD¶Policy and The Challenge to US Global Hegemony     
6FKRODUVVXJJHVWWKDWWKHµ2QH&KLQD¶SROLF\LVDPDMRUSROLWLFDOGULYHURIFXUUHQW6LQR-
African relations (Pannell 2008; Alden, 2005; Konings 2007)7KHµ2QH&KLQD¶SROLF\ 
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in Sino-African relations can be traced as far back as the post-war period (Wei 1982). 
The bedrock of this policy is the isolation of Taiwan in multilateral settings, and 
eventual reunification with the Chinese mainland by seeking political, and diplomatic 
support from African countries (Chapter 2, section 2.2.1).  
Alden (2005) VXJJHVWVWKDWWKURXJKWKHXVHRIµV\PEROLFGLSORPDF\¶± the promotion 
of national representation abroad, through infrastructure investments like the 
construction of large projects of prestige such as houses of parliament, and stadiums, 
China has strengthened its diplomatic support in African countries. Such prestige 
projects highlight circumstances whereby political objectives play an important role in 
carrying out FDI (Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris 2007). Although this policy is 
still relevant in contemporary engagement between China and Africa, it is worth 
mentioning that it was perhaps even more salient during the Cold War era when China 
battled for diplomatic recognition with Taiwan on the world stage.  
During the aftermath of the Cold War, the US emerged as the undisputed global 
hegemon, and this resulted in a shift in policy on the part of China towards a challenge 
to the new status quo wherever possible. Africa at this stage represented not only the 
SRWHQWLDOIRUDµWKLUGZRUOG¶alliance but also a source for natural resources and market 
for a newly reformed and growing Chinese economy (Cornelissen and Taylor 2000). 
It is suggested that the Chinese government uses concessional loans for so-called 
prestige FDI projects in African countries as a means of strengthening its diplomatic 
relations with African countries and on condition that recipient countries respect the 
µ2QHChina¶SROLF\(Alden 2005; Alden and Davies 2006). Thus, such an approach 
may suggest that FDI projects may be carried out by large Chinese SOMNEs with 
clear directions from the Chinese government whose motivation is to accomplish 
political and diplomatic goals rather than for strictly economic purposes.  
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Other scholars (Mohan & Power 2008; Mohan 2013; Muekalia 2004; Campbell 2008; 
Carmody & Owusu 2007; Konings 2007) DSSURDFK &KLQD¶V UHQHZHG HFRQRPLF
engagement with Africa from a geopolitical perspective. For example, Konings (2007) 
H[DPLQHWKHUHDVRQVIRU&KLQD¶VUHQHZHGVWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVKLSZLWK$IULFDLQDQHUDRI
neo-liberal globalisation. The author argues that China sees Africa as a partner in the 
fulfilment of its strategic goals like the quest for resources, access to new markets, and 
investment opportunities (Konings 2007). Furthermore, China is also interested in 
forging a political alliance with African countries. Such an alliance is to combat 
perceived western hegemony in international organisations like the UN, where China 
can increase its bargaining power at the Security Council by positioning itself as the 
head of the alliance of developing countries (Large 2008).  
Muekalia (2004) and Mawdsley (2007) adopt a historical approach, by examining the 
KLVWRULFDO UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ &KLQD DQG $IULFD WR XQGHUVWDQG &KLQD¶V UHQHZHG
strategic engagement with Africa. The authors argue that the current relationship 
eSLWRPLVHV&KLQD¶VGHVLUHWRVHHNGLSORPDWLFVXSSRUWDQGWRIRUJHDVWUDWHJLFDOOLDQFH
with Africa to fulfil not only strategic but its geopolitical interest. Other scholars 
(Campbell 2008; Carmody & Owusu 2007) argue that this strategic alliance with 
Africa is due to the need to combat US global hegemony and the inequalities of global 
governance. According to Carmody & Owusu (2007), although China needs to satisfy 
the growing demands of its high levels economic growth witnessed in the past decade, 
it also needs to seek diplomatic allies as it integrates internationally both politically 
and economically.  
However, there are criticisms of this notion of a geopolitical struggle and even a new 
µVFUDPEOH¶IRU$IULFDEHWZHHQWKH86DQG&KLQD(Ayers 2013). For instance, Frynas 




oil. The authors argue that although there is evidence of a greater political and 
commercial involvement of the US and China in Africa, this struggle is somewhat 
exaggerated as there exist several other actors at play such as other EMs like Brazil, 
and India (Frynas and Paulo 2006). The need to combat US global hegemony by 
IRUPLQJDVWUDWHJLFDOOLDQFHZLWKµWKLUGZRUOG¶FRXQWULHVUHPDLQVDQLPSRUWDQWSROLF\
to date. In a bid to appear as an alternative partner to African countries, China has 
leveraged its long-standing foreign policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of African countries in its current relationship with African countries advocating an 
alternative development paradigm ± the Beijing Consensus. Therefore it is important 
WKDW DQ\ DQDO\VLVRI&KLQD¶V2)', LQWR$IULFDQHHG WR WDNH LQWR DFFRXQt the PE of 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDDVSROLWLFDOREMHFWLYHVDQGQRWRQO\HFRQRPLFREMHFWLYHVDUH
at play in the FDI motivations of Chinese SOMNEs.  
3.6.2. The Strategic Bundling of FDI and Aid  
Some scholars (e.g. Sautman & Hairong, 2007; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2009; Mohan, 
2013) highlight the PE of Chinese investments into Africa by examining the unique 
integration of FDI and Aid. Mohan (2013) adopts a critical political economy approach 
to evaluate the pervasive notion that the Chinese work in enclaved investments to 
secure the resources of African countries. Through an ethnographic study of Chinese 
investments in Ghana, Nigeria, and Angola, the author argues that the Chinese do not 
appear to be any different from other investors. However, where the Chinese do differ 
is in their bundling of FDI with aid. Kaplinsky & Morris (2009) adopt a sectoral 
approach by highlighting this distinctive aspect of Chinese OFDI by focusing on the 
investments of large Chinese SOMNEs in the resources, and infrastructure sectors. 
The authors argue that Chinese aid has complemented FDI flows in these sectors. 
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Thus, the close integration of FDI and aid indicates that the Chinese government as 
the provider of aid to African countries may be highly influential in investment 
motivations of Chinese firms that invest in projects that are closely integrated with aid. 
This influence may also result in investments being carried out for political and 
strategic objectives, thereby rendering the strictly cost economising approach of NIEs 
invalid in explaining the location decision of CMNEs in Africa.     
Pehnelt (2007) DUJXHVWKDW&KLQDXVHVµWLHG¶DLGLQWKHIRUPRIFRQFHVVLRQDOORDQVWR
achieve both political, and economic goals. Mohan & Power (2008) argues that this 
method of giving aid is distinctive, in that it is given as a grant rather than a moralising 
political discourse, like that of Western donors. A comparative perspective of Chinese 
and Indian aid in Africa by McCormick (2008) provides empirical evidence and sheds 
light on the nature of Chinese aid in Africa. The author finds differing patterns of 
Chinese and Indian aid. India concentrates on non-monetary aid like technical 
assistance and scholarships while China offers a wider range of both monetary and 
non-monetary aid packages that include infrastructural loans, tied to the use of Chinese 
JRRGV DQG VHUYLFHV DQG UHVSHFW IRU WKH µ2QH &KLQD¶ SROLF\ (McCormick 2008). 
However, these loans are not based upon any conditionality on good governance and 
institutional development that typifies the characteristics of Western donors and 
international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. This non-conditionality 
approach to loans by the Chinese government has led to the flow of Chinese 
investments into African countries with relatively weaker institutions such as the case 
in the Sudan and Angola (Patey 2007; Corkin 2011). Thus, there is a need to account 
for the PE perspective when examining the pheQRPHQRQRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
Sautman & Hairong (2007) examine factors that make Chinese investments in Africa 
distinctive. The authors argue that the provision of aid without no conditions on issues 
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such as democratic reforms, human rights improvement, and economic reforms 
represents an alternative development paradigm. By advocating non-interference in 
what it regards as the internal affairs of African countries, China is consolidating its 
economic and political position in Africa. &KLQD¶V µQR VWULQJV DWWDFKHG¶ DSSURDFK
(Pehnelt 2007) WRGHYHORSPHQWDVVLVWDQFHLVLQFRQWUDVWWRWKHµFRQGLWLRQDOLW\DSSURDFK¶
to development assistance based on the general propositions of the Washington 
Consensus (Williamson 2000).  
Western conditions for the provision of loans include the demands on issues like the 
improvement of domestic institutional capacity, trade policy reforms and fiscal probity 
(Rodrik 2006; Ancharaz 2003). The non-conditionality approach of the Chinese 
government suggests that CMNEs may possess a competitive political advantage in 
Africa due to the willingness of their government to do business in any African country 
irrespective of domestic institutional capacity. Kragelund (2009) takes a somewhat 
paradoxical view of these neo-liberal policies of the Washington Consensus regarding 
Chinese FDI in Africa. The author argues that the adoption by African countries of 
liberal investments policies imposed by Western donors in the past is now playing a 
significant role in the advancement of CMNEs in the African continent, considering 
that these policies ensured the opening up of these African economies to foreign 
investment.  
Holslag (2011) evaluates the validity of this non-interference and non-conditionality 
approach by examining how China copes with political instability in Africa, through a 
case study of five coups which occurred between 2003 and 2010 in the Central African 
Republic (CAR), Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, and Niger. The author concludes 
that however destabilising LOOHJLWLPDWHUHJLPHFKDQJHVDUHIRU$IULFD&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQ
policy of non-conditionality and non-interference in the domestic affairs of African 
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countries has not changed. According to the author, China did not perceive the coups 
as a significant risk to its investments but acknowledge political instability as part of 
doing business in Africa by adapting to political realities (Holslag 2011). Considering 
the majority of Chinese firms that invest in Africa are SOMNEs (Chapter 2, section 
2.5.1), the likelihood of political backing from the Chinese government in cases of risk 
of expropriation is high (Duanmu 2014).  
This approach is in contrast with other perspectives on the intervention in Africa by 
Western countries ± notably France (Luckham 2007; Utley 2002). For instance, 
Luckham (2007)H[SORUHVWKHUDWLRQDOHIRU)UDQFH¶VPLOLWDULVPLQ$IULFDDQGDUJXHV
that French forces have been involved in Africa far more than any other outside power. 
Moreover, the explanations of this intervention range from the need to preserve French 
investments in the continent, to cementing alliances with particular ruling classes and 
regimes in African countries, by quelling any potential threat to stability. The non-
interventionist approach of China and the absence of any colonial relationship between 
China and Africa provides China with political capital that can be leveraged to acquire 
and establish legitimacy for CMNEs in Africa as they may be perceived positively by 
African governments and by local citizens.    
A comparative perspective is presented by Cornelissen & Taylor (2000) after 
H[DPLQLQJ WKH 3( RI &KLQD DQG -DSDQ¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK $IULFD 7KLV SHUVSHFWLYH
argues that through the Japanese official development assistance (ODA) charter, 
Japanese developmental aid to the continent is implemented based on principles such 
as the promotion of democracy, and the introduction of a market-oriented economy 
(Lehman 2005) &KLQD¶V DSSURDFK RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG is not based on the 
implementation of any of the principles above. This depicts a dichotomy in the 
approaches to development by China and Japan in Africa. This non-interference 
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approach to aid by the Chinese government may augment the competitiveness of large 
Chinese SOMNEs in African countries with relatively weaker institutions (Taylor 
2006).                
CMNEs are regarded as relative latecomers as investors in Africa (Alden and Davies 
2006). Large MNEs from European countries that possessed colonies in the continent 
are engaged in almost every strategic sector in the continent. Thus, CMNEs as 
µlatecomers¶PXVW LQYHVW LQFRXQWULHVZKHUH:HVWHUQ01(VKDYHbeen barred from 
investing for moral reasons or considered too risky (Tull, 2006). Thus CMNEs face a 
higher opportunity cost of morality and governance oriented policies (Pehnelt, 2007) 
as they cannot avoid investing in a country based on issues of governance due to the 
longstanding presence of Western MNEs in most African countries ± particularly in 
the extractive sector.  
Alden & Davies (2006) argue that the non-conditionality on aid, and thus non-
interference in the domestic affairs of host countries, and the political support for 
Chinese SOMNEs provides them with a compeWLWLYH µSROLWLFDO DGYDQWDJH¶6XFKDQ
advantage stems from their willingness to invest in any country, irrespective of host 
country institutional quality. Considering Western MNEs in Africa have been able to 
benefit from a generation of connections with African countries dating as far back as 
the colonial era, CMNEs, are left with no option but to devise other strategies to be 
competitive in the region. Therefore, the role of the Chinese government is imperative 
in creating good political relations such as through the use of aid with no preconditions 
to open up investment opportunities for CMNEs especially in African countries with 
relatively weaker institutions. This role of the Chinese government makes the PE 
perspective important for our complete understaQGLQJRIWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V
OFDI into Africa.  
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We believe that insights from the PE literature can enrich our understanding of Chinese 
OFDI into Africa by providing a more comprehensive explanation of the investment 
behaviour of CMNEs as regards the effects of institutions. By advocating non-
interference and with political support from the Chinese government, Chinese 
SOMNEs, in particular, can invest in countries with the lowest institutional quality in 
Africa making them less risk-averse than DCMNEs.  
In the following section, we review studies on the determinants of FDI by SOMNEs 
in particular to highlight some of the peculiarities of investments carried out by firms 
under this type of firm ownership.  
3.7. The Determinants of FDI by SOMNEs  
Research on the globalisation of SOMNEs is still limited in the IB field despite the 
scale of their global expansion (Bruton et al. 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra 2014 ). The 
majority of CMNEs are SOMNEs, and they also comprise the highest number of 
SOMNEs worldwide (Bruton, Peng and Ahlstrom 2015). Consequently, in this 
section, we review current studies on SOEs in general to highlight some of the specific 
attributes of FDI by SOMNEs. We uncover the different perspectives on the 
characteristics of FDI by SOMNEs crucial to our topic considering the high number 
of SOMNEs in China.  
The literature on SOEs highlights the political connection of SOMNEs and its impact 
on FDI. Studies that focus on this perspective focus on the political and non-economic 
objectives of SOMNEs (Bass and Chakrabarty 2014; Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Rudy, 
Miller and Wang 2016; Shi, Hoskisson and Zhang 2016), the home government 
political support of SOMNEs (Duanmu 2014), the effect of political connection on 
firm performance (Okhmatovskiy 2010), and the effect of political connection on the 
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degree of globalisation of SOMNEs (Liang, Ren and Sun 2014; Hung, Wong and 
Zhang 2012; Benito, Rygh and Lunnan 2016; Pan et al. 2014; Wei, Clegg and Ma 
2015; Estrin et al. 2016; Zhou 2018). 
Okhmatovskiy (2010) examine the performance implications of direct corporate board 
and ownership ties of state-owned banks to the Russian government. This study 
compares the implications of the direct board, and ownership ties to the government 
with the implications of board, and ownership ties to SOEs. The author finds that direct 
ties to SOEs are associated with higher profitability while firms with direct ties to the 
government are significantly less profitable (Okhmatovskiy 2010). The argument 
behind this difference in profitability is that, firms with direct ties to the government 
experience significant government involvement in their corporate governance process.  
On the other hand, firms with ties to SOEs benefit from state-owned resources, but 
escape the associated costs with direct government involvement in the corporate 
governance of the firm ± and influencing strategic decisions of the firm. Thus, 
according to Okhmatovskiy (2010), firms can preserve their autonomy by distancing 
themselves from the government and instead maintain indirect ties to the government 
through SOEs with direct ownership, and board ties to the government. However, there 
is an issue with generalisability of this argument as research has shown that in other 
EMs like China, politically connected SOMNEs usually have a chairman or CEO who 
is a former government bureaucrat (Hung et al. 2012) who is highly likely to follow a 
political agenda. 
Liang et al. (2014) and Hung et al. (2012) examine the effect of political connections 
on the globalisation of SOMNEs. Liang et al. (2014) adopt a state control perspective 
in their analysis of government control mechanisms influencing the globalisation of 
78 
 
SOMNEs in China. The authors suggest that state ownership control and the political 
connections of SOE executives influence the globalisation decisions of SOMNEs and 
the degree of globalisation. Both state ownership control and the political connections 
RI H[HFXWLYHV DUH FRQWLQJHQW XSRQ WKH KRPH FRXQWU\¶V HYROYLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
environments (Hung, Wong and Zhang 2012). According to the authors, their 
influence on SOE globalisation differs between the periods before, and after domestic 
governance reform (Hung, Wong and Zhang 2012). For instance, according to the 
study, the influence of the political connections of SOE executives on the globalisation 
decisions of SOMNEs diminishes, after domestic governance reforms in China. 
Domestic governance reform in China resulted in SOE managers behaving more like 
professional executives due to the compatibility between market-oriented institutions 
of China, and international governance regimes brought about by domestic governance 
reform of SOEs.  
The focus of Liang et al. (2014) is exploring the mechanisms of state control that 
influence the globalisation of SOEs rather than an explanation of the recent dramatic 
growth in the internationalisation of SOMNEs, a critical yet under-investigated 
phenomenon (Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Rudy, Miller and Wang 2016). Thus there is a 
need for the separate investigation of the determinants of FDI by SOMNEs due to their 
connections with the government. This connection, therefore, requires a PE approach 
ZKHQH[DPLQLQJWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD± where the presence 
of Chinese SOMNEs is dominant.  
Also, focusing on the degree of globalisation of SOEs, rather than on the choices of 
location does not take into consideration the peculiar manner in which SOMNEs are 
affiliated with different levels of government as well as the degree of state ownership 
and control (Wang & Hong  2012). Both factors can influence the willingness and 
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ability of SOMNEs to internationalise differently regarding the level of overseas 
investment, investment type (market vs resources seeking) and its location (developed 
vs developing countries) (Wang & Hong 2012). Chapter 2 of this study shows that the 
main origin of Chinese OFDI into Africa is the Beijing Municipality. Chinese SOEs 
from the Beijing Municipality are known as central SOEs with a high level of state 
ownership and control (Luo, Xue and Han 2010). Such high degree of government 
ownership might indicate a high degree of government influence in the 
internationalisation strategies of central SOEs making the need for a PE approach 
FUXFLDOLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
Hung et al. (2012) investigate why Chinese SOEs with strong political connections are 
more likely to internationalise than non-politically connected firms. The authors find 
evidence that politically connected firms list their firms overseas for both private and 
political benefits. Furthermore, managers of politically connected SOEs are far more 
likely to receive political media coverage and promotion to a senior government 
position than domestic firms after listing overseas. Thus, the political connections of 
Chinese SOEs suggest a different internationalisation strategy based on political and 
strategic objectives due to their close affiliation with the Chinese government. The 
GRPLQDQFH RI &KLQHVH 6201(V LQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD QHFHVVLWDWHV the 
inclusion of a PE dimension to H[SODLQWKHSKHQRPHQRQRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD
fully.  
In line with the above political connections of SOEs, Pan et al. 2014 propose two 
moderating factors to the level of ownership of overseas subsidiaries of MNEs ± 
governments as owners of firms and the legislative connections of firms. They find 
that the level of subsidiary ownership was less affected by the heterogeneity of the 
institutional environments in host countries for firms with very high levels of 
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government ownership and legislative connections. However, Zhou (2018) suggests 
that the level of government ownership matters as the internationalisation strategy of 
hybrid SOEs ± with mixed government and private ownership adopt different 
internationalisation strategies. Notably, the authors suggest that SOEs with majority 
government ownership are more favourable to the governments FDI location decisions 
than SOEs with minority government ownership. In a similar approach, Benito Rygh 
and Lunnan (2016) examined a sample of listed Norwegian firms and suggests that 
majority state-owned enterprises benefit more from internationalisation than minority 
SOEs mainly due to government firm-specific advantages that they can use for their 
internationalisation process.  
Estrin et al. 2016 examine how home country institutions exerting normative 
regulatory and governance-related controls affect the levels of internationalisation of 
SOEs and POEs. Based on a sample of 153 majority state-owned and 153 wholly 
privately firms from 40 different countries, the authors find when home country 
institutions are strong, the internationalisation strategies of SOEs tend to be similar to 
that of POEs.   
Some studies focus on the political, and strategic objectives of SOEs (Cuervo-Cazurra  
2014; Bass & Chakrabarty  2014; Rudy, Miller and Wang 2016; Shi, Hoskisson and 
Zhang 2016). In their analysis of the FDI location decision of SOMNEs, Cuervo-
Cazurra (2014) argue for a cross-fertilisation of the IB and SOE literature by 
introducing two arguments: the extraterritoriality argument, and the non-business 
internationalisation argument. The extraterritoriality argument postulates that the two 
reasons for the existence of SOEs namely market imperfections, and ideology/political 
strategy, are only valid in domestic settings where the government owns the right to 
implement and maintain rules, and regulations in a bid to promote the welfare of its 
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citizens. According to Cuervo-Cazurra (2014), the investments by SOMNEs renders 
both objectives for the existence of SOEs invalid because such investments are carried 
out across borders which the home government, cannot pass laws which put into 
question the rationale that the government owns and control businesses to promote the 
welfare of its citizens. The ideological/political strategy rationale for the existence of 
SOEs also becomes questionable because FDI activities by SOMNEs add an 
extraterritorial dimension to the political ideology rationale, for the existence of SOEs 
as SOMNEs could become an indirect transporter of political ideology, or policy into 
the host economy. However, the authors argue that this is contingent on the size 
asymmetry, between the home, and host country, as governments of larger countries 
are far more likely to impose their political policies through their SOMNEs on 
governments of smaller countries.  
We believe the size asymmetry between the home and host government is evident in 
WKHFDVHRI&KLQD¶V2)', LQWR$IULFDDV&KLQDKDVD VWURQJHUEDUJDLQLQJSRZHU LQ
$IULFDGXHWRWKHVL]HRILWVHFRQRP\7KXVLQWKHFDVHRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWRAfrica, 
both the extraterritoriality argument and the non-business internationalisation 
argument holds making the drivers of OFDI by Chinese SOMNEs different and hence 
the need for a PE approach.  
The non-business internationalisation argument states that even though investments 
carried out by SOMNEs may be carried out with profitability objectives akin to those 
of POMNEs, in some instances SOEs may be encouraged by the home government to 
invest abroad to attain strategic objectives with very little consideration for firm 
profitability. According to Cuervo-Cazurra (2014), this gives rise to possible 
incompatibilities in objectives between the managers of SOEs on the one hand and 
politicians on the other hand ± thus complicating what constitutes success, and the 
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actions required to achieve it. Bass & Chakrabarty (2014) suggest that the strategic 
intent of governments as owners that may not necessarily have to do with economic 
profitability. The authors focus on the resource sector ± specifically the petroleum 
industry, by examining the intent of the acquisition of scarce resources by MNEs 
globally. They find that when compared to POMNEs, SOMNEs tend to acquire 
resources for exploration (search and discovery of valuable resources for long-term 
resource security), while POMNEs are more likely to acquire resources for 
exploitation (using resources of known value for relatively shorter-term resource 
security). This difference in resource acquisition intent between SOMNEs and 
POMNEs is because governments as owners of SOMNEs are most concerned with 
securing the future well-being of their country. Thus, ownership has a significant 
influence on resource acquisition. Thus, the institutional quality of African countries 
with significant reserves of natural resources may not matter to Chinese SOMNEs 
involved in resource exploration to satisfy the demands of their home country.  
Rudy, Miller and Wang (2016) adopt a strategic-asset seeking perspective. They 
reached a similar conclusion to Bass & Chakrabarty (2014) by suggesting that the 
unique motivations of SOEs mean that these type of firms are more likely to engage 
in FDI with the primary goal of acquiring specific resources and capabilities that can 
be exported back to their home country. Shi Hoskisson and Zhang (2016) adopt a 
geopolitical perspective by suggesting that geopolitical concerns are one of the key 
factors influencing the FDI location choice of SOEs mainly due to their direct political 
ties to the government. However, the authors argue that the geopolitical concerns of 
SOEs mean they may face strong opposition particularly in host countries with 
dissimilar religious belief and political regimes to that of the home country of the SOE.    
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Other empirical studies demonstrate that the institutional pressure on SOE managers 
to conform to the above non-economic objectives, and strategic intent of governments 
as owners are contingent upon the level of the firm's resource dependence on home 
government institutions (Cui & Jiang  2012), and levels of government ownership 
(Wang & Hong 2012). Cui & Jiang (2012) employ institutional theory to investigate 
WKHHIIHFWRIVWDWHRZQHUVKLSRQ&KLQHVHILUPV¶)',VWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQV7KHDXWKRUV
argue that state owQHUVKLS LQFUHDVHV WKH ILUP¶V GHSHQGHQFH RQ KRPH JRYHUQPHQW
institutions. As a result, state ownership strengthens the institutional influence of the 
KRPH JRYHUQPHQW RQ ILUPV¶ VWUDWHJLF FKRLFHV Wang & Hong (2012) further 
demonstrate that it is not only the level of affiliation with the government, but also the 
level of state ownership (e.g., state, provincial and city level) that impacts the degree 
of government involvement, and the internationalisation patterns of Chinese 
SOMNEs. The authors argue that these different levels of government involvement, 
have different objectives and exert different levels of institutional pressures on SOEs 
that influences their ability to internationalise differently (Wang and Hong 2012).  
Choudhury & Khanna (2014) examine the licensing of intellectual property rights (IP) 
of 42 Indian state-owned laboratories and empirically demonstrate that SOEs can 
break from the resource dependence, and establish resource independence from 
government institutions by becoming a multinational firm and generating global cash 
flows. The authors argue that the reason why SOEs might license IP to MNEs is mainly 
to seek resource independence from home government institutions by generating 
DOWHUQDWLYHJOREDOFDVK IORZV7KLV ILQGLQJ LV OLPLWHG WR ,QGLD¶VSXEOLF UHVHDUFKDQG
development (R&D) laboratories and fails to identify that SOEs do not only depend 
on their home government institutions for financial resources but also for political 
backing usually in host countries with high risk of expropriation (Duanmu 2014). The 
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investments by Chinese SOMNEs in African countries with a very high risk of 
expropriation suggest that these firms rely heavily on the support of the Chinese 
government (Patey 2007) and as a consequence of government support may take more 
risks when investing in Africa.  
Using Chinese firm-level greenfield investment data between 2003, and 2010, 
Duanmu (2014) focuses on the political backing of SOMNEs by their home country 
governments in circumstances of host country expropriation risk. The author suggests 
that SOMNEs may counter the risk of expropriation by leveraging the political 
influence of their home government. However, the author also finds evidence that the 
magnitude of the political influence of the home government is contingent upon the 
strength of political relations between the home, and host country and the degree of 
economic dependence of the host country to the home market. Also, political relations 
between the home country (China), and the host country acts as a moderating factor to 
DWWHQXDWH ILUPV¶ H[SRVXUH WR WKH ULVN RI H[SURSULDWLRQ 7KRXJK ERWK 6201(V DQG
POMNEs benefit from good political relations between the home and host country, 
SOMNEs benefit more (Li and Liang 2012).  
Duanmu (2014) uses state ownership as a proxy for political power. Though state 
ownership in itself is an essential indicator of the political involvement of SOMNEs 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau 2009), there exist other political strategies that may strengthen 
the competitiveness of SOMNEs in weak institutional environments. For instance, in 
the China African context, the provision of aid with no conditions has been used as a 
political strategy by the Chinese government (McCormick 2008; TanǦMullins 2010) ± 
DXJPHQWLQJ WKH FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV RI &KLQD¶V 6201(V LQ $IULFD HVSHFLDOO\ LQ KRVW
countries with the worst institutional environment and human rights records.   
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Considering all the evidence above and arguments on the political connections, and 
non-economic objectives of SOMNEs, some scholars argue that the connections of 
SOMNEs and the government expose them to additional institutional pressures from 
home, and host country governments (Li et al. 2014; Meyer et al. 2014). For example, 
Li et al. (2014) characterise SOMNEs from EMs as institutionally heterogeneous 
entities and conceptualise this heterogeneity as an outcome of multiple institutional 
reform processes like administrative decentralisation, market liberalisation and 
industrial restructuring in EMs. The authors propose that the restructuring of central 
government 62(VLQ(0VLQWRµQDWLRQDOFKDPSLRQV¶H[SRVHVWKHVHILUPVWRVWURQJer 
institutional pressure from home and host country governments (Li, Cui and Lu 2014). 
This additional institutional pressure is because these firms are seen as instruments of 
foreign policy for sustainable economic growth, and domestic industrial policies. From 
a host country perspective, Li et al. (2014) argue that this difference in FDI objectives 
of central SOEs triggers adverse reactions from host country governments, thus 
creating difficulties in establishing host country legitimacy. Thus, to counter this 
problem of legitimacy, the Chinese government as the owner of Chinese SOMNEs 
have used its political relations with African countries and the provision of aid with 
non-interference to secure the legitimacy of Chinese SOMNEs in African countries.     
This argument shares insights with Cuervo-Cazurra (2014)¶V H[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\
argument of SOEs as entities that transfer the political, and economic ideologies of 
their home governments. Thus, the national strategic prerogatives of central SOEs 
results in distrust by host country governments, thereby triggering host country 
legitimacy challenges (Li et al. 2014). Unlike central SOEs,  Li et al. (2014) argue that 
local government SOEs have fewer responsibilities to serve national strategic 
objectives of the home country, but rather primarily rent-seeking objectives to attain 
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the fiscal needs of local governments. Such differences in their FDI objectives is what 
Li et al. (2014) argue will elicit different responses from host governments when 
dealing with FDI activities from central, and local SOEs.  
Meyer et al. (2014) provide empirical support for the above arguments on distrust of 
SOEs by examining how Chinese SOMNEs adapt their foreign entry to the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOSUHVVXUHVDEURDG7KHDXWKRUVDUJXH WKDW WKHZHDN OHJLWLPDF\RI µVWDWH
RZQHUVKLS¶LQitself trigger stronger institutional pressures in some host countries due 
to issues like ideological conflicts, perceived threats to national security, and unfair 
advantage due to home government support. Backed up by empirical evidence from 
Chinese listed firms, the authors suggest that as a result of this stronger host country 
institutional pressures, SOMNEs mode of adaptation and control decisions to host 
country conditions are different from POMNEs (Meyer et al. 2014).  
According to Meyer et al. (2014), pressures for legitimacy are greater in host countries 
with high institutional and technological development. Firstly, technologically 
developed countries might be concerned about losing critical technological know-how 
to foreign governments, and secondly host countries with a strong rule of law that 
limits direct government interference in business, ideological incompatibilities are 
bound to arise when firms associated with foreign governments enter the host country 
market. For our study, this will imply Chinese SOMNEs investing in host African 
countries with low technological development and a weak rule of law, would face 
lower institutional pressure for organisational legitimacy. However, considering SOEs 
³PD\ XVH PHDQV RWKHU WKDQ WKHLU HQWU\ VWUDWHJ\ WR DGDSW WR RU FRSH ZLWK ORFDO
institutLRQDOSUHVVXUHV´(Meyer et al. 2014  p.1023), little is known about the different 




OFDI into Africa, the use of loans with no conditions on the development of domestic 
institutions might be viewed as means of achieving legitimacy for Chinese SOMNEs 
in Africa in the eyes of important legitimating actors, i.e. the host country government.  
A group of studies (Cull & Xu  2003; Song et al. 2011; Chen & Chen  2011) in the 
SOE literature focus on the soft budget constraints and foreign investments (Bai & 
Wang 1998) of SOMNEs. Soft budget constraints mean home governments of SOEs 
can bail out these firms in times of financial difficulties, thereby resulting in SOEs, 
taking more risk than their counterparts in the private sector (Cuervo-Cazurra  2014). 
Cull & Xu (2003) investigate the factors that determine the sources of finance for firm-
level investment for a sample of Chinese SOEs from 1980 to 1994. The authors find 
that compared to the government, private banks allocated credit to more profitable 
SOEs, and these loans were more likely to be allocated to SOEs adopting market-
oriented reforms that signalled good future performance. However, the authors also 
find that as the 1990s wore on bailout responsibilities increasingly shifted from the 
government to banks (Cull and Xu 2003). As a result, SOE profitability and reform as 
a prerequisite for the allocation of bank loans grew weaker.  
Song et al. (2011) find that due to financial market imperfections, more risk-oriented 
firms using more productive technologies are forced to finance their investments 
through internal savings. On the other hand, SOEs with lower productivity can survive 
because of their preferential access to the credit market. Due to their preferential access 
to cheap capital, Chinese SOMNEs might be more financially equipped to cope with 
higher transactions costs in African countries with low institutional quality than 
Chinese POMNEs. Chen & Chen (2011) examine the effects of audit quality on the 
cost of equity capital for Chinese SOEs and POEs. They provide empirical evidence 
that the effects of audit quality on the cost of equity capital are more pronounced for 
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non-SOEs than for SOEs because while the state still retains two key control rights. 
These control rights include the ultimate decision on the disposal of assets and M&A 
and the appointment of CEOs (Chen and Chen 2011).  
Overall, the literature on SOEs shows that there is a dearth of research on the 
internationalisation of SOEs (Cuervo-Cazurra 2014). So far, the few empirical studies 
on this dimension of SOE research has shown that this internationalisation of SOEs 
from EMs is mainly due to state ownership control (Wang & Hong  2012; Liang et al. 
2014). Due to state ownership control, SOEs are much likely to follow political 
objectives when engaging in FDI activities overseas (Cuervo-Cazurra  2014). These 
political objectives result in stronger home (Cui & Jiang  2012) and host-country 
institutional pressure for SOMNEs that makes them adapt their foreign entry 
differently to POEs (Meyer et al. 2014). Considering SOEs are bound to face stronger 
institutional pressure in host countries with high technological and institutional 
development (Meyer et al. 2014) there is a lack of research on FDI activities by SOEs 
from EMs in host countries with institutional voids (Meyer et al. 2014). In this study, 
we fill this gap by examining the drivers of FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs 
into Africa separately considering the likely influence of the Chinese government in 
the location decision of Chinese SOMNEs in particular.  
Also, from the above literature on SOEs, SOEs have soft budget constraints which 
give them a higher risk tolerance and a higher survival rate than POEs (Song et al.  
2011). They also face (at least in the case of China) lower expropriation risk in 
countries with relatively lower institutional quality because they can leverage the 
political influence of their home government (Duanmu 2014). Thus, soft budget 
constraints and lower expropriation risk mean SOMNEs face a lower transactions cost 
or are not as risk averse as POMNEs regarding the high transactions cost that usually 
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accompanies operations in countries with low institutional quality. In the case of 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDWKLVmeans the soft budget constraints of Chinese SOMNEs 
will make them less risks averse than Chinese POMNEs when investing in Africa. In 
the following section, we review existing studies on the determinants of OFDI from 
EMs.   
3.8. The Determinants of OFDI from EMs± Extending Traditional IB Theories 
 
The last decade and a half have witnessed a rise in OFDI from EMs (UNCTAD 2017).   
However, there exist significant differences in the OFDI motivation, strategy and 
behaviour of MNEs from different EMs like China, India, and Russia (Deng 2009). 
The focus of this thesis is China, the largest of all the EMs in GDP terms and global 
OFDI (UNCTAD 2017). The purpose of this section is to review the perspectives of 
extant literature on the growth in OFDI from EMs enabling us to identify and to 
highlight soPHRIWKHXQLTXHSHUVSHFWLYHVRI&KLQD¶V2)',FRPSDUHGWR2)',IURP
other EMs, thus setting WKHVWDJHIRURXULQYHVWLJDWLRQRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
Countries that are mostly studied by the literature on OFDI from EMs are China 
(Ramamurti & Hillemann 2018; Buckley, Clegg, et al. 2018; Buckley et al. 2007; 
Child & Rodrigues 2005; Morck et al. 2008; Luo et al. 2010; Deng 2009; Wang et al. 
2012; Duanmu 2012; Wang & Hong 2012; Zhang & Daly 2011; J. Sun et al. 2017), 
India (Bhaumik & Driffield 2011; Hattari & Rajan 2010; Bhaumik et al 2009; Nayyar 
2008) and Russia (Kalotay 2008; Kalotay & Sulstarova 2010; Kalotay 2006). The 
extant literature on the determinants of OFDI from EMs varies in focus and results. 
Most studies examine either home (Morck et al. 2008; Luo, Xue & Han 2010; 
Tolentino 2010; Voss et al 2010; Kalotay 2008; Bhaumik et al. 2009) or host country 
factors (Chou, Chen & Mai 2011; Zhang & Daly 2011; Kang & Jiang 2012; Nayyar 
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2008; Hattari & Rajan 2010; Bhaumik & Driffield 2011) as determinants of OFDI 
from EMs.   
Firstly, many studies focus on the strategic-asset seeking behaviour of EMNEs (Deng 
2009; Cui et al. 2017; Luo and Tung 2017; Blomkvist and Drogendijk 2016; Child and 
Rodrigues 2005; Hattari and Rajan 2010; Mathews 2006; Nayyar 2008). This view 
asserts that the international expansion of EMNEs is mainly due to the desire by these 
firms to acquire strategic assets in developed economies. The desire for these type of 
investments is to compensate for their competitive disadvantages, due to their home 
institutional constraints (Luo and Tung 2007; Luo and Tung 2017) as well as to 
overcome their latecomer status compared to DCMNEs (Child & Rodrigues 2005).  
Due to the low levels of institutional quality in EMs scholars argue that the rise of the 
EMNE poses a challenge to the explanatory power of traditional IB theories of FDI 
(Buckley et al. 2007; Child and Rodrigues 2005; Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet 
2012a; Stoian 2013; Buckley, Chen, et al. 2018). They argue that traditional IB 
theories like the OLI paradigm and the IDP were built mainly on the experience of 
DCMNEs (Buckley et al. 2007; Child & Rodrigues 2005). The weak institutional 
frameworks in EMs hampers the propensity for firms from these economies 
(Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet 2012)WREXLOGWKHQHFHVVDU\µ2/,W\SH¶DVVHWVQHHGHG
to engage in value-added activities across borders, thus making them less competitive 
than their counterparts from developed economies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc 2008). 
Thus, scholars suggest that the home institutional environment in EMs plays a crucial 
role in the explaining the FDI activities of EMNEs mainly through government support 
and encouragement of domestic firms (Child & Rodrigues 2005; Luo, Xue & Han 
2010; Voss et al. 2010; Kalotay & Sulstarova 2010; Buckley et al. 2007). Domestic 
capital market imperfections in EMs ensure the provision of subsidised loans by home 
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governments (Luo & Tung 2007; Hattari & Rajan 2010; Nayyar 2008; Buckley et al. 
2007) to mostly SOMNEs, thus influencing domestic OFDI patterns (Kalotay & 
Sulstarova 2010; Buckley et al. 2007).  
Kalotay & Sulstarova (2010) evaluate the explanatory power of the OLI paradigm, 
within the context of Russian OFDI. The authors find that the home-country 
institutional environment, which comprises of state ownership of firms, and home 
country FDI policy change plays a vital role in shaping Russian OFDI. Similarly, 
Buckley et al. (2007) LQYHVWLJDWHG WKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',DQGILQG WKDW
&KLQD¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDl environment is likely to have far-reaching effects in the 
internationalisation GHFLVLRQVRI&KLQHVH ILUPV)RU LQVWDQFH WKH ODXQFKRI WKH µ*R
*OREDO¶ SROLF\ LQ  E\ WKH &KLQHVH JRYHUQPHQW SOD\HG D FUXFLDO UROH LQ WKH
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDVVLVWDQFHRIGRPHVWLFILUPVWRHQJDJHLQ2)', 
Others focus on the effect the host-country institutional environment plays in in the 
internationalisation of EMNEs. These studies (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008; 
CuervoǦCazurra 2012; Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008) suggest that EMNEs may be 
attracted to other developing countries based on their experiences in operating under 
similar institutional conditions in their home country. This experience provides 
EMNEs with an advantage over DCMNEs when investing in developing economies 
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008). The quality of the home and host country of the 
firm has thus become central in explaining FDI from developing economies into other 
developing economies (South-South FDI) (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013). Thus, 
we utilise the concept of institutional distance regarding institutional quality between 
WKHKRPHDQGKRVWFRXQWU\RIWKHILUPWRH[DPLQHWKHGULYHUVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR




Some scholars (Yamakawa et al. 2007; Marano et al. 2017; Stoian & Mohr 2016; Witt 
& Lewin 2007) adopt an institutional escapism view to explain the growing OFDI 
from EMs. This view argues that firms from EMs carry out value-added activities 
DEURDGLQDELGWRµHVFDSH¶WKHZHDNDQGXQGHYHORSHGLQVWLWXWLRQVDWKRPe (Witt & 
Lewin 2007). However, research has shown that firms from EMs are among the largest 
foreign firms in the least developed countries with weaker institutions (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc 2008; Bhaumik & Driffield 2011). As a result, the institutional 
escapism notion does not explain OFDI activities by EMNEs into host countries with 
even weaker institutions. In the context of increasing investments from CMNEs into 
Africa ± from a weak institutional environment to an even weaker institutional 
environment, the institutional escapism view fails to hold. In this case, we expect the 
role of the Chinese government as owners of SOMNEs and the no conditionality 
DSSURDFKWRDLGWRSOD\DVWURQJUROHLQH[SODLQLQJWKHLQYHVWPHQWVE\&KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa. Thus, in our study, we adopt a PE approach to examine the drivers of 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
In general, the literature examining the growth in OFDI from EMs highlights a few 
characteristics in explaining the investment patterns of EMNEs. Firstly, the literature 
suggests that the growth in OFDI from EMs is mainly due to their need to acquire 
strategic assets through the acquisition of DCMNEs that already possess strong 
technological and managerial competencies (Luo and Tung 2007). Secondly, from an 
institutional perspective, the literature emphasises that the nature of the home 
institutional environment ± mainly the role of the government of EMs plays a crucial 
in the expansion of EMNEs abroad. The literature above pays very little attention to 




FDI.   
Amongst all the EMs with growing number of firms engaging in OFDI, China as far 
as we are aware is the only EM with an official policy encouraging and supporting its 
domestic firms to engage in OFDI (Voss, Buckley and Cross 2008). Such a policy has 
the potential to enhance firm-level differences LQWKH³*R*OREDO´DGYHQWXUHEHWZHHQ
Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs (Duanmu 2012). This brings us to our EM market of 
interest ± China. Thus, we review the current literature on the determinants of OFDI 
from China in the following section to better inform our analysis of the determinants 
RI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
3.9. The Determinants of OFDI from China 
The literature on EMs depicts a dominant strategic-asset seeking behaviour by EMNEs 
suggesting the need to augment their competitive advantages through the acquisition 
of firms in developed economies (CuervoǦCazurra 2012). Treating OFDI from China 
as just a subset of the above strategic assets seeking does not necessarily acknowledge 
the key differences between these economies, and firms from China. For instance, 
China is a leading EM with one of the highest economic growth rates within the past 
two decades, that necessitates a growing need for energy and natural resources to 
satisfy the demand that accompanies such high levels of economic growth (Kolstad & 
Wiig 2011). This growth has led to an increase in Chinese OFDI into regions such as 
Africa with vast reserves of natural resources in a bid to secure a steady supply of 
natural resources for the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy (Jiang 2009).  
Another key difference is the high amount of firms in China that engage in OFDI that 
can be classified as state-owned (Buckley et al. 2007) especially in the context of 
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&KLQD¶V2)', into Africa, indicating a high degree of government influence in the 
OFDI activities of Chinese SOMNEs.  
Some studies highlight a strategic asset-seeking behaviour of CMNEs. For instance, 
examining the investments by a group of Chinese manufacturing companies, Deng 
(2007) suggests that the primary motivation of CMNEs investing in developed 
economies is their desire to acquire strategic assets. Also, conducting a multiple case 
study of three leading CMNEs ± TCL, BOE and Lenovo, Deng (2009) suggests that 
CMNEs invest abroad to acquire strategic assets. Exogenous institutional pressure 
arises from the role of the government, and endogenously from corporate values and 
norms bounded by top management teams (TMTs) of Chinese firms.  
Child & Rodrigues (2005) also reach this conclusion through their examination of the 
motives for engaging in OFDI through case studies of prominent market-seeking 
Chinese firms. The authors highlight a strategic asset-seeking investment behaviour 
with a particular reason to acquire technological assets in a bid to build up their 
competitive advantages. This strategic asset-seeking motivation by Chinese firms is 
mostly carried out in developed economies, with advanced institutional development. 
However, this view does not account for the growing role of the Chinese government 
in investments in the extractive sectors. Thus, there is a need to examine the location 
decision of CMNEs in other developing economies such as those in Africa which this 
study investigates.     
7KH PDMRULW\ RI VWXGLHV VXJJHVW WKDW &KLQD¶V 2)', LV KLJKO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK KRVW
countries with a significant stock of natural resource endowments (Buckley et al. 2007; 
Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet  2012; Kolstad & Wiig 2012; Amighini, Rabellotti & 
Sanfillipo  2013; Zhang & Daly  2011; Deng 2004; Tan 2013). However, the literature 
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on EMs in general highlights strategic asset-seeking as a dominant motivation for 
conducting OFDI by firms from EMs. The dominant motivation of natural resource-
seeking by CMNEs and the nature of their home institutional environment through 
significant government control of the economy does not make these firms a subset, but 
rather a particular case of OFDI from EMs (Buckley et al. 2007; Child & Rodrigues 
2005). In contrast to other EMs, the Chinese government has established clear 
directions on the type of OFDI it would like to encourage domestic firms to undertake 
(Deng 2004).  
The impact of the home country macroeconomic factors as determinants of OFDI from 
China has also been an area of focus in the literature. Tolentino (2010) examines the 
relationship between the openness of the home economy to international trade, and 
RWKHUPDFURHFRQRPLFIDFWRUVOLNHLQWHUHVWUDWHDQGH[FKDQJHUDWHDQG&KLQD¶V2)',
The author suggests that any changes in these factors have an impact on the level of 
OFDI from China. Morck, Yeung & Zhao (2008) also examine the effect of high 
domestic savings rate, weak corporate governance, and distorted capital allocation in 
the home country on OFDI levels. The authors suggest that all three factors have 
contributed to the surge in OFDI from China in recent years. The above studies 
examine home country macroeconomic factors only. On the other hand,  Zhang & Daly 
(2011) examine the effect of host country macroeconomic factors as determinants of 
&KLQD¶V2)',IRUDPL[RIFRXQWULHVDVGHWHUPLQDQWVRI2)',IURP&KLQD7KH\
suggHVW WKDW &KLQD¶V 2)', LV DWWUDFWHG WR FRXQWULHV ZLWK KLJK YROXPHV RI &KLQHVH
imports, high GDP growth, and high GDP per capita.  
The predominantly natural resource-seeking investments exhibited by CMNEs as 
portrayed in the literature is due to the strategy of the Chinese state, executed by 
predominantly SOMNEs (Kolstad & Wiig  2012; Mohan  2013). The desire is to seek 
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highly needed resources to support the high economic growth of the Chinese economy 
experienced within the past three decades (Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet  2012). The 
difference between Chinese SOMNEs and Chinese POMNEs has been an area of 
research focus notably because of the advantages enjoyed by Chinese SOMNEs. Next 
review the literature on the differences between the FDI location decisions of Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs.  
The internationalisation of SOEs is an important phenomenon in IB research (Cuervo-
Cazurra  2014). The internationalisation of SOEs raises new questions about how firm 
ownership types (SOMNE or POMNE) impact on their internationalisation strategies 
(Buckley et al. 2007; Wang & Hong  2012). China is one major EM with the highest 
number of SOEs (Bruton, Peng and Ahlstrom 2015). SOEs constitute a significant part 
of the Chinese economy (Voss, Buckley and Cross 2008). Many of the SOEs among 
the largest MNEs are Chinese (Bruton, Peng and Ahlstrom 2015), and these firms 
differ from their private counterparts regarding motivations, access to resources, and 
corporate strategies (Meyer et al. 2014). The motivations for engaging in OFDI by 
Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs can be put into context with the differences in the 
OFDI location decisions.  
Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet (2012) examine the international location decisions of 
both Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. The authors suggest that the motivations for 
conducting OFDI differed between both types of firms. SOMNEs are attracted to host 
countries with vast reserves of natural resources and risky political environments, 
while POMNEs tend to be more market seekers (Ramasamy et al. 2012). Relating to 
our phenomenon of interest, this means Chinese SOMNEs are the more likely 
investors in Africa, taking into consideration the hazardous institutional environment 
in Africa. This notion is confirmed by the dominant presence of Chinese SOMNEs in 
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Africa as implied by the top investing Chinese companies in Africa that are 
predominantly Chinese SOMNEs (Chapter 2, section 2.5).  
The above finding is replicated by Amighini, Rabellotti, & Sanfilippo (2013) who also 
examine the host country determinants of Chinese SOMNEs, and POMNEs and 
suggest that Chinese POMNEs are attracted by large markets, and host country 
strategic assets. According to the authors, Chinese POMNEs are also wary of host 
country political risk, while Chinese SOMNEs follow home country strategic needs 
by investing more in natural resources and energy sectors and less wary of the political 
risk of host countries. Wei et al. (2014),  Liang, Lu & Wang (2012) and Huang & 
Renyong (2014) all examine the location decision of Chinese POMNEs only. These 
studies suggest that Chinese POMNEs invest abroad due to their firm-specific 
attributes, and have so far concentrated on the market seeking and strategic asset 
seeking type investments. Considering the above characteristics of Chinese POMNEs, 
we examine the institutional determinants of Chinese investments in Africa by Chinese 
POMNEs.  
Bass & Chakrabarty (2014) compared the cross-border investments of SOMNEs and 
POMNEs. They suggest that SOMNEs are willing to invest in resources for the long-
term as security for the future due to the concern by governments, in securing access 
to natural and energy supplies which they consider to be crucial for the sustainability 
of the home economy. The dichotomy in investment motivations by Chinese SOMNEs 
and POMNEs highlights some of the peculiarities of SOMNEs that defy existing 
theoretical approaches to IB. For instance, their ability to internationalise to achieve 
political, or economic security goals has to a lesser degree to do with profitability, as 
governments as owners of these firms may encourage them to carry out OFDI to attain 
political rather than economic objectives. These type of investments is what Cuervo-
98 
 
Cazurra (2014) coined the non-business internationalisation argument for the existence 
of SOMNEs.  
For example, most of the investments by Chinese SOMNEs in Africa in the 
infrastructure, and energy resource sectors have been carried out for political 
objectives and not necessarily driven by profitability (Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Haan 
2011). These investments depict the intention by the Chinese government to extend its 
sphere of influence, while simultaneously achieving economic security through the 
exploration of natural and energy resources through its SOMNEs (Mohan  2013; 
Taylor  2006). Thus, there is a need for PE approach when examining the drivers of 
&KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD ,Q the following section, we review the literature that 




of institutional quality and distance remains limited ± and this is mainly due to data 
limitations (Cheung et al. 2012). The few studies carried out on this phenomenon  show 
that the primary PRWLYDWLRQIRUWKHUHFHQWVXUJHLQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWRWKHUHJLRQLVDV
a result of the need to secure natural resources (Kolstad & Wiig 2011; Drogendijk & 
Blomkvist 2013; Cheung et al. 2012; Biggeri & Sanfilippo 2009; Sanfilippo 2010). 
The primary rationale for natural resource-seeking FDI by CMNEs is to sustain 
&KLQD¶VKLJKOHYHOVRIHFRQRPLFJURZWK(Kolstad & Wiig  2011; Jiang  2009; Zafar  
2007) and to secure a steady supply of oil and gas, rather than rely on global markets 
(Besada, Wang, Whalley  2008). The literature also shows market-seeking FDI by 
CMNEs in other sectors like in the construction sector (Kaplinsky & Morris 2009; 
Corkin & Burke 2006) that delivers projects up to 25% cheaper, than DCMNEs charge 
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(Besada, Wang & Whalley  2008). The telecommunications sector has also seen large-
scale investments from large CMNEs (Corkin  2007). 
Adopting an institutional perspective, Kolstad & Wiig (2011) examine the dominant 
PRWLYHVRI&KLQD¶V increasing FDI flows to 29 African countries in the period 2003-
2006. The authors use the rule of law index as a measure of host country institutional 
quality and suggest that aside from the need to secure natural resources, these 
investments are also attracted to host countries with weak institutional frameworks. 
However, when compared to OFDI from developed economies, the authors suggest 
that there are no differences between CMNEs and DCMNEs as regards the effect of 
host country institutional quality (Kolstad and Wiig 2011). On the other hand, 
Drogendijk & Blomkvist (2013) find a positive link between political risk and Chinese 
OFDI into Africa. They suggest that evidence of a market, resource and strategic-asset 
seeking investment by CMNEs mean that they exhibit similar motivations for FDI to 
DCMNEs ± and thus are in line with the predictions of traditional IB theories. Mario 
Biggeri & Sanfilippo (2009) suggest that CMNEs are cautious where there is armed 
conflict and in countries with less freedom ± regarding political rights in Africa.  
Overall, we can draw several findings from the literature dealing specifically with the 
GHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD)LUVWO\WKHUe is still very limited research 
on the topic with very few empirical studies carried out so far  (Kolstad & Wiig  2011; 
Cheung et al. 2012; Drogendijk & Blomkvist  2013) ± and the results regarding the 
effect of institutional factors are mixed. Moreover, there is a lack of studies on the role 
of institutional distance in determining the investment patterns of CMNEs in Africa.  
One possible reason for the mixed results may be the use of a heterogeneous set of 
variables to capture institutional quality. For instance, Kolstad & Wiig (2011) use the 
single index of the rule of law while Mario Biggeri & Sanfilippo (2009) use the 
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variable political rights and the number of conflicts to capture the impact of political 
risk. We argue that to adequately estimate the effect of institutional quality on Chinese 
OFDI into Africa; a more comprehensive measure seems more suitable as such a 
measure would account for every aspect of host country institutions (Groh & Wich 
2009; Ali et al. 2010; Pajunen 2008). We use a composite measure of institutional 
quality for this study that captures both the political and economic institutions of the 
host country.   
Secondly, all the empirical studies fail to distinguish between the determinants of 
Chinese OFDI between Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. Prior empirical evidence of 
this dichotomy has shown that Chinese SOMNEs tend to have a different FDI 
motivation from Chinese POMNEs (Ramasamy et al. 2012). Also, the data on 
greenfield investments by CMNEs in Africa shows that the majority of investments 
are carried out by Chinese SOMNEs as shown in Chapter 2, section 2.5 of our study. 
Chinese SOMNEs enjoy high levels of economic and political support relative to 
Chinese POMNEs ± and thus can be less risk-averse in their FDI activities (Amighini 
et al. 2013). This difference has led to calls for the investigation of the drivers of 
Chinese OFDI into Africa from a firm ownership perspective, i.e. Chinese SOMNEs 
and POMNEs (Drogendijk and Blomkvist 2013).  
Thirdly, there is the need to examine the close integration of Chinese aid and FDI 
activities from a PE perspective ± notably how the non-interference policy impact on 
the investment pattern of CMNEs in Africa (Cheung et al. 2012; Kolstad and Wiig 
2011). Such close integration of aid and FDI makes it challenging to separate Chinese 
aid from FDI (Ajakaiye, Mwega, & N'zue  2008). Mario Biggeri & Sanfilippo (2009) 
examine Chinese aid as a medium of international economic cooperation ± suggesting 
WKDW WKH SURYLVLRQ RI &KLQHVH DLG LV D GULYLQJ IDFWRU LQ &KLQD¶V )', LQWR $IULFD
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However, aid also symbolises a political dimension that of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of African countries. The impact of this foreign policy of non-
interference on the OFDI patterns of CMNEs in Africa lacking in current studies is 
necessary to provide a comprehensive explanation of the location decision of CMNEs 
(Cheung et al. 2012).          
3.11. Conclusion  
In conclusion, the literature examining the impact of institutional quality on FDI flows 
suggest that institutional quality encourages FDI as it reduces transactions costs for 
MNEs and the risk of expropriation.  
The literature also suggests that MNEs are not only deterred by weak institutional 
frameworks but also by a large institutional distance between the home and host 
country as they are attracted to countries with similar institutions. A large institutional 
distance increases the cost of building and establishing legitimacy as well as the LOF 
of the foreign firm. Focusing on the specific literature on Chinese OFDI into Africa, 
the few studies that have examined this phenomenon do not account for the differences 
in the investment motivations between Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. Also, the 
provision of development aid by the Chinese government that is strategically 
integrated with FDI ± based on a policy of non-interference remains understudied in 
the literature.  Furthermore, the literature on the PE SHUVSHFWLYHRI&KLQD¶VHQJDJHPHQW
with Africa of Chinese investments in Africa highlights significant government 
influence in the location decision of CMNEs by highlighting the political and strategic 
objectives of the Chinese government. Such influence depicts a PE dimension not 
currently accounted for in the literature on the impact of institutions and FDI.  
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This PE dimension is demonstrated in two ways ± through the ownership and control 
of SOMNEs ± and through the strategic bundling of development aid and FDI based 
on a policy of non-interference. As a consequence, we adopt an interdisciplinary 
approach to theory building in our next chapter that discusses the conceptual 
framework (Chapter 4) of this study by employing concepts that capture this PE 
dimension, that is, state-owned multinational enterprises and development aid. These 
concepts are subsequently operationalised empirically in the theory testing parts of the 
thesis (Chapters 6 and 7), firstly by separating investments by SOMNEs and POMNEs 
(Chapter 6) and secondly by examining the moderating effect of Chinese development 































4.1. Introduction  
The primary aim of this chapter is to develop the conceptual framework that this study 
uses to analyse &KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD7KHFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNFRPSULVHVof the 
system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, and beliefs that inform our study 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). We seek to explain the main concepts studied and the 
relationships among them. Overall, we aim to formulate and present a novel conceptual 
framework that comprehensively explains the phenomenon at hand ± &KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa. We base the need to present a novel conceptual framework that 
comprehenVLYHO\H[SODLQV&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDRQWKHRXWFRPHVRIWKHOLWHUDWXUH
review of our study (Chapter 3).  
The review of the extant literature demonstrates the limitations of existing theoretical 
DSSURDFKHV DQG VWXGLHV LQ H[SODLQLQJ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD. This limitation is 
mainly due to the lack of incorporation of a PE dimension of Chinese investments in 
Africa in extant studies of the determinants of Chinese OFDI into Africa. Thus, in this 
chapter, we seek to provide a conceptual model that fully explains the investment 
pattern of CMNEs in Africa by adopting an approach that integrates knowledge from 
the IB and PE literature.   
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: In section 4.2, we justify the 
need for a novel conceptual framework. Section 4.3 introduces and explain the various 
concepts employed in our conceptual framework. This is followed by a discussion of 
the conceptual framework and hypotheses in section 4.4 that relates our concepts to 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDE\IRUPXODWLQJ a series of testable hypotheses that will be 
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empirically tested in Chapter 6 and 7 of this dissertation. Section 4.5 provides a 
conclusion to the chapter.   
4.2. The Need for a Novel Conceptual FUDPHZRUNIRU&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
 
In this section, we justify the need for a novel conceptual approach by highlighting the 
insufficiencies of existing institutional approaches to IB. The two widely employed 
institutional approaches to IB are the NIEs, and NIT approaches (Wood & Demirbag 
2012). We briefly how these two perspectives address the subject of MNE activities 
across national boundaries and the suitability of each theoretical approach in 
H[SODLQLQJ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
4.2.1 The Theoretical ASSURDFKRI1,(VDQG&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
The NIEs approach to IB is concerned with the quality of the institutional frameworks 
in a country and its impact on economic activity and FDI inflows (North 1990; 
Williamson 2000). The application of the NIEs approach to IB emphasises the 
importance of institutions as a determinant of the FDI location choice of MNEs. It 
suggests that the level of institutional quality matters to MNEs as institutions can both 
enable and constrain the international business activities of MNEs (Meyer & Nguyen  
2005; Pajunen  2008; Slangen & Beugelsdijk  2010). This impact of institutions on 
MNE activity is due to its effect on transactions costs (Meyer & Peng 2005; Meyer 
2001). As such, MNEs increasingly prefer FDI locations with high institutional quality 
to locations with low institutional quality (Henisz & Williamson 1999; Henisz 2000; 
Meyer et al. 2009) because high institutional quality reduces uncertainty and lowers 
transactions costs for firms (Meyer 2001).  
7KHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHDERYH1,(VDSSURDFKWR&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDLVsomewhat 




into Africa. This limitation is due to its view of value-added activities of MNEs strictly 
from a cost economising lens (Williamson  2000) while paying no attention to the 
political or social lens (Child & Rodrigues 2005). According to the ICRG (2016) and 
WKH:RUOG%DQN¶V:RUOG*RYHUQDQFH,QGLFDWRUV$IULFDQFRXQWULHVare among 
the least institutionally developed. As a result, investing in Africa is not 
straightforward as low institutional quality continue to pose challenges for many 
investors making the region the least attractive for foreign investment (UNCTAD 
2017). African governments have been encouraged to carry out reforms to improve the 
quality of their domestic institutions as a precondition for attracting more FDI (Asiedu 
2006).  
However, despite the apparent low institutional quality of the region, the presence of 
Chinese firms in Africa has been growing at a  fast UDWHVLQFHWKHDGYHQWRIWKHµ*R
*OREDO¶policy in the year 2000. According to the Africa Investment Report (2017), 
published by the Financial Times, China surpassed the US as the leading investor in 
Africa (in greenfield investments) regarding capital expenditure in 2016. Bearing in 
mind the cost-economising view of the NIEs approach to IB, the increasing presence 
of Chinese firms in Africa goes against the expectation of NIEs tradition of IB.  
We argue that the limitation of the NIEs approach in explaining the growth in Chinese 
investments in Africa is mainly due to the lack of a PE dimension contributing to the 
growth of Chinese investments in Africa. The PE dimension is reflected in the political 
and financial support of Chinese SOMNEs by the Chinese government (Luo, Xue and 
Han 2010) and the strategic bundling of aid and FDI projects. We provide arguments 
on how both PE aspects of Chinese FDI in Africa help explain the investments of 
CMNEs in Africa and formulate hypotheses in section 4.4. Thus, to fully explain the 
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location decision of CMNEs in Africa, we advocate a novel conceptual framework that 
takes into account the aspects mentioned above of Chinese OFDI into Africa.   
Overall, the PE of Chinese OFDI into Africa is an important dimension that is needed 
to explain the location decisions of CMNEs in Africa comprehensively. Thus, a novel 
conceptual model that accounts for the impact of this dimension is required to explain 
the limitations of the NIEs to IB. The literature RQWKH3(RI&KLQD¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWK
Africa (Chapter 3, section 3.6) suggests two distinctive aspects of Chinese OFDI into 
Africa. These include the strategic integration of FDI and development aid with no 
conditions attached (Sautman & Hairong 2007; Mohan 2013) and the significant 
influence of the Chinese government in the location decisions of large Chinese 
SOMNEs in Africa (Alden and Davies 2006). The strategic bundling of aid and FDI 
projects with no conditions attached constitute a novel alternative development 
paradigm for Africa.  
The novel alternative development paradigm has facilitated the entrance of mostly 
large Chinese SOMNEs into African countries by improving their competitiveness in 
the region compared to MNEs from countries that do not provide such conditions to 
host-country governments (Alden and Davies 2006). Thus, the involvement of the 
Chinese government in Chinese FDI in Africa through the provision of development 
aid and its role as the owner of large Chinese SOMNEs indicate a significant influence 
of the Chinese state that is nested within a PE dimension (Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Luo, 
Xue and Han 2010). As such, we believe that the incorporation of this dimension is 
necessary to provide a comprehensive understanding of the investment patterns of 
CMNEs in Africa. We believe that the lack of this PE dimension in the NIEs explains 
the limitations of these approaches. Consequently, our approach to theory building is 
107 
 
interdisciplinary. This approach is reflected in our chosen concepts that make up our 
conceptual framework.    
Overall, the PE of Chinese OFDI into Africa is an important dimension that is needed 
to explain the location decisions of CMNEs in Africa comprehensively. Thus, a novel 
conceptual model that accounts for the impact of this dimension is required to explain 
the limitations of the NIEs approach to IB. 7KH OLWHUDWXUH RQ WKH 3( RI &KLQD¶V
engagement with Africa (Chapter 3, section 3.6) suggests two distinctive aspects of 
Chinese OFDI into Africa. These include the strategic integration of FDI and 
development aid with no conditions attached (Sautman & Hairong 2007; Mohan 2013) 
and the significant influence of the Chinese government in the location decisions of 
large Chinese SOMNEs in Africa (Alden and Davies 2006). The strategic bundling of 
aid and FDI projects with no conditions attached constitute a novel alternative 
development paradigm for Africa.  
The novel alternative development paradigm has facilitated the entrance of mostly 
large Chinese SOMNEs into African countries by improving their competitiveness in 
the region compared to MNEs from countries that do not provide such conditions to 
host-country governments (Alden and Davies 2006). Thus, the involvement of the 
Chinese government in Chinese FDI in Africa through the provision of development 
aid and its role as the owner of large Chinese SOMNEs indicate a significant influence 
of the Chinese state that is nested within a PE dimension (Cuervo-Cazurra 2014; Luo, 
Xue and Han 2010). As such, we believe that the incorporation of this dimension is 
necessary to provide a comprehensive understanding of the investment patterns of 
CMNEs in Africa. We believe that the lack of this PE dimension in the NIEs approach 
explains the limitation of this approach. Consequently, our approach to theory building 
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is interdisciplinary. This approach is reflected in our chosen concepts that make up our 
conceptual framework.  
4.3. Concepts  
In this section, we present and explain the different concepts that make up our 
conceptual framework. We chose these concepts based on our review of extant 
literature from both IB and PE perspectives. The concepts include institutional quality, 
regulative quality, institutional distance, regulative distance, aid and state-owned 
multinational enterprises.  
4.3.1. Institutional Quality 
The concept of institutional quality is derived from the NIEs approach to IB that is 
FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHµUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶± the economic and political institutions of a 
country, and their impact on economic development (North  1990; Rutherford  2001). 
The concept of institutional quality relates to the degree of efficiency and effectiveness 
of the institutional frameworks of a country (Rutherford  2001). This view of 
institutions suggests that the nature of exchange processes is contingent upon the 
institutional context in which they occur (Williamson  2000) because the level of 
institutional quality of a country can have a positive or negative effect on the 
performance of domestic firms (North  1990; North  1994).  
North argues that the effect of institutions on the activities of firms is due to the impact 
of institutions on transactions and production costs. Transaction costs arise when the 
behaviour of one party in an economic exchange is not complete thereby creating 
uncertainties in economic exchanges in the absence of strong and reliable institutions 




reducing the competitiveness of operating in such conditions (North 1990). Thus, due 
to its impact on transactions and production costs for firms, the concept of institutional 
quality has been utilised in the IB literature to examine its effect on the location 
decision of MNEs (e.g. Pajunen 2008; Ali et al. 2010; Gastanaga et al. 1998; Meyer et 
al. 2009). In this study, we focus on a comprehensive measure of institutions as the 
decision to engage in FDI is based on a combination of institutional factors and not 
just a single one (Pajunen 2008).  
However, it is not enough to focus on the overall institutional quality of the host 
country as the effect of the regulative institutions of the host country can have an effect 
on the internationalisation of firms (Eden and Miller 2004). Thus, we capture the 
regulative institutions of the host country by disaggregating the overall institutional 
quality into its regulative component. We split the overall institutional quality into its 
regulative (formal) aspects because among other things; development policy requires 
efficient and effective formal institutions with reliable enforcement mechanisms of 
existing rules and regulations governing property rights.  Prior studies have focused 
solely on the impact of regulative (formal) institutions or regulative and normative 
institutions on FDI flows and suggest a significant relationship between strong 
regulative institutions and FDI flows (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer 2004; Seyoum 2009; 
Schwens, Eiche and Kabst 2011). Thus, in this study, we follow this approach by 
disaggregating the overall institutional quality into regulative institutions to ascertain 
the impact of regulative institutions on Chinese OFDI into Africa.      
4.3.2. Regulative Quality   
The overall institutional framework of a country comprises of what North (1990) 
coined formal and informal institutions. The formal institutions consist of formal rules 
and regulations and enforcement mechanisms that underpin the economic environment 
110 
 
under which firms operate such as the rule of law, rules, and regulations governing 
product markets, level of bureaucracy and the overall legal systems of the country 
(Scott 1995). In complex economic exchanges where the rewards on opportunism are 
high, a coercive mechanism ± provided by a third party is required to enforce 
agreements and provide certainty. We conceptualise the degree of efficiency and 
effectiveness of formalised rules and regulations and their enforcement mechanisms 
governing the activities of firms as regulative quality (Grosse and Treviño 2005; Alan 
Bevan, Estrin and Meyer 2004). Regulative quality in this study reflects aspects of the 
economic, political and legal regimes of the country that regulate FDI activities (Kang 
& Jiang 2012). 
4.3.3. Institutional Distance  
The concept of institutional distance is based on Scott (1995)¶VSLOODUVRILQVWLWXWLRQV
the concept of institutional distance is a measure of cross-country institutional 
differences. It is the extent of dissimilarity between the overall institutional quality of 
the home and host country of the MNE  (Kostova  1997). A high institutional distance 
between the home and host country of the firm generates a high degree of liability of 
foreignness (Eden and Miller, 2004). Thus, we conceptualise the absolute difference 
in the quality of the institutions in the home and host country as the institutional 
distance (Cezar and Escobar 2015)   
We decompose the concept of institutional distance into regulative (formal) distance . 
to investigate potential differential effects of the overall institutional distance and 
regulative distance on FDI location decision of CMNEs in Africa (Eden and Miller 
2004; Aguilera-Caracuel et al. 2013).  
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4.3.4. Regulative Distance   
Regarding regulative distance, the investment decision of MNEs is to determine 
conducive locations where the regulative institutions are favourable to FDI activity for 
easy conformity to the formalised rules and regulations of the host country. A higher 
level of difference in the regulative institutions between the home and host country of 
the MNE can make it difficult for the MNE to conform to the regulative institutional 
frameworks of the host economy (Xu & Shenkar 2002). Such a large difference 
between the regulative constituents of the home and host country can cause difficulties 
in achieving market legitimacy (Scott  2001). In this study, we conceptualise the 
absolute difference in the quality of the regulative institutions between the home 
country and host country of the firm as the regulative distance (Pogrebnyakov and 
Maitland 2011).     
4.3.5. Development Aid 
Chinese development aid represents one facet of the PE dimension that this thesis 
accounts for when examining the FDI location of CMNEs in Africa. It is a cornerstone 
RIDQDOWHUQDWLYHDSSURDFKWRGHYHORSPHQWIRU$IULFDNQRZQDVWKHµ%HLMLQJ&RQVHQVXV¶
(Halper  2010). By Chinese development aid, we mean Chinese loans and monetary 
grants provided to African countries6 - and strategically integrated with FDI projects 
with no conditions on the improvement of domestic institutions. The non-
conditionality approach to development assistance (TanǦMullins  2010; Large  2008) 
is based on an over-arching foreign policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
African countries (Holslag 2011).  
                                                          
6
  Parks & Strange (2014) provides the major differences between the type of aid provided by Western 




The Chinese foreign policy of non-interference acts as a guiding framework to every 
DVSHFW RI &KLQD¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ $IULca and has been utilised to achieve both 
economic and political objectives of the Chinese government (Pehnelt 2007; Alden & 
Davies 2006). Thus, the close integration of Chinese development aid with FDI 
projects may mean CMNEs may not pay much attention to the institutional quality of 
host African countries due to the non-interference policy of the Chinese government ± 
as the provider of development aid. Thus, the Chinese government through its 
provision of development aid and the related policy of non-interference can influence 
the location decision of CMNEs in Africa and therefore crucial for the comprehensive 
understanding of the investment motivations of CMNEs in Africa (Kolstad and Wiig 
2011; Cheung et al. 2012). We conceptualise the provision of loans and grants ± based 
on a policy of non-interference by the Chinese government to African countries as 
development aid (Strange et al. 2017; Muchapondwa et al. 2016).  
 
4.3.6. State-Owned Multinational Enterprises 
The concept of state-owned multinational enterprises highlights another aspect of 
Chinese FDI in general and in Africa in particular that captures the PE dimension of 
Chinese FDI alongside the above-discussed development aid. Since the initiation of 
WKHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\&KLQHVH6201(VKDYHEHHQDQGFRQWLQXHWREHDWWKHIRUHIURQW
of the growth in Chinese outward FDI through support and encouragement by the 
Chinese government (Child and Rodrigues 2005; Liang, Ren and Sun 2014). The 
ownership and control of Chinese SOMNEs by the Chinese government may affect 
the investment motivation of FDI carried out by Chinese SOMNEs (Liang, Ren and 
Sun 2014; Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet 2012a) and how Chinese SOMNEs build 
legitimacy in host countries (Meyer et al. 2014). Thus, the high degree of influence by 
the Chinese government in FDI by Chinese SOMNEs in particular, coupled with the 
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political connection of these firms signify a PE dimension of Chinese FDI (Luo, Xue 
and Han 2010) that we seek to capture in our conceptual framework.  
4.4. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses   
An overview of the empirical models that are to be estimated in the theory testing parts 
of the thesis is provided in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 provides a comprehensive explanation 
RI&KLQD¶V2)', and the relationships between our dependent variable (FDI inflows) 
and our institutional (institutional quality, regulative quality, institutional distance, 
regulative distance) and moderating variables (Aid) that this study seeks to examine.    
From Table 4.1, this study examines the potential differences in the effect of our key 
institutional variables between Chinese OFDI carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and 
Chinese POMNEs as well the moderating effect of Chinese development aid on the 
relationship between the key institutional variables and Chinese OFDI. Both aspects 
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In the following sections, we develop and explain our hypotheses.  
4.4.1. Institutional Quality and Location Choice of CMNEs in Africa   
Numerous studies (e.g., Pajunen  2008; Ali et al. 2010; Meyer & Peng  2005; Slangen 
& Beugelsdijk  2010) suggest that institutional quality of a country is positively related 
to the levels of FDI it attracts. For instance, firms planning on entering African 
countries face unclear regulatory frameworks, weak judicial systems, political 
instability and corruption that can negatively affect a firPV¶WUDQVDFWLRQVFRVWV(Bartels, 
Napolitano and Tissi 2014; Asiedu 2006; Osabutey and Okoro 2015). These increased 
costs mean foreign firms are more likely to be cautious and less likely to enter foreign 
locations characterised by very low institutional quality (Dikova & Van Witteloostuijn  
2007; Meyer et al.  2009; Meyer  2001; Rodriguez  Uhlenbruck  & Eden  2005). It has 
also been suggested that single institutional factors like political instability, democracy 
and corruption can be highly significant in determining the FDI inflows into a country 
(Asiedu & Lien 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra 2006; Habib & Zurawicki 2002).  
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For example, countries with strong democratic institutions (Guerin & Manzocchi 
2009; Jakobsen & de Soysa  2006; Li & Resnick  2003), low political risk (Busse & 
Hefeker  2007) and the absence of corruption (Habib & Zurawicki  2002) attract FDI 
inflows. Based on such evidence on the positive relationship between institutional 
quality and FDI, it has been suggested that to attract higher levels of inward 
investment, African countries need to improve the quality of their domestic institutions 
(Asiedu 2006). This prescription LVEHFDXVH µJRRG¶ LQVWLWXWLRQV LQ$IULFDQFRXQWULHV
will reduce uncertainty, transactions and production costs for both foreign and local 
firms (Ngobo & Fouda  2012).  
Despite the relatively low institutional quality of the majority of African countries, 
&KLQD¶V)', LQ$IULFDKDVJURZQVLJQLILFDQWO\$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH$IULFD ,QYHVWPHQW
Report 2017, China is now the leading investor in greenfield investments regarding 
capital expenditure. We argue that contrary to the suggestions by numerous studies 
mentioned above of a positive relationship between institutional quality and FDI flows, 
host-country institutional quality will have a nHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR
Africa. Firstly, this effect is due to the existence of capital market distortions in China 
making CMNEs more competitive in countries with low institutional quality by 
helping to offset part of the costs of operating in conditions of low institutional quality 
(Buckley et al. 2007; Voss et al. 2010). Also, the inefficiency of the banking system 
in China means cheap loans are awarded to outward investing firms not necessarily 
through government policy but as a result of inefficiency (Child & Rodrigues  2005; 
Antkiewicz & Whalley  2006). 
Secondly, CMNEs investing in African countries are faced with a relatively similar 
level of quality of institutions compared to DCMNEs. For instance, according to data 
from the ICRG (2016), the corruption levels in China is much higher than in developed 
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economies. Similarly, the levels of bureaucracy quality and democratic accountability 
in China are also much lower in China than in most developed economies. Therefore, 
such similarities in institutions (regarding quality) might prove attractive to CMNEs 
as it might prove advantageous over DCMNEs because Chinese firms already have the 
experience in operating in conditions of low institutional quality in their home country 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc  2008; Costinot  2009).  
Thirdly, over the past decade and a half, the Chinese government has played a key role 
in the increase in Chinese OFDI through its encouragement and support of domestic 
ILUPVWRHQJDJHLQ2)',VLQFHWKHODXQFKRILWVRIILFLDOµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\(Wang and 
Hong 2012). Indeed among EMs, China is the only country that has an official policy 
of promoting OFDI, and with clear directions on the type of OFDI, it would like to 
encourage (Deng 2004; Voss, Buckley and Cross 2008). Such degree of government 
involvement in the OFDI activities of domestic firms may make CMNEs less risk 
averse and also seek lower competition where weak institutions are present.   
Although capital market distortions do exist in other developing economies as well as 
similarities in institutional quality between other developing economies and African 
countries (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008). However, the unique approach of 
HQFRXUDJLQJ2)',E\ WKH&KLQHVH JRYHUQPHQW WKURXJK LWV µ*R *OREDO¶ SROLF\ LV D
GLVWLQFWLYHDVSHFWRI&KLQD¶V2)',WKDWJHQHUDWHVJRYHUQPHQW-created advantages for 
CMNEs making them different from that of other developing economies (Ramamurti 
and Hillemann 2018).  
Based on the arguments above, we expect that the level of institutional quality in 
African countries will have a negative effect on FDI from China. Specifically, we 
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expect that a high level of overall institutional quality to negatively influence the 
amount of FDI from China. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:      
Hypothesis 1a: CMNEs are attracted to African countries with low 
institutional quality    
Although the involvement of the Chinese government in OFDI has a strong influence 
on the level of OFDI and its location, this influence is contingent upon the degree at 
which the firm is affiliated ZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHILUP¶VRZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUH
(that is, SOMNE or POMNE) (Wang and Hong 2012). In particular, Chinese SOMNEs 
are considered to be highly affiliated with the Chinese government compared to their 
private counterparts. For instance, in most cases, the state retains the controlling shares 
and appoints CEOs with strong political connections (Hung, Wong and Zhang 2012; 
Liang, Ren and Sun 2014). Such close connection with the Chinese government also 
means Chinese SOMNEs are more likely to receive and benefit more from the support 
and backing of the Chinese government when investing overseas than Chinese 
POMNEs that lack such high levels of affiliation with government agencies (Wang 
and Hong 2012).  
It has been suggested that Chinese SOMNEs are more likely to have access to capital 
at below market rates than Chinese POMNEs due to their close connections to 
government agencies (Cull and Xu 2003; Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti 2011). Such 
soft budget constraints enjoyed by Chinese SOMNEs is the primary reason why 
inefficient Chinese SOMNEs can survive for longer than Chinese POMNEs (Sun, 
Tong and Tong 2002). The close connection of Chinese SOMNEs to the Chinese state 
also means  Chinese SOMNEs are more likely to enjoy political backing from the 
Chinese government and protection from the risk of expropriation when investing in 
countries with high risk of expropriation (Duanmu 2014). Moreover, international 
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relations also play an important role in explaining the high propensity for Chinese 
SOMNEs to invest in risky countries because good political relations between China 
and the host government can reduce the risk of expropriation (Li and Liang 2012).     
The close connections between Chinese SOMNEs and the Chinese government mean 
that these firms may be far less cautious and willing to invest in countries with low 
institutional quality than Chinese POMNEs (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Amighini et al. 
2013). This willingness to commit more resources in countries with low institutional 
quality is due to easy access to cheap capital that is capable of offsetting the high 
transactions and production costs when operating in conditions of low institutional 
quality (Duanmu 2012). Also, the possible protection of Chinese SOMNEs from 
expropriation might make these firms less cautious when entering countries considered 
to be politically risky (Duanmu 2014).  
The close connection between Chinese SOMNEs and the Chinese government 
suggests that the Chinese government may be highly influential in the location decision 
of Chinese SOMNEs than POMNEs (Guo and Clougherty 2015). Government 
influence might mean that overseas investments by SOMNEs are carried out based on 
political objectives rather than purely for economic reasons (Bass & Chakrabarty 
2014; Amighini et al. 2013). On the other hand, Chinese POMNEs are more likely to 
invest abroad strictly for profit maximisation purposes. Thus they are more likely to 
be market seekers and averse to the risks of operating in conditions of low institutional 
quality (Lu et al. 2011; Ramasamy et al. 2012; Amighini et al. 2013). Their inability 
to access cheap capital compared to Chinese SOMNEs (Sutherland and Ning 2011) 
suggests Chinese POMNEs may invest abroad in accordance with the prescriptions of 
traditional IB theories, i.e., through the exploitation of their FSAs (Liang et al. 2012; 
Ramasamy et al. 2012).  
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Overall, the influence and role of the Chinese government in the OFDI activities of 
Chinese SOMNEs, in particular, constitute one facet of the PE dimension of Chinese 
OFDI into Africa that needs to be accounted for to fully understand the investment 
patterns of CMNEs (Luo, Xue and Han 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra 2014). Chinese 
SOMNEs are prepared to enter and more willing to invest more in African countries 
with low institutional quality than Chinese POMNEs due to their close affiliation with 
the Chinese government.  
Based on the arguments above, we expect that the effect of the level of the host 
FRXQWU\¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\ZLOOEHGLIIHUHQWEHtween FDI into Africa by Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs. Specifically, we expect that a low level of host-country 
overall institutional quality will attract inward FDI by Chinese SOMNEs but will 
attract less inward FDI by Chinese POMNEs. Thus we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: Chinese SOMNEs tend to be more attracted to African 
countries with low institutional quality compared to Chinese POMNEs  
 
4.4.2. Regulative Quality and Location Choice of CMNEs in Africa  
 
The regulative dimension of the institutional environment is particularly critical to the 
firm as it establishes the rules and regulations that govern the activities of both foreign 
and domestic firms (Williamson 2000). Indeed efficient rules and regulations in 
African countries can lead to a reduction in the variability of firm profitability resulting 
in high-return and low-risk investments (Ngobo & Fouda 2012). Thus, when deciding 
whether to invest in a particular foreign location, MNEs are mostly concerned about 
the quality of the regulative institutions in host countries such as the bureaucratic 
quality, stable economic policy and the enforcement of the rule of law (Grosse & 
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Trevino  2005; Kang & Jiang  2012; Bevan et al. 2004). The absence of reliable rules 
and regulations backed by robust enforcement mechanisms can create uncertainty in 
an economic exchange between two parties (Ali et al. 2010). All parties in an economic 
exchange have incomplete information about the real intentions of their counterparts 
in an agreement ± and thus cannot be entirely sure of their ability to honour the 
agreement. Due to this uncertainty, the cost of transacting includes a risk premium. 
This risk premium is contingent on the extent to which the enforcement mechanisms 
of the rule and regulations governing contract enforceability and protection of property 
rights are stable and reliable, i.e., the quality of the regulatory (formal) institutions 
(North 1990). Thus, the risk premium is higher in countries with low regulative quality 
and lower in countries with high regulative quality (Williamson 2000). Regulative 
quality can also have an impaFWRQILUPV¶SURGXFWLRQFRVWV)RULQVWDQFHLQHIILFLHQW
rules and regulations that cause costly production delays and waiting times, bribes to 
obtain permits can all raise production costs for firms operating in such an environment 
(North 1990).  
+RZHYHUDV HDUOLHUGLVFXVVHG WKH LQIOXHQFHRI WKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQW LQ&KLQD¶V
OFDI constitute a significant driving force behind the growth and investment pattern 
of CMNEs in Africa. The availability of cheap capital in China may mean that Chinese 
firms may be less cautious when investing in African countries with very low 
regulative quality. Furthermore, the quality of the regulative institutions in China can 
be considered as relatively low in comparison to that of developed economies. Such 
low levels of regulative quality may be advantageous to CMNEs when operating in 
African countries with almost similar levels of regulative quality as they already 
possess the experience of operating in conditions of low regulative quality in their 
home country. In other words, due to their experience in operating in conditions of low 
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regulative quality, CMNEs are more capable of dealing with burdensome regulations. 
Therefore we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 2a: CMNEs are attracted to African countries with low regulative 
quality.  
 
Engaging in FDI is a risky activity, especially in countries characterised by low 
regulative quality. However, in the case of Chinese FDI, the ownership structure of 
the firms undertaking FDI matters for a few reasons. Firstly, from the onset, the 
JRYHUQPHQW OHG µ*R *OREDO¶ SROLF\ UHVXOWHG LQ D KLJK QXPEHU RI &KLQHVH 62(V
undertaking FDI with a high degree of encouragement and support from the Chinese 
government (Luo, Xue and Han 2010). These SOMNEs are still highly controlled by 
the Chinese government which suggests that the motivations for their FDI activities 
are broadly aligned with that of the national economic and political objectives of the 
Chinese government (Ramasamy et al. 2012). On the other hand, Chinese POEs have 
been at the periphery of this government-led agenda with limited government support 
and financial resources. Thus, investing in African countries with low regulative 
quality and potentially high transactions and production costs might yield different 
location decisions for Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs.  
The divergence above in the location decisions of Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs is 
due to the risk tolerance of Chinese SOMNEs in particular. Chinese SOMNEs will be 
more capable of managing the high transactions and production costs in African 
countries due to their preferential access to bank loans and financial markets compared 
to POMNEs who face capital constraints (a product of government-induced long-
lasting capital market distortions) (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). Also, the likely 
appointment of party officials as CEOs of Chinese SOMNEs might mean that 
managers of Chinese SOMNEs may have little individual interest in the long-term 
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profitability of their firm and instead pursue the long-term strategic objectives of the 
Chinese government (Hung, Wong and Zhang 2012). Such an approach is also likely 
to be in the interest of the career advancement of a politically appointed CEO in 
government bureaucracies. Chinese SOMNEs might be able to cope with the low 
regulative quality in African countries due to their unique experience of operating in 
weak and inefficient regulations in China in the form of high levels of direct 
government intervention and cumbersome rules and regulations. Such an experience 
renders Chinese SOMNEs with a competitive advantage over their private 
counterparts who lack the experience in dealing with direct government intervention. 
Therefore we hypothesise:  
Hypothesis 2b: Chinese SOMNEs tend to be more attracted to African 
countries with low regulative quality than Chinese POMNEs  
4.4.3. Institutional Distance and Location Choice of CMNEs in Africa 
 
In IB research, the associated notion of institutional distance has become central in 
explaining the location choices of MNEs (Cezar and Escobar 2015; Pogrebnyakov and 
Maitland 2011; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013). It has been suggested that MNEs 
are not only deterred by the overall institutional quality of host countries but also by a 
large institutional distance between the home and host country (Bae and Salomon 
2010). As a result, MNEs would prefer to carry out FDI in countries with similar 
institutional environment to their home country (Xu & Shenkar 2002; Habib & 
Zurawicki 2002; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; Cezar & Escobar 2015).  
Research suggests that MNEs would prefer to invest in locations with similar 
institutional quality to their home country because this minimises the additional costs 
of doing business abroad (CDBA) due to reduced LOF (Zaheer & Mosakowski 1997; 
Zaheer 1995). On the other hand, a high institutional distance will result in increased 
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LOF which increases the additional costs for foreign firms due to unfamiliarity, 
relational and discriminatory hazards (Eden and Miller 2004; Zhou and Guillen 2016). 
However, the suggestions above of a negative relationship between institutional 
distance and the FDI location choice of MNEs are based on samples of DCMNEs 
(North-South FDI). South-South FDI such as Chinese OFDI into Africa is different in 
that the institutional quality in China and the majority of African countries is broadly 
similar (i.e. low institutional distance) with potentially adverse consequences for the 
long-term institutional development for African countries (Demir 2016).  
The low institutional quality in developing economies that deter MNEs from a high 
institutional quality environment might act as a comparative advantage for EMNEs 
when investing in other developing economies with low institutional quality (South-
South FDI). Thus, EMNEs might be more eager to invest in other developing 
economies due to their previous experience in operating in conditions of low 
institutional quality back home (Darby, Desbordes and Wooton 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra 
and Genc 2008). ,QWKHFRQWH[WRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDWKLVLPSOLHVWKDWCMNEs 
might, therefore, be more attracted to African countries with low institutional quality 
as they are more likely to face a limited LOF considering the relatively low 
institutional distance regarding institutional quality between China and most African 
countries.  
As earlier mentioned, CMNEs might be better equipped in managing the additional 
costs of operating in countries with low institutional quality due to financial and 
political support from the state. Based on the arguments above, we argue that the low 
overall institutional distance between China and host countries in Africa will attract 
Chinese FDI inflows into Africa. Therefore we hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3a: Low home-host country distance in terms of institutional 
quality will attract Chinese FDI inflows into Africa.     
We discuss the proposed heterogeneous effect of institutional distance on the location 
decision of Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. It has been suggested that Chinese 
SOMNEs have more experience in operating in conditions of low institutional quality 
in China such as dealing with direct government intervention and navigating opaque 
political/corporate governance constraints than Chinese POMNEs (Morck, Yeung and 
Zhao 2008). As a result of this experience, Chinese SOMNEs might face less LOF 
when investing in African countries with similar or lower levels of institutional quality 
than Chinese POMNEs. Thus, if Chinese SOMNEs had truly acquired such an 
experience, they would be more attracted to countries with the same low levels of 
institutional quality (low institutional distance) than Chinese POMNEs to exploit their 
capabilities gained from their experience.  
There is indeed empirical evidence that shows that Chinese SOMNEs seem to be more 
attracted to countries considered to be risky (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Amighini et al. 
2013). In the case of African countries, the main reason could be because as 
µODWHFRPHUV¶WKHVHILUPVKDYHOLWWOHRSWLRQEXWWRLQYHVWLQFRXQWULHVZLWKWKHORZHVW
levels of institutional quality and considered to be too risky by DCMNEs like in the 
Sudan and Angola (Patey 2007; Corkin 2011). However, their additional experience 
of operating in conditions of low institutional quality in China might also play a role 
in their decision to invest in these countries. On the other hand, it is suggested that 
Chinese POMNEs are pushed to invest abroad by the need to escape the low 
institutional quality in China (Luo and Tung 2007; Luo, Xue and Han 2010).  
Empirical research has shown that Chinese SOMNEs are more attracted to countries 
with vast reserves of natural resources and weak institutions than Chinese POMNEs 
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(Duanmu 2012; Ramasamy et al. 2012). Such attractiveness to resource seeking FDI 
and weak institutions highlight a strategic intent on the part of Chinese SOMNEs that 
follows the strategic and political goals of the Chinese government (Amighini et al. 
2013), that is, the acquisition of natural resources for long-term security and not for 
short-term gains (Bass and Chakrabarty 2014). Thus, based on their tendency to 
engage in resource seeking FDI for exploration purposes, a low overall institutional 
distance is more likely to encourage FDI by Chinese SOMNEs than by Chinese 
POMNEs. Overall, we formulate the following hypothesis:    
Hypothesis 3b: Low home-host country distance in terms of institutional 
quality will attract more FDI by Chinese SOMNEs than by Chinese 
POMNEs.            
 
The disaggregation of institutional distance into regulative institutional distance has 
been shown to have a differing effect on the location choice of MNEs (Pogrebnyakov 
and Maitland 2011). Thus, we decompose the overall institutional distance into the 
regulative distance and discuss the concept of regulative distance in relation to the 
location choice of CMNEs in Africa in the following section.  
 
4.4.4. Regulative Distance and Location Choice of CMNEs in Africa 
Regulative (formal) distance measures the dissimilarities between the home and host 
country of the MNE as regards the setting, monitoring of rules and regulations ± and 
the enforceability of them (Xu & Shenkar 2002). The regulative quality in developed 
countries is considered to be relatively higher than in developing economies (Liou, 
Chao and Yang 2016). In developing economies, membership of international 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank has curtailed the ability of 
governments in these countries to impose unilateral policy changes on foreign firms 
through structural adjustment programs that seek to improve the quality of the 
127 
 
regulatory environment (UNCTAD 2001). However, developing economies are still 
characterised E\ µUHJXODWLYH YRLGV¶ WKDW DFFRXQW IRU D KLJK QXPEHU RI µHVFDSH¶
investments from these economies into developed economies (considering the 
relatively high regulative distance) to take advantage of the relatively better regulatory 
environment in developed economies (Stoian & Mohr 2016).  
Weak and inefficient government regulations can affect the location choice of MNEs 
(Bevan et al. 2004). For instance, where respect for the rule of law and reliable 
enforcement mechanisms is lacking, inter-relational and discriminatory hazards can 
increase, thus resulting in opportunistic behaviour by the host government and local 
partners (Eden and Miller 2004). However, the relatively low regulative quality in 
developing economies can also act as a source of comparative advantage for EMNEs 
as they can leverage their experience of operating in conditions of weak and inefficient 
government rules and regulations in their home country. For instance, it has been 
suggested that firms from developing countries with high levels of corruption tend to 
seek other developing countries where corruption is prevalent (Cuervo-Cazurra 2006) 
(considering the relatively low corruption distance).  
CMNEs operate in an environment of high government intervention in business, 
cumbersome government rules and regulations and uncertainty regarding the 
enforcement mechanisms monitoring the rule of law (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). 
Thus, we argue that when investing in African countries CMNEs might not be deterred 
by low regulative quality but instead be attracted to weak regulatory environments in 
African countries (low regulative distance). The relatively low regulative distance 
between China and the majority of African countries might mean CMNEs are likely 
to face lower LOF when investing in African countries due to lower unfamiliarity and 
inter-relational hazards. Therefore we hypothesise: 
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Hypothesis 4a: Low home-host country distance in terms of regulative 
quality will attract Chinese FDI inflows into Africa.  
 
Although the experience of CMNEs in operating in conditions of weak regulatory 
environments back home can act as a source of comparative advantage to CMNEs, it 
can also be a source of difference in the location decisions between Chinese SOMNEs 
and POMNEs. Chinese SOMNEs might possess more experience in dealing with 
challenging regulatory environments in African countries as a result of the presence of 
state equity in these firms that can lead to excessive government intervention and 
imposition of rules and regulations. Thus, based on this additional experience in 
dealing with direct government intervention, Chinese SOMNEs might be more 
equipped in dealing with and perhaps more attracted to low regulative quality in 
African countries (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008) than Chinese POMNEs that lack 
this additional experience. Put simply, Chinese SOMNEs will face an even lower LOF 
as regards regulative quality when investing in African countries than Chinese 
POMNEs. Therefore, we hypothesise:  
Hypothesis 4b: Low home-host country distance in terms of regulative 
quality will attract more FDI by Chinese SOMNEs than by Chinese 
POMNEs.        
 
4.4.5. The Moderating Effect of Chinese Development Aid Inflows   
Thus far, the focus of our discussion and hypothesis building has been on the direct 
HIIHFW RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO TXDOLW\ DQG GLVWDQFH RQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD +RZHYHU
although institutional quality and distance are important factors determining the FDI 
location decision of CMNEs in Africa, the close integration of aid with FDI projects 
with no conditions on the improvement of host country institutional quality is a 
distinctive aspect of Chinese FDI in Africa worth examining (Kolstad and Wiig 2011).  
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Other important factors have been found to significantly impact the relationship 
between host country institutional quality and FDI inflows. For instance, empirical 
research has shown that the impact of democracy on FDI inflows is contingent on the 
size of natural resources reserves in the host country (Asiedu & Lien 2011). Similarly, 
Africa-specific studies also show that the impact of host country institutional quality 
depends on the presence of natural resources (Asiedu 2006) and the interaction 
between natural resource abundance and low institutional quality attracts FDI inflows 
into Africa (Kolstad and Wiig 2011). In the case of Chinese OFDI into Africa, CMNEs 
focus on other factors that can impact the magnitude of the impact of host country 
institutional quality on Chinese FDI inflows.  
We argue that the close integration of Chinese aid and FDI projects moderates the 
effect of host country institutional quality and inVWLWXWLRQDOGLVWDQFHRQ&KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa. The close integration of development aid and FDI projects has been 
identified as an important IDFWRURI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD(Biggeri & Sanfilippo 
2009; Sanfilippo 2010) that needs an examination to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the FDI location decision of CMNEs in Africa (Kolstad and Wiig 2011).  
The associated policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of African countries 
when providing aid (Pehnelt 2007; McCormick 2008; TanǦMullins 2010) has thus 
become central in providing a comprehensive explanation of the location decision of 
CMNEs in Africa (Cheung et al. 2012). The close integration of Chinese aid and FDI 
projects constitute a PE dimension of Chinese OFDI into Africa that we seek to 
account for in our conceptualisation of the phenomenon. This PE dimension captures 
the full influence of the Chinese government alongside its role as the owner of large 
Chinese SOMNEs investing in Africa when explaining the effect of host country 
institutional quality and home-host country distance in terms of institutional quality. 
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We argue that the close integration of aid with FDI with no preconditions on the 
improvement of domestic institutions such as the rule of law, and corruption levels 
(TanǦMullins 2010) may suggest that Chinese investments that accompany Chinese 
aid into Africa may not be deterred by low institutional quality. This attraction is 
because the Chinese government as the provider of aid advocates a policy of non-
interference in the improvement of the institutions of the host country as a precondition 
for the provision of aid. On the contrary, these investments might seek African 
countries with very low levels of institutional quality.    
Although Chinese investments in Africa will be attracted to low host country 
institutional quality, the higher the amount of Chinese aid integrated with Chinese 
investments the less attention is paid to the institutional quality of the host country. An 
increased level of Chinese aid integrated with Chinese investments would potentially 
create even more intensified attraction to host countries with low institutional quality 
with the non-interference policy of the Chinese government acting as the mechanism 
through which Chinese firms become even less risk-averse. Therefore we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 5a: Chinese aid negatively moderates the relationship between 
institutional quality and Chinese FDI such that the effect is stronger when 
aid is present in Chinese FDI. 
 
Similarly, we argue that CMNEs will be even less risk-averse as regards the quality of 
the regulative institutions in the host country. Regarding the relationship between host 
country regulative quality and Chinese FDI inflows, we argue that the presence of 
Chinese aid in investments will act as an enhancer for the negative relationship 
between host country regulative quality and Chinese FDI inflows.  The majority of 
&KLQHVHµDLG¶WR$IULFDis in the form of concessional loans with terms and purpose 
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that are wholly or partly of a commercial nature (Parks and Strange 2014). Thus, the 
presence of a sound legal system with reliable enforcement mechanisms is even more 
imperative for the monitoring of contractual obligations between the Chinese 
government and the host country government. However, similar to the argumentation 
of the previous hypothesis we believe that the approach of no demands on the 
improvement of domestic institutions as a condition to the provision of aid means that 
the presence of Chinese aid in Chinese FDI might make Chinese firms carrying out 
such projects to be less risk-averse regarding the regulative quality of the host country. 
Therefore we hypothesise:  
Hypothesis 5b: Chinese aid negatively moderates the relationship between 
regulative quality and Chinese FDI such that the effect is stronger when aid 
is present in Chinese FDI.         
We argue that the close integration of aid with Chinese FDI projects is also likely to 
moderate the relationship between home-host country distance regarding institutional 
quality (institutional distance) and Chinese FDI inflows. MNEs prefer to invest in host 
countries with similar institutional environment to their home country (Xu & Shenkar 
2002; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007) as this reduces the degree of LOF faced by the 
foreign firm in the host country (Eden and Miller 2004). Thus, the relative similarity 
in the quality of the institutions in China and African countries (low institutional 
distance) will attract Chinese FDI inflows. However, we argue that in cases where aid 
is closely integrated with FDI projects, the deterring effect of high institutional 
distance between China and African countries will be stronger. This enhancing effect 
of aid on the relationship between institutional distance and Chinese FDI is due to the 
no conditions approach in the provision of aid by the Chinese government that makes 
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Chinese FDI more attracted to African countries with similar overall institutional 
quality to China. Thus, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 6a: Chinese aid negatively moderates the relationship between 
institutional distance and Chinese FDI such that the effect is stronger when 
aid is present in Chinese FDI. 
Applying the above logic to the effect of regulative distance and on Chinese FDI 
inflows, we argue that the presence of Chinese aid moderates the relationships 
mentioned above. Firstly, we argue that CMNEs would be more attracted to low 
regulative distance when investing in FDI projects that are closely integrated with 
Chinese aid due to the no conditions approach to the provision of development aid of 
the Chinese government. The relatively weak regulative frameworks (formal 
institutions) in China might act as an advantage to CMNEs when investing in African 
countries with similar or even worse levels of regulative institutions (considering the 
relatively low regulative distance) (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008). However, the 
non-conditionality approach to the provision of aid means CMNEs investing in FDI 
projects that are closely integrated with Chinese aid might even be more attracted to 
African countries with similar regulative quality (low regulative distance). Such an 
attraction is due to the absence of any conditions on the improvement of the quality of 
host country regulative institutions as a precondition to the provision of aid. Therefore 
we hypothesise:  
Hypothesis 6b: Chinese aid negatively moderates the relationship between 
regulative distance and Chinese FDI such that the effect is stronger when 





In this chapter, we have put forward the conceptual framework and testable hypotheses 
relating to the investment behaviour RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD :H DGRSW DQ
interdisciplinary approach by integrating information and knowledge from both the IB 
and political economy approaches to this phenomenon. We deem such an approach to 
be necessary for fully explaining the location decisions of CMNEs in Africa. We 
believe that our combination of relevant theoretical concepts into a unifying theory 
building block can be deemed a valuable theoretical contribution. The hypotheses 
developed are to investigate the main influences and determinants of the FDI location 
decision of CMNEs in Africa. We test the validity of our hypotheses in Chapter 6 and 








This chapter aims to discuss the research methodology utilised to empirically test our 
hypotheses, explain the research context of our study as well as provide an explanation 
of our data collection and data handling processes. This chapter is structured as 
follows: Section 5.2 discusses the research philosophy of this study. In this section, we 
provide detailed discussion and justification of the specific philosophical perspectives 
adopted in this study based on our research paradigm of Positivism. Section 5.3 
discusses our research approach. This is followed by a justification of Africa and China 
as our research contexts in section 5.4. Section 5.5 describes our sample, followed by 
a discussion on all variables used in this study in section 5.6. Next, we present and 
discuss the regression models that we specify in this study with a justification of our 
chosen research method in section 5.7. This is followed by a discussion of the summary 
statistics and correlation analysis of the variables used in section 5.8. The research 
limitations of the study are provided in section 5.9, and section 5.10 concludes the 
chapter.      
5.2. Research Philosophy  
Every research is grounded in a specific set of philosophical beliefs that depicts a 
particular view of the world. These philosophical beliefs relate to the development of 
knowledge and the nature of that knowledge (Saunders et al. 2011) which contain 
important assumptions about the way the researcher views the world.  These 
assumptions can be associated with the type of research paradigm (e.g. Positivism, 
Realism, Interpretivism) employed by the researcher when analysing the chosen 
phenomenon. Considering the multiplicity of meanings of the term in the Social 
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Sciences, and for clarity, we use Saunders et al.'s (2011, p.118) definition of a 
SDUDGLJP DV ³D ZD\ of examining social phenomena from which particular 
understandings of these phenomena can be gained, and H[SODQDWLRQVDWWHPSWHG´7KH
differences between the above research paradigms are due to different underlying 
philosophical assumptions, based on the ontological, epistemological and axiological 
perspectives of each research paradigm.      
The philosophical perspective we adopt through our choice of research strategy holds 
important assumptions about our view of the world. Johnsons & Clark  (2006) argue 
that the important issue is not whether every piece of research should be 
philosophically informed, important though that is, but is how well a researcher can 
explain and defend his/her philosophical choices. Thus, next, we present and discuss 
the philosophical stands of this study based on our epistemological, ontological, 
methodological and axiological perspectives. 
5.2.1. Our Ontological Position  
Ontology is concerned with a UHVHDUFKHU¶V view of the nature of reality, i.e. the reality 
of the phenomenon under investigation (Burrell & Morgan  1979). Blaikie (2000, p.8) 
provides a full definition proposing that ontological claims are µFODLPV and 
assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about what exists, 
what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each RWKHU¶
This definition inevitably raises questions about the assumptions researchers have 
about the way the world works. Such differences in assumptions about what constitutes 
social reality and how the world works are by no means absent among researchers in 
the Business and Management field.  
Saunders et al. (2011) identify two aspects (Objectivism and Subjectivism) of ontology 
in Business and Management research that are likely to be accepted as producing 
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viable knowledge by many scholars. However, researchers in the Business and 
Management field do not agree about which view is best (Objectivism or Subjectivism) 
(Tsoukas & Knudsen  2003). Objectivism is an ontological position that assumes that 
social phenomena exist in reality independent of social actors, while Subjectivism is 
an ontological position that argues for the existence of social phenomena as a 
consequence of the actions of social actors (Grix 2002). One notable debate that 
epitomises this Objectivism-Subjectivism divide between researchers is that between 
two different research paradigms ± Positivism, corresponding to Objectivism and 
Social Constructivism, corresponding to Subjectivism.  
5.2.2. Positivism and Social Constructivism  
Positivism is a widely adopted paradigm in Business and Management research. Its 
roots can be traced from the work of Comte (1853). Positivism advocates the 
philosophical position of the natural scientist (Trochim 2006). Thus, positivists in 
%XVLQHVVDQG0DQDJHPHQWUHVHDUFKIDYRXUµZRUNLQJZLWK observable social reality and 
argue that the end product of such research can be law-like generalisations similar to 
those produced by the physical and natural VFLHQWLVWV¶(Remenyi & Williams  1998,  
p.32). Research adopting the Positivist Approach is predominantly carried out through 
the use of existing theory for the development of hypotheses that can be confirmed in 
full or part or outright disproved. Research results lead to further development of 
theory, which is then evaluated by further research (Saunders et al. 2011).  
Ontologically, positivist researchers in Business and Management research advocate 
an objective ontology were the existence of the social phenomena are independent of 
social actors (Saunders et al. 2011, p.135). Epistemologically, what constitutes 
knowledge are only social phenomena that are observable and provide credible data 
(Johnson & Duberley 2000, p.11). The methodology of examining observable 
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phenomena is generally by hypothesis testing through quantitative methods (Creswell  
2013, p.20). From an axiological standpoint, the positivist approach advocates a strong 
split between facts and values as the researcher is detached from the phenomenon 
being investigated (Saunders et al. 2011, p.136). In reaction to the application of the 
above approaches, Social Constructionism was developed.  
Rooted in the Interpretivist philosophy, Social Constructivism proposes that social 
phenomena are created from the perceptions of social actors such that reality exists in 
the form of meanings and constructions that are socially and individually created 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). Thus, Social Constructivism is underpinned by the 
ontology of Subjectivism that reality is constructed because the world we experience 
is already an interpreted one (Guba & Lincoln 1994, p.110). This leads to an 
epistemology that acceptable knowledge of social phenomena is that which is socially 
constructed through interpretations (Guba & Lincoln 1994,  p.111). From an 
axiological standpoint, research is value bound and finally a methodology based on 
conversation, dialogue and interpretation (Miller & Brewer  2003).  
The ontology that corresponds to this study is Objectivism. In this study, we see 
investments by Chinese firms as real in the same way as natural phenomena are 
considered real. Thus, considering the ontology of objectivism of this study, we 
ascertain that the research philosophy for this study is Positivism. Table 5.1 provides 
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5.2.3. Our Epistemological Position  
Epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge, especially what constitutes 
acceptable knowledge and how it is validated (Grix  2002). The ways of discovering 
knowledge are not static but continuously changing, and as a result, there exist 
competing views on what constitutes acceptable knowledge (Knudsen & Tsoukas 
2003). Positivists advocate an epistemological perspective that proposes the 
application of the methodological approaches of the natural scientist to the study of 
social phenomena (Remenyi & Williams  1998). On the other hand, Interpretivists 
advocate an epistemological perspective that requires the social scientist to grasp the 
subjective meaning of social phenomena through qualitative methods of interpretation 
of human action  (Bryman  2001, p.13) 
We consider the nature of thHSKHQRPHQRQLQYHVWLJDWHGLQWKLVVWXG\&KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa - to be of separate existence to the researcher. Investments carried out by 
Chinese firms are considered to the observable and measurable on which credible data 
can be collected. A theory is developed by a conceptual framework (comprising of 
testable hypotheses) that are rigorously tested against the collected data. The 
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epistemological position of a researcher influences the research methods employed by 
the researcher (Grix  2002). Thus, our epistemological position (the view that social 
phenomena that are observable constitute knowledge) has influenced our chosen 
methodological position. Next, we discuss our methodological position.              
5.2.4. Our Methodological Position  
The interrelationship between what we think can be researched (our ontological 
position) and what we can know about the phenomenon (our epistemological position) 
leads us to how we can go about acquiring knowledge about the phenomenon (our 
methodological position). Grix (2002,  p.179) GHILQHVDUHVHDUFKHU¶VPHWKRGRORJLFDO
DSSURDFKDVDµFKRLFHRIDSSURDFKDQGUHVHDUFKPHWKRGVDGRSWHGLQDJLYHQVWXG\¶
Also, the research methodology is concerned with the logic of scientific inquiry, 
particularly with investigating the capabilities and limitations of specific research 
techniques (Grix 2002). The research methodology is different from the research 
methods (Kothari 2004,  p.7). The latter is inextricably linked to the research questions 
of our study and are considered to be the techniques used to collect and analyse data 
(Blaikie  2000). Considering our methodological approach is guided by our choices in 
relation to our ontological and epistemological positions (Burrell & Morgan 1979), the 
discussion on our ontological and epistemological positions suggests that our research 
reflects the philosophy of Positivism. As a result, a purely quantitative research method 
is the research method for our study. Furthermore, various aspects of the nature of the 
topic of this dissertation justify our choice of a quantitative approach.  
Firstly, the research problem of this dissertation (Chapter 1, section 1.2), requires the 
employment of a quantitative research method. Overall, our research problem focuses 
on how institutional factors of the home and host institutional environments influence 
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the investment decisions of CMNEs in Africa. Thus, there is a need to investigate the 
impact of institutional quality and institutional distance home and host institutional 
environments on the outcome ± investments of CMNEs in Africa which are usually 
tested through quantitative research methods (Creswell 2013). Furthermore, 
quantitative research methods have been advocated by scholars and employed in 
multiple studies (Biggeri & Sanfilippo  2009; Cheung et al. 2012; Drogendijk & 
Blomkvist 2013; Kolstad & Wiig  2011; Sanfilippo  2010) RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR
$IULFD&KLQD¶VJURZLQJSUHVHQFHLQ$IULFDLVDFRPSOH[SKHQRPHQRQ 
This complexity arises from the different motivations of various actors in the political 
and economic domains in China such as the Chinese government itself alongside large 
CMNEs (SOMNEs and POMNEs) currently active in Africa (Alden & Hughes  2009; 
Jiang  2009). To this end,  Kolstad & Wiig (2011) suggest that quantitative research 
methods are well suited in analysing which actors and motives are the most salient in 
shaping the investment decision of CMNEs in Africa while also enabling us to address 
the distinctiveness of Chinese OFDI in Africa. Secondly, the phenomenon consists of 
many observations of investments in many countries over many years that can 
appropriately be tested using quantitative approaches. Thirdly, several theories can be 
bridged resulting in the formulation of several hypotheses that can be tested through 
quantitative methods.   
Overall, the above justifications ± the research problem of this study, the use of 
quantitative data with many observations and the bridging of several theories through 
the formulation of hypotheses all account for the need for a quantitative study.  
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5.3. Research Approach   
Research approach constitutes WKHµSODQVDQGWKHSURFHGXUHVIRUUHVHDUFKWKDWVSDQWKH
steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection, analysis and 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶(Creswell  2013, p.3). The choice of which research approach to adopt 
is important as it enables the researcher to make a more informed decision about the 
overall research design of the study (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008). This dissertation 
VHHNV WR FRQWULEXWH WR H[LVWLQJ UHVHDUFK RQ WKH GHWHUPLQDQWV RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR
Africa from an institutional perspective by cross-fertilising insights from the IB and 
PE literature. The overall decision of which research approach should be used to study 
a phenomenon is informed by the philosophical assumptions of the researcher about 
the research design, and specific research methods of the collection, analysis and 
interpretation of data (Creswell  2013). In the previous section, the research philosophy 
of this study was discussed and justified. This section aims to explain the chosen 
research approach within the research philosophy of Positivism.  
Firstly, certain social research problems require specific approaches (Creswell  2013). 
The nature of the research problem of this study requires a deductive approach. The 
research problem of the study requires not only the identification of the most 
LQIOXHQWLDO IDFWRUV WKDW GHWHUPLQH WKH FRPSOH[ SKHQRPHQRQ RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR
Africa, but it also requires to comprehensively explain this phenomenon through the 
development and testing of theory. Theory testing is usually through the empirical 
testing of hypotheses that represents the research approach of deduction. Also, 
DOWKRXJK&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDLVDUHODWLYHO\QRYHOphenomenon, several studies 
examine WKH GHWHUPLQDQWV RI &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD (e.g. Biggeri & Sanfilippo  
2009; Cheung et al. 2012; Drogendijk & Blomkvist  2013; Kolstad & Wiig  2011). As 
a result of the presence of existing studies, the use of an inductive approach is not 
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required, as such an approach is best suited to the study of a topic with little existing 
literature whereby working inductively by generating and analysing data highlights 
novel concepts about a phenomenon (Saunders et al. 2011). Our research problem also 
requires the statistical generalisation of the results of our study to the totality of the 
population under study. Such a requirement can be best achieved by a deductive 
approach, were samples of sufficient numerical size (usually n>30) allows for 
statistical inference to the entire population.   
Secondly, philosophical assumptions about what constitutes knowledge influence the 
research approach adopted in a study (Creswell  2013). Section 5.2 shows the research 
philosophy of this study is Positivism whereby theory is tested by formulating 
hypotheses that are then validated or refuted through the collection and analysis of data 
using statistical procedures. Thus, in line with our research philosophy, the research 
approach adopted for this study is a deductive approach. This approach involves the 
deducing of testable hypotheses about the nature of the relationship between two or 
more concepts that have been empirically operationalised to enable statistical 
measurement (Robson  2002).  
This study seeks WR LQYHVWLJDWH WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO GHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)', LQWR
Africa by bridging both IB and PE literature. In our theory building chapter, (Chapter 
4), a new theory of our phenomenon was constructed ZLWKWKHKHOSRIµROG¶FRQFHSWV
from the IB and PE literature. From these concepts, we generate a series of hypotheses 
on how they help explain our phenomenon of interest. These hypotheses are then 
statistically tested for validation using data. Thus, from a research philosophy 
standpoint, the deductive approach is appropriate for this study. We now discuss the 
research contexts of this study in the following section.  
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5.4. Research Context  
 
5.4.1. OFDI from China  
6LQFHWKHDGYHQWRIWKHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\LQWKH\HDU&KLQHVH2)',DEURDGKDV
grown at a  fast rate making China the second largest outward investor in 2016 
(UNCTAD  2017). This high growth in Chinese capital abroad is due to particular 
characteristics of the institutional environment of China that makes Chinese OFDI an 
interesting phenomenon worth examining (Child and Rodriguez  2005; Morck et al. 
2008). In this section, we explain why this study focuses on Chinese OFDI.  
Firstly, the active involvement of the Chinese state in the encouragement of OFDI 
makes Chinese OFDI an interesting phenomenon notably from a theoretical 
perspective (Luo et al. 2010). Traditional IB theories highlight the importance and 
existence of specific OAs (Dunning 2001), usually in the form of superior 
technological know-how and managerial expertise for FDI to take place. However, the 
recent phenomenon of Chinese firms engaging in OFDI suggests that in the absence 
of ownership advantages derived from superior technology or managerial experience, 
CMNEs have developed political advantages a new type of OAs. These political 
advantages result from the active support given by the Chinese government to CMNEs 
engaging in OFDI (Luo, Xue and Han 2010; Buckley et al. 2007).   
Secondly, from an institution-based view of IB, the NIEs theoretical approach to IB 
posit that MNEs are more likely to invest in countries with secure and stable 
institutions (Henisz 2000; Henisz & Williamson  1999). However, it has been 
suggested that Chinese firms invest in African countries with low institutional quality 
and high political risk (Haglund 2008; Patey 2007). Such investments pose a challenge 
to current predictions of the effects of institutions on FDI flows (Wang et al. 2012). 
This challenge arises from the political influence of Chinese OFDI which cannot be 
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neglected in circumstances where strong links exist between government and business 
as is the case in China.  
The links between the government and business in China are reflected in the higher 
number of SOEs in China (Bruton, Peng and Ahlstrom 2015). The existence of such a 
high number of SOEs in itself makes Chinese OFDI an interesting research context. 
The investment motivation of Chinese SOMNEs can differ from that of Chinese 
POMNEs (Duanmu  2012). For instance, Chinese SOMNEs are more likely to have 
political objectives than Chinese POMNEs (Ramasamy et al. 2012) when engaging in 
OFDI and thus, might be less risk-averse than their private counterparts (Duanmu  
2012). This difference in investment motivation is why we compare the drivers of 
Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs.  
Overall, the active involvement by the Chinese government in OFDI and the 
prevalence of SOEs in China makes Chinese OFDI an important research context due 
to challenges to the existing theoretical approaches to IB. For instance, the above 
characteristics will help us examine the extent to which host country institutional 
quality impacts the investment decisions of CMNEs originating from an institutionally 
supportive environment (RQ 1). Furthermore, the high number of SOMNEs engaging 
in OFDI will help us examine the extent to which the host country institutional quality 
impacts the investment decisions of Chinese SOMNEs compared to Chinese POMNEs 
differently (RQ 3)    
5.4.2. Africa As a Research CRQWH[WIRU&KLQD¶V2)', 
7KH UHFHQW JURZWK LQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD KDV LJQLWHG LQterest from IB and 
Political Economy scholars (Kolstad & Wigg 2012; Drogendijk & Blomkvist 2013; 
Mohan 2013; Konings 2007). This fast growth in Chinese FDI in Africa has increased 
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research on the factors behind the growth in Chinese investments in Africa. 
Continental Africa has several distinctive features as a context for Chinese OFDI. 
Thus, the objective of this section is to justify the choice of continental Africa in this 
study as a research context of Chinese OFDI by highlighting some of these 
peculiarities that make Africa an important UHVHDUFKµODERUDWRU\¶WRWHVWexisting theory.  
Firstly, since the year 2000, a growing number of CMNEs have been investing in 
Africa (UNCTAD 2017). This growth in Chinese firms is due to specific political 
IDFWRUVERWKLQ&KLQDDQG$IULFD,Q&KLQDWKHODXQFKRIWKHµ*R*OREDO¶SROLF\E\WKH
Chinese government encouraged CMNEs to seek new markets overseas (Voss, 
Buckley and Cross 2010).  
In Africa, there was a desire on the part of African governments to forge new strategic 
partnerships with countries not usually considered traditional partners such as 
European countries. This desire culminated in the establishment of FOCAC in the year 
2000 (Taylor 2010). Both factors have contributed to Africa becoming an increasingly 
important destination for Chinese OFDI (Fernando  2007), paving the way for Chinese 
firms into Africa (Lide  2001).  
Secondly, the institutional quality of African countries makes Africa unique as a 
research context for Chinese OFDI. The African continent has the largest number of 
countries with institutional voids of strong institutional frameworks where in some 
cases the so-FDOOHG µUXOHV RI WKH JDPH¶ DUH DOPRVW QRQ-existent (Asiedu 2006). For 
LQVWDQFH DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ,&5*  GDWDEDVH DQG WKH :RUOG %DQN¶V :RUOG
Governance Indicators (2017) database, the majority of African countries rank among 
the lowest in institutional quality. ICRG (2016) data shows the majority of African 
countries to be very high-risk scoring below 50 out of a possible 100 points on the 
political risk index (80 to 100 points is considered very low risk). According to the 
146 
 
same data reported by ICRG (2017), very few countries are relatively better from an 
institutional quality standpoint, examples of which are Botswana, South Africa, and 
Morocco, all scoring more than 60 points. Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea are on the other 
end of the spectrum with the worst institutional quality scoring below 30 points.  
On political rights and civil liberties, data from Freedom House (2017) shows the 
PDMRULW\RI$IULFDQFRXQWULHVFDWHJRULVHGDVµQRWIUHH¶ZLWKWKHmajority of countries 
scoring between 5.5 and 7 (1.0 to 2.5 is categorised as free and 3.0 to 5.0 categorised 
as partly free). Such low levels of institutional quality in African countries have been 
highlighted as one of the most significant predictors for the lack of inward investment 
into the continent relative to other regions in the world (Asiedu, 2006). For instance, 
firms from developed economies firms may find it more challenging operating in 
African countries with poor institutional quality than their counterparts from 
developing economies such as China that operate in a similar institutional environment 
in their home country (Morck et al. 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc  2008).  
Thirdly, the colonial history of Africa makes the continent a very interesting context 
for investigating the drivers of Chinese OFDI. Nearly all African countries today were 
under colonisation by Western European countries from the late 19th century until the 
1960s ±a period which began with the so-FDOOHGµ6FUDPEOHIRU$IULFD¶DQGHnded with 
WKHµZLQGRIFKDQJH¶WKDWVZHSWDFURVVWKHFRQWLQHQWFXOPLQDWLQJLQWKHGHFRORQLVDWLRQ
of the majority of African countries. Thus, betweeQWKHHDUO\¶VDQGPLG-1970¶V
almost the entire African continent was free from European colonialism and comprised 
of a vast number of newly independent states (Birmingham  2008).  
Due to almost a century of European colonialism, in nearly all African countries today, 
the official language in business interactions, government, the media and how judicial 
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matters are structured are a relic inherited from their European colonisers (Poku 1996). 
Indeed there exist several institutional similarities not in quality but in aspects like 
language, educational systems and business culture between, for example, France and 
its former African colonies, who now form the majority of the 80 member club known 
as La Francophonie (Holter & Skattum  2006). In contrast, China has never possessed 
any colonies in Africa but has played an active role in support of the fight for 
independence in most African countries (Konings  2007).  
RegaUGLQJ&KLQHVH2)',LQWR$IULFD&KLQD¶VVWDWXVDVDUHVSHFWHURIVRYHUHLJQW\KDV
indeed been helpful its renewed engagement with the continent. African countries were 
keen to forge new partnerships with China not only because of its economic rise but 
also because of &KLQD¶VODFNRIDFRORQLDOSDVWZLWKWKHFRQWLQHQWmeans it is viewed 
positively by African leaders. Thus, they view a partnership with China as a means to 
µGLVWDQFH¶WKHPVHOYHVIURPWKHIRUPHUFRORQLDOSRZHUVwhich in their view have not 
helped African development since independence. For instance, responding to President 
;L¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWRIELOOLRQRIILQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHDWWKH)2&$&FRQIHUHQFHLQ
Johannesburg in 2015, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe stated in his speech:  
³+HUHLVDPDQrepresenting a country once called poor, a country which never was 
our coloniser...he is doing to us what we expected those who colonised us yesterday 
to do.´ 
Therefore, the lack of colonial links between China and Africa acted as a push factor 
with African countries attracted to forging a strategic relationship with China as an 
alternative to their traditional European partners. This OHG WR WKH µQR FRQGLWLRQV¶
approach to Chinese development assistance to Africa in a bid to bolster its status as a 
respecter of African sovereignty.  
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Fourthly, large Chinese OFDI projects into Africa are often integrated with aid, which, 
unlike aid from the West is not conditional (Haan  2011; TanǦMullins  2010). 
According to regional official development assistance data (ODA) 2016 published by 
the OECD, every African country is a recipient of foreign aid from Developed 
Economies and multilateral organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the 
European Union institutions. The provision of this aid is based on conditional 
acceptance of issues like fiscal probity, respect for human rights, and transparency 
(Taylor  2007)7. Particularly, the issue of human rights has always been a major bone 
of contention for African regimes due to accusations of human rights abuse from 
western democracies (Taylor 2008). For instance, the Africa growth and opportunity 
act (AGOA) which allows free duty access to US markets for selected exports from 
Africa is conditional to African countries respecting human rights and the rule of law 
(Zafar  2007).  
This approach is in contrast to the Chinese foreign policy of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of other sovereign countries (Taylor  2002; Taylor  2007). Such 
differences in approach between the West and China on issues of human rights in 
Africa can be attributed WRWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHGHILQLWLRQRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHµKXPDQ
ULJKWV¶(Taylor  2008). Chinese discourse on human rights attaches more importance 
to collective human rights to economic development and social rights than the Western 
approach.  
As Burstein & Keijzer (1998,  p.136) QRWHGµ7RWKH&KLQHVHWKHKXPDQULJKWVWRIRRG
clothing, shelter, economic development and security are paramount over traditional 
Western-VW\OHLQGLYLGXDOSROLWLFDOOLEHUWLHV¶7KLVQRWLRQis fully echoed in the Chinese 
                                                          
7
 See (Taylor, 2007) for discussion on a classic example of the negotiations between Angola and the 
IMF  where perceived interference resulted in the halt of negotiations.  
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mainstream media. For instance in an article in Xinhua ± a government news agency, 
WLWOHG µ+XPDQ ULJKWV FDQ be manifested GLIIHUHQWO\¶ LW LV DUJXHG WKDW LQ WKH FDVH RI
developing countries, human rights are based firstly on survival and development 
which in turn forms tKHEDVLVRIDOORWKHUULJKWV,WJRHVRQWRQRWHWKDWµ)RUa starving 
man what should he choose bread or ballot if he is supposed to choose only one? The 
ballot is, of course, important. However, he must feed himself with bread before he 
FDQFDVWDEDOORW¶ (Xinhua, Beijing, 12 December 2005, p.2).  
Overall, the non-interference policy of the Chinese government makes Africa as a 
ORFDWLRQ RI &KLQHVH 2)', LQWHUHVWLQJ IURP D UHVHDUFKHU¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ GXH WR WKH
repeated accusations of African regimes of human rights abuse by the West (An-naim 
& Deng  2010). The alternative approach perpetuated by China might seem attractive 
to African governments who are growing impatient with the constant criticisms of their 
records on human rights (Tull  2006). This approach by the Chinese shows that the 
need for a PE approach at least LQWKHFRQWH[WRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDLVFUXFLDO
in fully explaining this phenomenon especially because African countries with weak 
human rights records have attracted a high level of Chinese OFDI. This approach is 
currently lacking in traditional IB theories.  
)LQDOO\VWXGLHVRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDH[DPLQLQJWKH3(DVSHFWVXFKDVWKHQRQ-
interference policy and its impact on Chinese investments into the continent are 
lacking. As Cheung et al. (2012, p.218) SRLQWRXW µ)XWXUH UHVHDUFK LVZDUUDQWHG WR
broaden understanding of nature and the implications of the China-Africa economic 
LQWHUDFWLRQV¶Also, there is a need to show a link between Chinese developmental aid 
and outward FDI in Africa  (Biggeri & Sanfilippo  2009). Previous research suggests 
that FDI is part of an overall strategy by the Chinese government that also comprises 
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of aid and trade. For instance, Sanfilippo (2010) examines the implications of FDI-
economic cooperation on Chinese OFDI in Africa. Based on empirical evidence that 
investment decisions in Africa often follow bilateral aid patterns (Yasin 2005), 
Sanfilippo (2010) utilises Chinese aid into Africa to proxy the variable of economic 
cooperation.  
However, this also highlights a gap in the literature on Chinese OFDI in Africa. 
Though the use of aid as a proxy for economic cooperation captures an important 
dimension of Chinese OFDI into Africa, aid can still be utilised to capture the effect 
of the political strategy of non-interference. This is because as already indicated 
before, Chinese developmental assistance is granted with no conditions attached 
(except for issues on the sovereignty of Taiwan), and this helps legitimise CMNEs in 
operating in African countries.    
To sum up, this section explained our choice of Africa as a context for Chinese OFDI 
in our study. We have argued that the nature of the institutional environments of 
African countries, the colonial past of the African continent, Africa as one of the 
largest recipient region of aid and finally the lack of studies examining the impact of 
the PE dimension of Chinese OFDI into Africa, all make Africa a suitable context for 
examining Chinese OFDI. In the following section, we describe the characteristics of 
our research data.    
5.5. Research Data 
The paucity of quality and reliable data on Chinese OFDI on the one hand and the lack 
of data on macroeconomic indicators for all African countries on the other have been 
a major hurdle for formal empirical analyses of the determinants of Chinese OFDI into 
Africa (Cheung et al. 2012).  
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To counter the problem of lack of reliable data on Chinese OFDI we use firm-level 
greenfield investments in the period 2003 and 2015 to test our hypotheses formulated 
in Chapter 4. The data on greenfield investments was drawn from FDI Markets, a 
database operated by FDI Intelligence, a specialist branch of the Financial Times 
group. This database tracks and monitors global cross-border greenfield investments 
in all sectors in real time since 2003. This database is advantageous compared to the 
data published by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in the Statistical Bulletin of 
&KLQD¶V2)',IRUa number of reasons.       
)LUVWO\ZKDWZHGRNQRZDERXWWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDLVEDVHG
on aggregate-level data (e.g. Drogendijk & Blomkvist  2013; Cheung et al. 2012; 
Kolstad & Wiig  2011). The FDI Markets database provides firm-level data enabling 
us to use the firm as our unit of analysis, thereby allowing us to complement our results 
with the above predominantly aggregate level studies. Secondly, the FDI Markets 
provides an industry-level classification of each project enabling the robustness checks 
of our results across different economic sectors. Thirdly, the database also provides 
the identity of each company carrying out the project. The identity of the firm is 
important for our study as this enables us to carry out further identification on their 
ownership type, i.e. if they are a SOMNE or a  POMNE to investigate the differences 
in investment motivations between Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. Furthermore, 
company reports of each firm are also provided which in many cases provide 
information on the ownership structure of the company (such as company 
shareholders).  
We sought data capturing the institutional quality of the investing and host countries 
from the ICRG database 2016. Data on macroeconomic indicators of African countries 
are sourced IURP WKH:RUOG%DQN¶V:RUOG'HYHORSPHQW ,QGLFDWRUVGDWDEDVH
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Data on Chinese development assistance to African countries are sourced from the 
AidData database 2017.    
5.5.1 Description of Data  
To test our hypotheses, we compile a sample dataset that comprises of data from all 
the above-mentioned secondary sources. Sampling is typically carried out when it 
would be impracticable to collect data on the entire population (Saunders et al. 2011). 
Thus, it is important to collect a sample that is not only representative of the population 
but also from which our research findings can be generalised to the population of 
interest.  
Our sample consists of a dataset of investments into Africa in general from both China 
and other source countries (both developed and other developing countries) enabling 
for a benchmarking of the determinants of OFDI from these investors with that of 
Chinese investors. Therefore, we collect a total of 5748 investments carried out in 37 
African countries in the period between 2003 and 2015. The dataset records the amount 
of each investment with each investment categorised as a new project or an expansion 
of a previous project.  
Of the 5748 investments in our sample, 241 investments are Chinese investments. We 
categorise these 241 investments in our sample into those carried out by Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs. Identifying which company is a SOMNE or a POMNE in 
China is a complicated task. Firstly, from a general standpoint, the level of ownership 
DQGFRQWURORIWRGD\¶V62(VYDULHV a great deal, and thus it is more nuanced than was 
two decades ago (Bruton, Peng and Ahlstrom 2015). Secondly, the changes of 
ownership and reform of Chinese SOEs over the past two decades (Yiu 2011) makes 
the identification of Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs complex. Thirdly, in China, it is 
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observed that who controls the firm is based on the type of shares held. For example, 
shares that vote on issues of control may be held by the government who has veto 
power (Xu & Wang  1999). For this study, the important aspect is whether a 
government body (directly or indirectly controlled by the government) has a 
controlling influence over the investing firm. Thus, we categorise a firm as a SOMNE 
if the single largest shareholder is a government entity or another SOE, and a POMNE 
if it is owned by an individual or a private company. This definition is in line with 
earlier studies (Meyer et al. 2014; Jones and Mygind 1999; Yuan, Hua and Junxi 
2008).  
Also, we generate a company report for each investing company or its parent company. 
The company reports contain information on the profile of the company, the names of 
company contacts and their positions within the firm, the profile of each project carried 
out by each company. We use the information on the ownership structure provided in 
the company profile to identify SOMNEs from POMNEs. Where such information is 
limited, we acquire information on ownership structure from information available on 
the profile of firms listed in either of the Hong Kong, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges or from the most recent annual reports information on shareholding. By our 
definition of SOMNEs and POMNEs, and as of the end of 2015 152 of the 241 projects 
were carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and 89 by Chinese POMNEs. After dropping 
all observations with missing data (listwise), the final sample of total Chinese 
investments is 197 and 120 for SOMNEs and 77 for POMNEs for the period 2003-
2015.  




in our overall sample. However, data on this variable is available up to 2014 resulting 
in a drop in observations for Chinese investments from 197 to 128 for the second part 
of our analysis for the period 2003-2014. Appendix A1 shows the countries included 
in our sample. 
5.6. Variables and Measurement 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of all variables. In the following subsections, we present 
and provide a detailed explanation of the dependent, independent, moderating and 
control variables used in this study. 
 
5.6.1. Dependent Variable  
In this study, we employ a single specification for the dependent variable. Following 
earlier studies (Buckley et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2012; Guerin & Manzocchi 2009). 
The interest of this study is to examine the location decision of CMNEs in Africa in 
monetary terms. Thus, we use the natural log of the capital invested as the dependent 
variable to capture the level of the FDI and not the number of jobs created. We use the 
natural log as this ensures a normal distribution of our dependent variable (Doane & 
Seward  2005). Data on the amount of the investments is sourced from the FDI Markets 
database 2016.   
5.6.2. Independent Variables  
We utilise broadly the same independent variables for the analysis conducted in 
Chapter 6 and 7. Based on our literature review (Chapter 3) we identify the following 
key independent variables - institutional quality, institutional distance, regulatory 
quality, and regulatory distance. Data on all these variables are sourced from the ICRG 
database 2016.  
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The variable institutional quality captures the overall quality of the institutional 
environment of the host countries. It is measured as a sum of twelve (these are: 
government stability, socio-economic conditions, investment profile internal conflict, 
external conflict, corruption, law and order, military in politics, religion in politics 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality) political risk 
components provided by the PRS group published as the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). We use the sum of the above twelve indicators to create a composite 
measure of institutional quality. The lower the institutional quality, the greater the risk 
to potential investors. The political risk components of the ICRG database have been 
used by previous studies to capture the level of institutional quality (Asiedu 2004; Ali, 
Fiess and MacDonald 2010a; Demir 2016; Knack and Keefer 1995), thus in this study 
we follow this approach in utilising these variables to capture the level of institutional 
quality in African countries. Furthermore, scholars (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001) have 
argued that there is an overlap between economic and political institutions in the 
measurement of institutional quality including the democracy, government 
bureaucracy, law and order, and level of corruption. Thus, to proxy all these different 
aspects of institutions, we use the ICRG variables as they are measured using a 
composite index of that includes political, economic, and legal institutions (Demir 
2016).     
We use a composite measure for this variable because measurement problems arise 
when a single index is used to capture a broad aspect of a country such as institutions 
(Ali et al. 2010; Pajunen 2008). The employment of single institutional indicators has 
shown to yield different results (Busse & Hefeker 2007). Furthermore, MNEs are more 
likely to consider the overall institutional quality when deciding to engage in FDI 
rather than a single institutional factor such as corruption (Pajunen 2008). For instance, 
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the negative impact of corruption on FDI  is worsened by the presence of a weak rule 
of law (Méon & Sekkat  2005). The impact of this variable is linked to Hypothesis 1a 
VXJJHVWLQJDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRIKLJKHUKRVWFRXQWU\LQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\RQ&KLQD¶V
OFDI into Africa. 
Another key independent variable of this study regards the regulative institutions of 
the host country. We call this variable regulative quality. The variable regulative 
quality captures the level of quality of the regulative institutions of the host country. 
By regulative institutions, we mean the effective and efficient rules and regulations 
governing a society such as constitutions, the guarantee of property and intellectual 
property rights otherwise known as formal institutions (North 1990, p.110). Regulative 
quality is measured by the sum of five indicators ± government stability, corruption, 
law and order, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. Higher values 
represent higher regulative quality and vice versa.  
It has been suggested that MNEs are more likely to invest in countries with high levels 
of regulative quality as this reduces uncertainty in the policy environment as well as 
the cost of doing business through lower transactions and production costs (Meyer  
2001; Meyer et al. 2009; Henisz  2000). Instead of the above suggested positive impact 
of regulative quality on FDI, we hypothesise that higher regulative quality in African 
countries will have a negative effect on Chinese OFDI. Thus, the impact of regulative 
quality is linked to Hypothesis 2a of our study put forward in Chapter 4.  
We now turn to our independent variables capturing the level of dissimilarity between 
the institutional quality of the home country and the host country of the MNE. We 
begin with the variable institutional distance. The variable institutional distance 
captures the dissimilarity in the quality of the institutional environment of the home 
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and host country of the firm. We measure this variable by taking the annual differences 
between aggregate institutional quality in the source and host countries (Aleksynska 
and Havrylchyk 2013). The index values of this variable indicate higher values 
represent high institutional distance between the home country of the firm and the host 
country and vice versa.  
It has been suggested that MNEs are not only deterred by poor institutional quality in 
host countries but are also discouraged by a large institutional distance between the 
home country of the firm and its host country (Habib & Zurawicki  2002; Xu & 
Shenkar  2002; Aleksynska & Havrylchyk 2013). This deterring effect of institutional 
distance on FDI is mainly due to uncertainty and the difficulties faced by MNEs in 
building organisational legitimacy when the institutional distance between its home 
and host country is large (Kostova & Zaheer  1999) and increased LOF (Eden and 
Miller 2004). Thus, in this study, we investigate the impact of institutional distance on 
Chinese OFDI by hypothesising that a low institutional distance will have a positive 
impact on the FDI location decision of CMNEs in Africa (Hypothesis 3a) ± developed 
in Chapter 4.  
We also include the variable regulative distance as a key independent variable in this 
study. Firstly, the variable regulative distance captures the dissimilarity between the 
regulative quality of the home and host countries regarding the setting, monitoring and 
enforcement of rules and regulations. We measure this variable by constructing annual 
differences of the aggregate regulative quality of the source and host countries. Higher 




Regulative institutions provide needed legitimacy to organisations operating in 
compliance with the relevant regulations of the country (Scott  2001). Thus, from a 
regulative institutional perspective, MNEs are more likely to choose to locate in 
countries where the difference in the quality of the regulative regime between the home 
and host country is small (Xu & Shenkar  2002; Eden & Miller  2004).  This decision 
is based on the notion that MNEs can readily conform to the regulative institutions of 
the host country (and consequently build legitimacy) and face lower LOF when the 
difference between the regulative regime of the home and host country is small (Chan 
& Makino 2007; Zaheer 1995). The inclusion of the regulative distance will provide 
an answer to Hypothesis 4a suggesting that the FDI location choice of CMNEs in 
Africa is positively associated with a low regulative distance between China and the 
host country. 
5.6.3. Moderating Variable       
To test the moderating effect of Chinese aid on our key independent variables we use 
the variable Aid as a moderating variable in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. This variable 
is measured as the annual flow of aid as a percentage of GDP. It is widely suggested 
that the provision of Chinese aid mostly in the form of concessional loans plays a 
significant role in promoting Chinese OFDI in Africa (Biggeri & Sanfilippo  2009; 
Sanfilippo  2010). To capture this potential moderating effect of Chinese development 
aid on the impact of key independent variables, we source data on Chinese aid from 
AidData 2016. AidData has been tracking Chinese development finance in Africa 
since the year 2000 and has data available from 2003-2014 for 38 African countries.  
Prior studies have utilised this data to better understand the scale and distribution of 





It is worth mentioning that China defines and measures aid in ways that are 
inconsistent with Western countries. According to (OECD 2017) DLG LV µRIILFial 
GHYHORSPHQW DVVLVWDQFH¶ DQG is defined as the flows of finance with the intent of 
development with an element of grant of at least 25%. Aid that does not meet this 
criterion of ODA is categorised as other official flows (OOF) that typically comprise 
of loans that are mostly concessional and commercial. An empirical examination of 
&KLQD¶VRYHUVHDVGHYHORSPHQWDLGshows that the bulk of it is mostly loans that can be 
classified as OOF as their terms and aims are partly or even wholly commercial 
(Bradley et al. 2014). Also, this variable also serves as a proxy for the Chinese foreign 
policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of African countries including on 
matters relating to the improvement of institutional quality. Thus, we argue that the 
above nature of Chinese Aid in Africa makes this variable a potential moderator of the 
impact of institutional quality and institutional distance on Chinese OFDI into Africa. 
The moderating impact of aid is captured in hypotheses H5a, H5b, H6a, and H6b. 
   
5.6.4. Control Variables 
Alongside the institutional environment of the African countries, other characteristics 
of the host country can play a role in determining the amount of FDI it receives. Thus, 
we explain and discuss below how we control for factors relating to the 
macroeconomic environment.  
5.6.4.1. Traditional Macroeconomic Factors Affecting FDI 
We first control for the size of the host country market. The size of the host country 
market is recognised as a significant determinant of market-seeking FDI. Dunning & 
Lundan (2008 p.70) suggest a number of reasons why MNEs carry out market-seeking 
investments. Firstly, it may be that their major suppliers have set up production 
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facilities overseas and thus to retain their business they are compelled to follow them 
overseas. Secondly, quite often products need to be adapted to local taste. Thus local 
production might be the only means of achieving this aim. Finally, MNEs may find it 
necessary to establish a presence in increasingly important markets already served by 
their competitors. For CMNEs, Africa represents one of the fastest growing regions in 
the world with a relatively high average GDP growth of between 6 and 7% 
(International Monetary Fund 2017). Fast-growing economies such as those in Africa 
present opportunities for MNEs to generate profit more than those countries that are 
growing slowly or not growing at all.  
Research on the determinants of Chinese OFDI, in general, provides evidence of 
market-seeking FDI by CMNEs (Buckley et al. 2007; Deng  2004; Kolstad & Wiig  
2012) and Chinese OFDI into Africa in particular (Cheung et al. 2012; Drogendijk & 
Blomkvist  2013; Kolstad & Wiig  2011). We, therefore, control for the host market 
characteristics of African countries by using the variables GDP and GDP per capita 
growth to capture the host market size (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad & Wiig 2011). 
The variable GDP captures the overall size of the economy and measured by the 
natural log of the annual GDP of host countries while the GDP per capita growth 
captures the annual growth in the purchasing power of the citizens of host countries. 
The variable GDP per capita growth is measured as an annual percentage growth in 
GDP per capita. Data on both variables are sourced IURP WKH:RUOG%DQN¶V:RUOG
Development Indicators (WDI) 2016. We expect a positive relationship between GDP 
on the one hand and GDP per capita growth on the other hand and Chinese OFDI into 
Africa.  
We then control for the natural resource-seeking motivation for Chinese OFDI into 
Africa. Natural resource-seeking motives have been suggested to also be a key 
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determinant of Chinese OFDI into Africa (Kolstad & Wiig  2011; Drogendijk & 
Blomkvist  2013). The high levels of economic growth in China within the past decade 
and a half necessitate a constant supply of raw materials and other commodities to 
sustain it (Ramasamy et al. 2012). As a result, of this economic necessity, the Chinese 
JRYHUQPHQW KDV LQWHQWLRQDOO\ XVHG 2)', PDLQO\ WKURXJK LWV µ*R *OREDO¶ SROLF\ WR
safeguard the supply of domestically scarce physical resources and commodities like 
oil and gas, minerals timber and agricultural products (Zafar  2007; Jiang  2009). 
Consistent with existing studies (Buckley et al. 2007; Drogendijk & Blomkvist  2013), 
we use the ratio of ore and metals exports to merchandise exports as a control for the 
presence of natural resource endowment in host countries. Data on this variable is 
derived from the WDI 2016 database. We expect a positive relationship between this 
variable and Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
Thirdly, we control for the impact of high and unpredictable inflation rates on Chinese 
OFDI. Empirical evidence suggests host country inflation rates have a significant 
negative impact on Chinese OFDI (Zhang & Daly  2011; Ramasamy et al. 2012). High 
and unpredictable inflation rates in African countries create uncertainty through their 
domestic currency devaluation which reduces the real value of revenue in domestic 
currency. It is also likely to increase the prices of locally sourced factor inputs thereby 
having an adverse effect on profit margins (Busse & Hefeker  2007). We control for 
the impact of host country inflation rates by using the variable inflation measured by 
the annual percentage growth in consumer prices. Data on this variable is derived from 
the WDI 2016 database. Overall high rates of host country inflation rate discourage 
inward FDI. Thus, we expect a negative relationship between Chinese OFDI into 
Africa and host country inflation rate.  
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Fourthly, we control for the impact of the quality of the physical infrastructure of host 
countries. As a continent, the majority of African countries lag behind their 
counterparts in the developing world on just about every measure of the quality of 
physical infrastructure (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia  2009). Such a low quality in 
physical infrastructure can have a significant impact on the FDI location decisions of 
MNEs due to LWVLPSDFWRQDILUP¶VFRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJH(Wheeler & Mody 1992). 
Thus, we control for the impact of host country infrastructure quality, by using the 
variable fixed telephone subscriptions. This variable is measured by the number of 
fixed telephone line subscribers per 100 people (Stoian & Mohr 2016). Data on this 
variable is sourced from the WDI 2016 database. We expect a positive relationship 
between this variable and Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
We also control for a group of other macroeconomic factors likely to influence FDI 
inflows ± net foreign direct investment flows, the real effective exchange rate and trade 
balance. The variable foreign direct investment captures any potential agglomeration 
effects of FDI. This variable is measured as the net foreign direct investment flows to 
GDP. Data for this variable is sourced from the WDI 2016 database. It has been 
suggested that firms seek to invest in countries where a high number of firms from 
their home country are already in operation (Disdier & Mayer  2004). Thus, we expect 
a positive relationship between this variable and Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
We control for the effect of exchange rate volatility on Chinese OFDI into Africa by 
using the variable real effective exchange rate capturing the degree of volatility in the 
exchange rate between the home and host currency. This variable is measured by the 
weighted average of the currency of host countries relative to the index of a basket of 
major currencies (Dunning  2006). We derive data on this variable from the WDI 2016. 
Higher volatility in exchange rates can signify instability in the economic environment 
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of the host country and result in high levels of unpredictability, thereby acting as a 
deterrent to foreign investment (Duanmu  2012; Gastanaga et al. 1998; Globerman & 
Shapiro  2002). Thus, we expect a negative relationship between this variable and 
Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
We also include the variable trade balance as a control variable that captures the degree 
of openness of the economy of host countries to international trade. This variable is 
measured by the ratio of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP (Dunning  2006; 
Kolstad & Wiig  2011). Data for this variable is sourced from the WDI 2016. The 
LPSDFWRIDFRXQWU\¶VRSHQQHVVWRLQWHUQDWLonal trade depends on the type of FDI, i.e. 
horizontal or vertical FDI. For instance, horizontal FDI might be attracted to countries 
that are more restrictive to trade because it protects the goods of the foreign firm in the 
domestic market against imports from foreign competitors. On the other hand, MNEs 
engaged in export-oriented investments might seek to avoid high transactions cost due 
to high trade barriers by investing in countries that are relatively open to international 
WUDGH7KXVDFRXQWU\¶VRSHnness to trade might be positively or negatively related to 
inward FDI. However, empirical evidence suggests there is a positive relationship 
between trade and FDI (Busse & Hefeker  2007; Adam & Filippaios  2007; Dunning  
2006). We expect a positive relationship between the variable trade balance and 
Chinese OFDI into Africa.           
5.6.4.2. Colonial Ties 
We control for the effects of colonial ties. This variable is measured by a dummy 
variable indicating the presence of colonial ties between the home country and the host 
country. Where colonial ties exist between the home and host country is coded as 1, 
and where no such ties exist this is coded as 0. Information on the colonial power is 
derived from the CIA World Fact Book 2016. In Africa, one of the relics of 
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colonisation has been a cultural similarity between the colonised country and the 
colonising country. For instance, France as one of the major colonial powers in Africa 
adopted a policy of assimilation in its colonies in Africa in the throughout the 19th and 
20th century (Diouf  1998). The assimilation policy was based on the notion of 
spreading the French culture to their colonies, and by adopting the French culture, local 
Africans were considered French citizens (Betts 1960).  
A typical illustration of the assimilation policy was demonstrated in the four 
communes of Senegal ± Saint Louis, Dakar, Goree, and Rufisque where rights of full 
French citizenship were extended to the inhabitants of these towns (Johnson  1971). 
Firms from countries that possessed colonies in Africa might still benefit from such 
colonial ties mainly through the transfer of culture that occurred during the colonial 
era (Rangan & Drummond  2004). This was the case with MNEs from Western Europe 
that historically engaged in FDI in African countries because of post-colonial links 
(UNCTAD 2001). Empirical evidence suggests MNEs are attracted to countries with 
colonial ties to their home country as cultural similarities will make their operations 
easier (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc  2008). We expect a positive relationship for OFDI 
from countries with colonial ties with African countries. Table 5.6 describes all the 










Table 5.2. List of Variables and Measurement 
Variables  Measure  Hypothesis  Expected sign  Source  
Dependent variable   
Log FDI The natural log of the amount of capital 
investment (million $USD) 
 n/a FDI Markets  
Independent variables   
Institutional quality  A simple sum of 12 components  of  political risk  H1a - Calculated from ICRG data, 
PRS Group.  
Institutional distance  The difference between the score of home and 
host country overall institutional quality  
H3a + This study  
Regulative quality  A simple sum of 5 components of political risk 
components 
H2a - This study  
Regulative distance  Difference between the score of home and host 
country regulative quality  
H4a + This study  
Moderating variable   
Aid flows Aid (% GDP) H5a H5b H6a 
H6b 
 Aid Data 2016 
Control variables   
Log GDP  The natural log of the GDP (in 2010 $USD) n/a + WDI 2016  
GDP per capita  GDP per capita growth (annual %) n/a + WDI 2016 
Ores and metals exports  % of ores and metals in the FRXQWU\¶V total exports n/a + WDI 2016 
Inflation  Annual % change in consumer prices  n/a - WDI 2016 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  Number of telephone lines per 100 people n/a - WDI 2016 
Foreign direct investment  Annual net inflows of FDI as a % of GDP n/a + WDI 2016 
Real effective exchange rate  &RXQWU\¶V FXUUHQF\ DJDLQVW DQ index of a trade-
weighted basket of major currencies  
n/a - WDI 2016 
Trade balance Merchandise trade as a % of GDP  n/a + WDI 2016 
Colonial links  Dummy of 1 for a colonial link and 0 otherwise  n/a  + CIA World Fact Book 2016 
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5.7. Regression Model  
We formulate the following regression model: 
LFDIikt  Įkt ȕ1Institutionalqualkt ȕ2,QVWLWXWLRQDOGLVWȕ3Regulativequalkt 
ȕ55HJXODWLYHGLVWȕ7LogGDPkt ȕ8GDPpcgrowthkt ȕ9Oresandmetalskt 
ȕ10Inflationkt ȕ11Foreigndirectinvkt ȕ125HDOHIIHFWLYHH[FKȕ13Fixedtelekt 
ȕ14Tradekt ȕ15&RORQLDOOLQNVİkt 
 
The above equation models the scale of OFDI into Africa from developed, developing 
economies and China by firm i in the host country k. We have 37 host countries in 
total. The t represents the year. We have 12 years in total. This regression model is 
adopted for empirical estimation for the determinants of OFDI from China in 
comparison to the determinants of OFDI from developed and developing economies 
into Africa. The right-hand side of the equation includes the key variables of interest 
in this study namely ± institutional quality, institutional distance, regulative quality, 
regulative distance, as well as control variables.  
Our data is cross-sectional where each investment enters the data only once. Thus, we 
adopt the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method with pooled cross-sectional 
data of 37 African countries over the period 2003-2015 by accounting for the industry, 
year and source country effects. The use of a panel model is not preferred as each 
observation corresponds to an individual investment making every each observation 
unique. We use the same regression model for empirical estimation of the determinants 
of OFDI by Chinese SOMNEs in comparison to Chinese POMNEs from our 
subsamples of Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
In chapter 7, we estimate the moderating effect of Chinese development aid on our key 
institutional variables of interest. To do this, we interact our key institutional variables 
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with the variable aid. We use multiple regression analysis by estimating a series of 
linear interaction models (OLS). This method allows for the inclusion of a moderating 
variable in the proposed cause-and-effect relationship between our primary 
independent variables and dependent variables (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). The 
moderating variable in this analysis shapes the strength of the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables in our analysis. It is thus an interaction whereby 
the effect of a change in our primary independent variables on the dependent variable, 
is contingent on the level of the moderating variable. Hence we estimate the following 
regression model: 
LFDIikt  Įkt ȕ1Institutionalqualkt ȕ2Aid*Institutionalqualkt ȕ3Institutionaldist 
ȕ4Aid*Institutionaldist ȕ5Regulativequalkt ȕ6Aid*Regulativekt + 
ȕ95HJXODWLYHGLVWȕ10$LG5HJXODWLYHGLVWȕj&RQWUROVİkt 
 
5.7.1. The Assumptions of the OLS Model     
Our dependent variable has an error component that is unobservable. However, clues 
to this error are in the residuals. According to Cameron & Trivedi (2009,  p.83), the 
OLS estimation method makes three important assumptions about the error term.   
Assumption 1: The residuals are approximately normally distributed. This assumption 
is used to construct the confidence intervals for the regression parameters. Thus, when 
the residuals are non-normal, the confidence intervals for the regression parameters 
may be unreliable. However, the confidence intervals are ok with large sample size, 
e.g. n > 30 (Doane & Seward  2005). In this study, the sample size is greater than 30 
(see section 5.5.1)   
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To ensure the above assumption is met for our study, we first carry out an initial kernel 
density plot of our dependent variable (capital investment). 
Figure 5.1.  Kernel Density Plot of the Dependent Variable (FDI inflows) 
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The kernel density plot displays an approximate of the probability density of the 
variable. We chose it over a histogram because they are smooth and independent of 
the choice of origin. Figure 5.1(A) shows the initial kernel density plot of the 
dependent variable to be highly skewed to the right, hence a non-normal distribution. 
To ensure a normal distribution, we perform a log transformation of this variable. We 
then perform a second kernel density plot of the variable after taking its natural log. 
Figure 5.1(B) shows the distribution of this variable takes a somewhat normal 
distribution. 
Assumption 2: The second assumption of the OLS estimation method is that the 
residuals have a constant variance (homoscedastic). If the variance of the residuals is 
non-constant, the residuals are considered heteroscedastic. In circumstances of 
heteroscedasticity even though the OLS regression parameter estimates are still 
consistent and unbiased, their estimated variances are likely to be understated making 
the t statistic to be inflated artificially narrowing the confidence intervals (Cameron & 
Trivedi  2009).  To ensure that the variance of the errors in our regression models is 
constant, we use white corrected errors. We do this E\LQFOXGLQJWKHµUREXVW¶FRPPDQG
when carrying out each regression model in STATA 15.      
Assumption 3: The independent variables included in the model, should not correlate 
too highly with each other. This condition is known as multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity does not result in bias in the predictions for our dependent variable. 
However, it does result in the inflation of the variances of the estimated regression 
coefficients of the independent variables thereby widening the confidence intervals 
(Montgomery, Peck and Vining 2012). Due to the entanglement of the roles of the 
independent variables, multicollinearity makes it difficult to separate the individual 
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contribution of each independent variable in explaining the dependent variable 
(Montgomery, Peck and Vining 2012).   
We ensure that there are no multicollinearity problems by carrying out a test for 
tolerance by generating the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all regression models 
which we report. The VIF test is a widely used measure of the degree of 
multicollinearity of each independent variable with other variables in a regression 
model. For this study, we use the acceptable threshold of an average VIF value of less 
than 10 and a value of less than 5 for each independent variable in our models as a 
guide (Wang & Hong 2012; Wu & Chen  2014; Doane & Seward  2005). Furthermore, 
to avoid the problem of multicollinearity between our key independent variables, we 
include each of our six key independent variables in separate regression models.  
5.7.2. The Assumptions of Moderation Analysis   
This section presents and discusses the assumptions that have to be fulfilled by 
researchers before carrying out a moderation analysis. Also, we explain how each 
assumption is fulfilled in our analysis. It is worth noting that the moderating variable 
included in our analysis is a continuous moderating variable. Thus the assumptions 
presented below relate to moderation analysis with a continuous moderating variable.    
The first assumption regards the coding of the interaction term. The coding of the 
interaction term is contingent on the nature and measurement of the independent and 
moderating variables (that is, if measured as continuous or categorical) (Aiken, West 
and Reno 1991). For this analysis, all our primary independent variables and moderator 
variables are measured as continuous. Under such circumstances, where the 
independent and moderating variables are continuous, scholars typically create an 
interaction term by multiplying the primary independent variable by the moderating 
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variable (Kingsley, Noordewier and Bergh 2017).  To mitigate any risk of wrongful 
coding, we follow the appropriate and widely utilised method of coding interaction 
terms by creating a series of multiplicative interaction terms of each of our primary 
independent variables and our moderating variable.  
The second assumption is that there are no issues of collinearity between the 
independent and moderating variable of interest. The third assumption is that there is 
no multicollinearity between both variables and the interaction term. In moderation 
analysis there is likely to be a high degree of multicollinearity considering the 
independent variable and its interaction term is included in the same regression model. 
To ensure there are no issues of collinearity between our primary independent 
variables and the moderating variable we perform a pairwise correlation of all 
variables. The results show a high correlation between our primary independent 
variables and our interaction variable as expected.  
To solve this problem, we follow previous studies (Wu & Chen 2014; Asiedu & Lien 
2011; Jandhyala 2015; Min & Smyth 2014) by generating the standardised values of 
the independent and moderating variables with their product terms (Aiken, West and 
Reno 1991) in our models examining the moderating effect of Chinese aid in Chapter 
7.  
5.8. Summary Statistics and Correlations  
In this section, we describe our variables numerically and perform correlation analysis 
showing the degree of correlation between our variables. 
5.8.1. Summary Statistics  
For variables of numerical nature, we examine the measures of location and measures 
of dispersion. The measures of location help us understand the central tendency of our 
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variables, while the measure of dispersion shows how the values of our variables vary 
around their means (Saunders et al. 2011). 
In management research, the three ways of measuring the central tendency are the 
mean (known as the average), the mode (most frequent value) and the median (middle 
value). The most standard of statistical measures of central tendency is the mean. For 
measures of dispersion, the most frequently used measure is the standard deviation 
(the extent to which values are spread around their mean). Our variables are numerical. 
Thus we deem the mean and standard deviation as suitable measures of central 
tendency and dispersion respectively (Doane & Seward, 2005).  
Table 5.2 provides the overall summary statistics for all variables. We adopt a 
comparative approach to describing our sample data by firstly describing the sample 
of investments from other investors into Africa except for China, followed by 
investments from China in particular. This comparative approach aims to show how 
the profile of the host countries differ between all other investors on the one hand and 
China on the other hand.    
The descriptive statistics show that the average value of the institutional quality 
variable is 60.81 out of a possible 100 points with 100 points indicating better quality 
for the period 2003-2015. This value indicates that the institutional quality of most 
African countries can be regarded as poor. Another interesting finding of this variable 
relates to its maximum and minimum value. The minimum value is 23.6 while the 
maximum value is 79. This statistic indicates that although Africa, in general, can be 
regarded as a continent with a high number of countries with relatively poor 
institutional quality, some countries score far higher than others in this domain. For 
instance, countries like Namibia (79), Morocco (73) and Botswana (74) have made 
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great strides towards the improvement in the quality of their institutional frameworks. 
On the other hand, countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (35), Nigeria (45) 
and Ivory Coast (46) score among the lowest in respect to institutional quality. 
Table 5.3. Summary Statistics 
Variables  Observations  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
 All Other  Investors 
Log FDI 4853 2.98 1.66 -4.3 10 
Institutional Quality 4853 60.81 8.88 23.6 79 
Regulative Quality 4853 18.88 2.89 7.8 26 
Institutional Distance 4853 16.90 10.88 -18.4 60 
Regulative Distance 4853 6.80 3.72 -7.2 22 
Log GDP 4853 25.27 1.22 20.3 27 
GDP per capita growth 4853 2.62 3.78 -62.2 30 
Ores and metals exports  4853 13.76 15.04 0.0 86 
Inflation 4853 9.73 29.06 -35.8 1097 
Foreign direct investment 4853 3.47 5.54 -6.0 42 
Real effective exchange 
rate  
4853 93.87 38.82 0.0 237 
Fixed telephone 
subscriptions  
4853 6.22 4.82 0.0 20 
Trade balance 4853 -3.21 16.24 -69.2 56 
Colonial links 4853 0.25 0.43 0.0 1 
                     Chinese Investors Only 
Variables   Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Log Capital Investment 197 3.37 1.89 -3.9 8 
Institutional Quality 197 57.36 8.57 36.9 76 
Regulative Quality 197 17.72 2.28 11.4 24 
Institutional Distance 197 5.47 9.53 -14.4 33 
Regulative Distance 197 1.22 2.48 -6.3 9 
Log GDP 197 1.37 1.37 21.2 27 
GDP per capita growth 197 4.09 4.09 -18.9 30 
Ores and metals exports  197 18.66 21.34 0.0 85 
Inflation 197 12.87 29.57 -2.4 433 
Foreign direct investment 197 3.12 4.96 -6.0 35 
Real effective exchange 
rate  
197 97.87 41.97 0.0 220 
Fixed telephone 
subscriptions  
197 4.56 4.41 0.0 16 
Trade bala ce 197 -2.52 16.12 -62.1 56 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
For the sample of Chinese investors only, the average institutional quality of host 
countries is 57.36. This statistic shows that regarding institutional quality, there is no 
much difference between the institutional quality of the host countries of all other 
investments in Africa and the institutional quality of host countries of Chinese 
investors. Similar to the institutional quality variable, the descriptive statistics also 
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show almost no difference in the regulative quality (average of 18.8 for all other 
investors and 17.72 for Chinese investors only) of host countries of all other investors 
and the host countries of Chinese investors only.      
Regarding institutional distance, the descriptive statistics also shows a relatively high 
distance between the institutional quality of African countries and that of the investing 
countries in our sample as the average value is 16.90 out of a possible 100 points. 
Higher values equate to higher overall institutional distance. However, the negative 
sign of the minimum value for this variable indicates that although most African 
countries have poor institutional quality, some countries have a higher institutional 
quality than some developing countries investing in Africa. For instance, Turkey has 
an institutional quality score of 52.2 while the score for Botswana is 74.  
For Chinese investors, in particular, the average overall institutional distance is 5.47, 
far lower than 16.90 for the sample of all other investors in our sample. This result 
indicates a  much lower overall institutional distance between China as the home 
country of Chinese investors and the host African countries in which they are 
investing. The minimum value of this variable -14.4 suggest that some African 
countries have a higher overall institutional quality than China. The above difference 
of 5.47 also exists between the regulative distance variable. The descriptive statistics 
also show a relatively lower regulative distance between the host African countries of 
Chinese investors and China compared to the host African countries for all other 
investors in our sample.    
For our macroeconomic variables, the average annual GDP per capita growth is 2.62%. 
This result indicates a relatively high growth in GDP per capita. However, the standard 
deviation for this variable is also higher than the mean at 3.80. This large standard 
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deviation is not surprising as the range for this variable is also large with a minimum 
value of -62.2 and a maximum value of 30. Such a wide range of values illustrates the 
diversity of our sample. The average GDP per capita growth of host countries of 
Chinese investors only is slightly higher at 4.09% thus suggesting a potential market 
seeking motivation for CMNEs in Africa.   
The average exports of ores and metals as a percentage of total merchandise exports 
in all host countries for all other investors are sample stands at 13.76%. This represents 
a relatively high percentage of overall exports of raw materials. According to the 
minimum (0) and maximum (86) value for this variable, it is also worth noting that the 
exports percentage of raw materials is far higher in some countries than others. In other 
words, some countries rely far more on exports of raw materials for their economic 
growth than others. For instance, exports of ores and metals as a percentage of total 
merchandise exports for Zambia is up to above 83% and 64% in Mozambique. Egypt 
and Kenya are at the end of the spectrum with 3% of exports of ores and metals. We 
agree that ores and metals are one type of natural resource in a continent characterised 
by a variety of raw materials. However, it shows the degree of divergence in natural 
resource endowments across the continent. The average ores and metals exports are 
even higher in the host countries of the Chinese investors only standing at 18.66%. 
This difference might suggest an attraction to African countries with high natural 
resource endowment by Chinese firms.    
As a proxy for the quality of physical infrastructure in the African countries in our 
sample, the average number of subscribers of fixed telephones per 100 people in host 
countries for all other investors is 6.22. This variable shows that the majority of the 
African countries in our sample are lacking in high-quality infrastructure. This is not 
at all surprising as the lack of high-quality physical infrastructure in the continent as a 
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whole has been cited as a major drawback to economic development in Africa (Foster 
& Briceno-Garmendia, 2009). In the host countries with Chinese investors only, this 
proxy for infrastructure quality is lower at 4.56. This attraction to host countries with 
even lower quality in physical infrastructure by Chinese investors can be explained by 
the growing role the Chinese government in general and Chinese firms in particular in 
WKHGHYHORSPHQWRI$IULFD¶VLQIUDVWUXFWXUH(Foster, 2009; Corkin et al. 2008). 
5.8.2. Correlations 
To investigate the pairwise correlation between our dependent variable and our 
independent variables, we perform a correlation analysis by using the statistical 
technique of correlation (Pearson correlation) denoted r. We deem the method of 
correlation appropriate because the sample data we are using is numerical (Saunders 
et al. 2011). The correlation quantifies the strength of the association between our 
dependent variable and our key independent variables. When using the statistical 
technique of correlation, we assume that if there is any relationship between our 
variables, this relationship is a linear one. Thus as one variable increases the other 
increases or decreases in the same regular way.   
Thus in this study, the sample correlation coefficient measures the degree of linearity 
between inward FDI flows into Africa and our key independent variables. This 
coefficient has values that range between -1 and +1, where r =1 equates to a perfect 
positive correlation between the two variables under observation. By contrast, r = -1 
indicates a perfectly negative correlation and where r = 0 means the two variables are 
entirely independent of one another (Doane and Seward 2005). In our correlation 
analysis, we assume the above range of -1 and +1 whereby the closer r is to either -1 
or +1 the stronger association between the two variables under observation. In cases 
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where r is somewhere between -1 and +1, we assume linear independence between 
each variable under observation.  
Table 5.4 provides the correlation between our variables. Using the values of the 
correlation coefficient ranging from -1 and 1, the correlation matrix shows that the 
majority of our variables show weak or negative correlation. However, some of our 
key variables show a high correlation with each other. Firstly, the variable regulative 
quality shows a strong correlation with the variable overall institutional quality with r 
= 0.7. We expect this result as the variable regulative quality is a subcategory of the 
variable overall institutional quality. Secondly, we find the same result for the variable 
regulative distance showing high correlation with the variable overall institutional 
distance. Again, this high correlation is to be expected as the regulative distance 
(r=0.75),  is a subcategory of the overall institutional distance variable. The above high 
correlation between the above key variables can create multicollinearity problems and 
lead to spurious regressions (Montgomery, Peck and Vining 2012). To counter this 
potential multicollinearity problem, we perform our regression models by using each 
of our key independent variables in separate models. We seek further confirmation of 
multicollinearity problems by performing a variance inflation factor (VIF) test of all 
regression models. These tests show no multicollinearity problems (i.e. mean VIF <10) 
and the VIF value of each key independent variable less than 5.   
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Table 5.4. Pairwise Correlations  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 
1 Log FDI inflows  1 
               
2 Institutional quality -0.239 1 
              
3 Institutional distance  
 
0.297 -0.946 1 
             
4 Regulative quality  -0.0794 0.872 -0.775 1 
            
6 Regulative distance  
 
0.191 -0.800 0.881 -0.836 -0.745 1 
          
8 Aid (% GDP) -0.156 0.440 -0.484 0.342 0.448 -0.415 -0.481 1 
        
9 Log GDP -0.214 0.0174 -0.0697 -0.138 0.067 0.041 -0.104 0.255 1 
       
10 GDP per capita growth  0.0703 -0.188 0.235 -0.0349 -0.227 0.104 0.267 -0.0476 -0.250 1 
      
11 Ores and metals exports  -0.11 0.526 -0.544 0.309 0.568 -0.337 -0.585 0.460 -0.0268 -0.0362 1 
     
12 Inflation -0.0748 -0.186 0.231 -0.0608 -0.217 0.148 0.247 -0.318 -0.0979 0.184 -0.333 1 
    
13 Real Effective Exchange 
rate  
-0.0399 0.108 -0.0943 0.0158 0.133 0.035 -0.133 -0.104 -0.365 -0.196 0.107 0.159 1 
   
14 Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflows  
0.185 0.203 -0.195 0.329 0.151 -0.307 -0.146 0.0601 -0.404 0.248 0.176 0.137 -0.0706 1 
  
15 Fixed telephone 
subscriptions 
-0.247 0.385 -0.364 0.198 0.425 -0.176 -0.408 0.165 0.526 -0.262 0.171 -0.138 0.0185 -0.199 1 
 




5.9. Research Limitations 
Every research design whether quantitative or qualitative or a mixture of both is not 
without its limitations (Saunders et al. 2011). Thus, it is important that researchers 
acknowledge these limitations and view them as an opportunity to make suggestions 
for future research (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2008). We discuss our 
methodological limitations regarding sample size and data limitation. 
Firstly, our firm-level data is limited to greenfield investments into Africa. According 
to the Africa Investment Report 2015 (Africa Investment Report 2015), greenfield 
investments account for the bulk of investments in Africa. It is possible that the factors 
driving alternative modes of investment will be different. Thus, future research should 
explore the roles of institutional and regulative quality and institutional, and regulative 
distance in influencing Chinese OFDI in different modes of entry. Secondly, due to 
lack of data for Chinese aid for the years 2015, our analysis on the moderating role of 
Chinese aid (Chapter 7) is limited to 2003-2014.  
Thirdly, as earlier mentioned, the separation of investments by Chinese SOMNEs and 
Chinese POMNEs was a nuanced process. This is due to the complex patterns of 
government ownership and control not only specific to Chinese SOEs but also to 
modern SOEs at large (Bruton, Peng and Ahlstrom 2015). Although investments by 
Chinese POMNEs in Africa are growing, Chinese SOMNEs are still dominant in 
Africa (Jiang  2009). Unsurprisingly, the separation of investments into Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs resulted in an unbalanced sample with relatively smaller 
sample size for investments by Chinese POMNEs. Finally, our choice of variables was 
limited by data availability which continues to be a problem for researchers studying 
Africa. For instance, we would have liked to include information on the cognitive 
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institutions of the institutional environment of African countries. The most commonly 
used measure of this dimension is provided by Dow & Karunaratna (2006). However, 
the data used to measure this dimension is not available for the majority of African 
countries in our sample. On the other hand, information on normative institutions of 
the institutional environment of African countries is also limited. The most commonly 
used data sources to measure this dimension is that provided by Hofstede (1983) and 
the World Values Survey. However, data from both sources are only available for only 
a few African countries, thus in this study, we are unable to use data from these 
sources.   
5.10. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to present the chosen research design and methodology of 
this dissertation. Firstly, we sought to explain how our philosophical research 
positions, i.e. ontological epistemological and methodological stands. After a 
discussing our philosophical research positions we explained our research approach. 
We discuss China as a research context and then Africa as a research context for 
Chinese OFDI. We then described the characteristics of our samples, followed by the 
presentation of our variables. Next, we described our research data collection 
processes and our analytical techniques. Finally, we discussed the limitations of this 
study.   
In the next two chapters, we report and discuss the results of this study beginning with 
WKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQHVH2)',LQWR$IULFDE\EHQFKPDUNLQJ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR
Africa against OFDI from developed and developing economies in Chapter 6. This is 
followed by an examination of the moderating role of Chinese development aid on the 
impact of our key institutional variables in Chapter 7.   
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This chapter aims to test the impact of the institutional environment of the host 
countries on FDI inflows into Africa ± comparing OFDI from developed and 
developing economies8 on the one hand and China on the other. Although the source 
country of focus of this study is China, we use the examination of the effects of our 
key variables on FDI from other developing economies and developed economies as 
benchmarks IRU &KLQD¶V 2)', Lnto Africa. The FDI location decision of MNEs 
investing in Africa can differ between DCMNEs compared to EMNEs. This difference 
is due to potential differences in how the relatively low institutional quality in African 
countries (Bartels, Napolitano and Tissi 2014) can be viewed differently by DCMNEs 
and EMNEs.  
On the one hand, DCMNEs operate in an environment characterised by high 
institutional quality in their home countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc  2008). As a 
result, these firms might find it relatively more challenging operating in countries with 
low institutional quality as well as high risk of expropriation. This view of institutions 
is in line with the predictions of extant theoretical perspectives on FDI flows built 
mainly for DCMNEs (Child & Rodrigues  2005). On the other hand, although EMNEs 
are also exposed to the same risks when investing in African countries, these firms 
already operate in conditions of relatively weak institutional frameworks in their home 
countries (Meyer et al. 2009). As a result, EMNEs already possess the experience of 
                                                          
8
. We use the United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2017 to distinguish between 




operating in conditions of weak institutional frameworks and thus might be less 
cautious investing and operating in developing economies characterised by low 
institutional quality (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc  2008; Morck et al. 2008).   
Within the group of developing economies, we then focus on the determinants of FDI 
from China, which we believe represents a particular case of the group of developing 
economies. Firstly, the Chinese government has been actively involved in its support 
and encouragement of CMNEs (predominantly SO01(V WKURXJK LWV µ*R *OREDO¶
strategy (Voss, Buckley and Cross 2008). In Africa in particular, CMNEs enjoy clear 
political support, mainly under an overarching government foreign policy of non-
interference (Alden & Davies 2006). Focusing on China as a special case allows us to 
benchmark the effects of our independent variables on the FDI location decisions of 
&01(VZLWKWKDWRI'&01(VDQGRWKHU(01(VWKHUHE\VKRZLQJ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR
Africa as a special phenomenon.  From a theoretical perspective, the benchmarking 
process enables us to show the inadequacies of traditional IB theories in explaining the 
phenomenon of the growing levels of Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
For Chinese OFDI in particular, there is evidence (Duanmu 2012) suggesting that there 
is a difference in the FDI location decision of CMNEs based on firm ownership. For 
instance, Chinese SOMNEs often follow the strategic needs of their home government, 
thus making them less risks averse when engaging in FDI (Ramasamy et al. 2012). On 
the other hand, Chinese POMNEs are averse to the risks posed by weak institutional 
frameworks when choosing investment locations (Amighini et al. 2013). Based on the 
above potential differences in motivations between Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs, 
we distinguish between investments carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs 
to examine any potential differences in their investments patterns in Africa.   
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We organise the remainder of the chapter as follows: Section 6.2 reports and discusses 
the results of the effect of overall institutional quality, regulative quality on OFDI into 
Africa from developed and developing economies in comparison with FDI from China. 
In section 6.3, we report and discuss the results of the effect of home-host country 
overall institutional distance, and regulative distance on OFDI into Africa from 
developed and developing economies in comparison with OFDI from China. Next, we 
report and discuss the results of our control variables in section 6.4. In section 6.5, we 
report and discuss our results on the effect of overall institutional quality, and 
regulative quality on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. Section 6.6 reports and 
discuss the effect of the home-host country overall institutional distance, and 
regulative distance on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. Section 6.7 concludes 
the chapter.   
6.2. The Effect of Host country Institutional QualiW\RQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD
Compared to OFDI from Developed and Developing Economies   
 
In this section, we report and discuss the effect of our key variables related to 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO TXDOLW\ RQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR Africa using the results on FDI from 
developed and developing economies as benchmarks. We begin with a report and 
discussion of the results of institutional quality in section 6.2.1, and regulative quality 
in section 6.2.2. Table 6.1 provides the results of the effect of overall institutional 
quality, and regulative on FDI from developed, developing and Chinese economies.   
6.2.1. The Effect of Host Country Institutional Quality 
  
Models 1 and 3 examine the effect of institutional quality on FDI from developed and 
developing economies respectively. In both models, we include time and industry 
effects while model 1 includes source country effects. The results show the coefficient 
for institutional quality is negative and statistically significant for FDI from developed 
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(ȕ = - 0.02201, p < 0.01 in Model 1) and developing economies (ȕ = - 0.02995, p < 
0.01 in Model 3). For FDI inflows from developed economies, we find that a one 
percent increase in host-country institutional quality decreases FDI inflows by 0.02 
percent and 0.03 percent for developing economies. These results suggest that both 
DCMNEs and EMNEs are attracted to low institutional quality in African countries.  
Model 5 examines the effect of institutional quality on FDI inflows from China. In this 
model, we control for industry effects. The results show that the coefficient for 
institutional quality is a negative and statistically significant (ȕ= - 0.07467, p < 0.01) 
for FDI from China. Specifically, we find that a one percent increase in institutional 
quality decreases FDI from China by 0.07 percent. This result suggests that CMNEs 
are attracted to African countries with low levels of institutional quality, thus 
supporting Hypothesis 1a ± predicting that CMNEs tend to be attracted to African 
countries with low institutional quality.  
Our results also show that host-country institutional quality matters to CMNEs but not 
in the manner suggested in several existing studies on the relationship between 
institutional quality and FDI. Several empirical studies (e.g. Globerman & Shapiro  
2002; Busse & Hefeker  2007; Pajunen  2008; Delios & Henisz  2003; Meyer et al. 
2009) suggest a positive influence of institutional quality on FDI flows, showing 
MNEs are more likely to invest in locations with higher levels of institutional quality. 
This positive influence between host country institutional quality and FDI inflows is 
because operating in conditions of low institutional quality can increase the 
transactions cost for firms (Meyer  2001).  
7KHGLVFUHSDQF\EHWZHHQRXUUHVXOWVVKRZLQJDQHJDWLYHOLQNEHWZHHQ&KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa and host-country institutional quality and existing empirical evidence 
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showing a positive relationship between host-country institutional quality and FDI 
might be due to a few reasons. Firstly, the unique institutional environment in China 
might explain the negative influence of host-country institutional qualiW\DQG&KLQD¶V
OFDI into Africa. China has a legacy of a high degree of government involvement and 
encouragement of OFDI activities by Chinese domestic firms (Voss et al. 2010; Child 
& Rodrigues  2005). Buckley et al. (2007) and Morck et al. (2008) suggests that the 
encouragement of Chinese firms to engage in OFDI is usually through privileged 
access to capital on favourable terms due to local capital market distortions. 
Favourable treatment and access to cheap capital can encourage Chinese firms to 
invest abroad as cheap capital, and government support can reduce the financial risk 
associated with OFDI activities in countries with low institutional quality in the form 
of high transactions costs (Voss et al. 2010).  
Also, Chinese firms carrying out natural resource seeking investments in African 
countries might be doing so for the long-term interest of the Chinese economy with 
the support of the Chinese government. Investments under such circumstances are 
carried out with political and long-term strategic objectives rather than solely on 
economic ones. Thus, investments carried out with political and strategic motives in 
mind are more likely to be less risk averse to low institutional quality than investments 
carried out for purely economic motives (Ramasamy et al. 2012).   
We now use the results for FDI inflows from developed (Table 6.1, Model 1) and 
developing economies (Table 6.1, Model 3) as benchmarks for FDI from China. We 
find that the coefficient of institutional quality is negative and statistically significant 
for FDI from China (ȕ = - 0.07467, p < 0.01 in Model 5), developed economies (ȕ = - 
0.02201, p < 0.01 in Model 1) and developing economies (ȕ = - 0.02995, p < 0.01 in 
Model 3). Thus, regarding the impact of host-country institutional quality, we do not 
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find any difference (regarding the sign of the estimated coefficients) between FDI 
inflows from China and developed and developing economies.   
Although our results show a similarity regarding the sign of the coefficient between 
FDI  from the developed and developing economies on the one hand and from China 
on the other, the magnitude of the negative influence of institutional quality is greater 
for FDI from China ȕ= - 0.07467 (Model 5, in Table 6.1). The size of the coefficients 
suggests the magnitude of the effect of host country institutional quality is greater for 
investments by CMNEs, thereby suggesting that CMNEs invest more in African 
countries with low overall institutional quality than DCMNEs and other EMNEs. 
Although CMNEs have the same experience as other EMNEs in operating in 
conditions of low institutional quality compared to DCMNEs, specific factors can 
account for the higher magnitude of the effect of institutional quality on FDI from 
China. For instance, the institutional environment in China has been highly supportive 
of and promoted OFDI (Wang et al. 2012).  
The Chinese government, in particular, has played a significant role in encouraging 
OFDI such as through its financial assistance of large CMNEs and political backing in 
host countries with high risk of expropriation (Luo et al. 2010; Duanmu  2014). 
Furthermore, large FDI projects carried out by CMNEs in Africa have been carried out 
not solely for economic reasons but also with political and strategic objectives (Jiang  
2009; Haan 2011). Thus, such firms are likely to be less risk-averse than firms that 
invest strictly for profit.  
A few reasons might account for the similarity in investment motivation as regards 
host country institutional quality between CMNEs, DCMNEs and EMNEs. The 
presence and need for the exploitation of natural resources by DCMNEs can explain 
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the negative influence of host country institutional quality. For instance, previous 
empirical research suggests that both DCMNEs and EMNEs are even more attracted 
to host African countries with abundant reserves of natural resources, the lower the 
institutional quality of the host-country (Kolstad and Wiig 2011; Asiedu 2006). This 
finding suggests the need for the exploitation of resources and weak institutional 
frameworks, whereby institutional voids in African countries are viewed DVµVSDFHVRI
opportuQLW\¶IRUH[SORLWDWLRQ(Mair, Martí and Ganly 2007). In the case of FDI inflows 
from developing economies, the negative influence of institutional quality can be 
explained by the experience of EMNEs in operating in conditions of low institutional 
quality, thereby making these firms undeterred by the low institutional quality in 
African countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc 2008).  
Considering the above difference in the magnitude of the negative effect of 
institutional quality on FDI by CMNEs, DCMNEs and EMNEs we employ a multiple 
paired independent sample t-test to determine if the mean of our dependent variable ± 
FDI inflows is the same between all three groups. Specifically, we want to determine 
if the mean difference between each pair of investors is statistically significantly 
different from zero. 
From Table 6.2, DCMNEs (N = 4365) is associated with FDI inflows M = 2.92 (SD = 
1.64). By comparison, EMNEs (N = 1142) have higher FDI inflows M = 3.21 (SD = 
1.69). We test the hypothesis that the mean FDI inflow is significantly different 
between DCMNEs and EMNEs. The assumption of homogeneity of variance is 
satisfied throXJK /HYHQH¶V WHVW IRU WKH HTXDOLW\ RI YDULDQFH 7KH DVVXPSWLRQ RI
homogeneity of variance is necessary to justify using the pooled variance in the 
calculation of the t statistic when the sample size of both groups differ (Brown and 
Forsythe 1974). The independent samples t-test show a statistically significant effect, 
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t(5505) = -5.39, p = .000. Thus, EMNEs have a higher mean FDI inflows than 
DCMNEs. Next, we report the independent samples t-test between other DCMNEs 
and CMNEs.  
Table 6.3 shows DCMNEs (N = 4365) is associated with FDI inflows M = 2.92 (SD = 
1.64). By comparison, the CMNEs (N = 241) is associated with a numerically higher 
FDI inflows M = 3.36 (SD = 1.89). We test the hypothesis that the mean FDI inflow 
by DCMNEs and MNEs from China is significantly different. The assumption of 
KRPRJHQHLW\RIYDULDQFHLVQRWVDWLVILHGWKURXJK/HYHQH¶VWHVW. When the homogeneity 
of variance assumption is violated, and the sample sizes for both groups differ, the 
Welch test has been suggested as an alternative that does not assume equal population 
variances (Welch 1947). Thus, we employ a Welch approximation assuming unequal 
variance between the two groups. The independent samples t-test shows a statistically 
significant effect t(260.69) = -3.57, p = .000. This result suggests that CMNEs have a 
significantly higher mean FDI inflows than DCMNEs.  
We employ similar independent samples t-test in Table 6.4 between other EMNEs and 
CMNEs. EMNEs (N = 1142) is associated with FDI inflows M = 3.22 (SD = 1.69). 
We employ a Welch approximation due to unequal variance between the two groups. 
Although the CMNEs have a numerically higher FDI inflows, M = 3.36 (SD = 1.89), 
we do not find support for the hypothesis that EMNEs and CMNEs have a significantly 
different mean FDI inflows. The independent samples t-test does not show a 
statistically significant effect t(326.90) = -1.12, p = 0.2621
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Table 6.1. OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: Institutional, and Regulative Quality as Determinants of FDI from Developed, Developing and 
Chinese Economies 
Log FDI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Developed Economies Developing Economies China 
Institutional quality -0.02201***  -0.02995***  -0.07467***  
 (0.00438)  (0.00765)  (0.01955)  
Regulative quality  -0.04180***  -0.06230***  -0.15660** 
  (0.01168)  (0.02194)  (0.07018) 
Log GDP -0.10665*** -0.09224*** -0.10626* -0.08514* -0.02702 -0.06490 
 (0.02962) (0.02929) (0.05808) (0.06007) (0.15026) (0.15311) 
GDP per capita growth 0.00182 0.00530 0.00743 0.01589 0.01683 0.05106 
 (0.00928) (0.00931) (0.02364) (0.02432) (0.05244) (0.05327) 
Ores and metals exports  0.00509** 0.00208* 0.00631* 0.00367* 0.01043* 0.00293** 
 (0.00206) (0.00187) (0.00356) (0.00328) (0.00665) (0.00652) 
Inflation  -0.00055 -0.00025 -0.00202*** -0.00176*** -0.02352 -0.01293 
 (0.00076) (0.00066) (0.00046) (0.00047) (0.01951) (0.02018) 
Foreign direct investment 0.00370 0.00246 0.00504 0.00689 0.06198** 0.05162** 
 (0.00519) (0.00517) (0.01345) (0.01321) (0.02722) (0.02547) 
Real effective exchange rate  -0.00151* -0.00172* 0.00049 0.00030 0.00277 0.00170 
 (0.00091) (0.00091) (0.00168) (0.00170) (0.00458) (0.00462) 
Trade balance 0.00193* 0.00084* -0.00461 -0.00447 0.00698 0.00652 
 (0.00190) (0.00202) (0.00414) (0.00423) (0.00985) (0.01003) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  0.01498*  0.00038* 0.05586*** 0.03317** -0.00026 -0.03281 
 (0.00783) (0.00709) (0.01343) (0.01333) (0.03337) (0.03426) 
Colonial links -0.27067*** -0.27693***     
 (0.07795) (0.07788)     
Constant 8.61989*** 7.83086*** 8.84069*** 7.52120*** 8.09545* 7.73421* 
 (0.85408) (0.82162) (1.60952) (1.71600) (4.16521) (4.42735) 
Time effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  No  No  
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Source country effects  Yes  Yes  No  No   
Mean VIF  2.86 2.85 2.23 2.23 1.81 1.75 
Observations 3,869 3,869 984 984 197 197 
R-squared 0.28387 0.28116 0.33930 0.34329 0.41751 0.39465 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectivel
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Table 6.2. Results of T-Test for FDI by DCMNEs and EMNEs   




 DCMNEs   EMNEs   
 M SD n  M SD n t df 
FDI inflows  2.92 1.64 436  3.21 1.69 1142 -0.44, -0.16 -5.39*** 5505 
*** p<0.01. 
 
Table 6.3. Results of T-Test for FDI by DCMNEs and CMNEs  




 DCMNEs   CMNEs   
 M SD n  M SD n t df 
FDI inflows  2.92 1.64 436  3.36 1.89 241 -0.69, -0.20 -3.57*** 260.69 
*** p<0.01. Note: Welch approximation employed due to unequal group variances. 
 
Table 6.4. Results of T-Test for FDI by EMNEs and CMNEs   




 EMNEs  CMNEs   
 M SD n  M SD n t df 
FDI inflows  3.22 1.69 1142  3.36 1.89 241 -0.41,  0.12 -1.12 326.90 
*** p<0.01. Note: Welch approximation employed due to unequal group variances. 
 
6.2.2. The Effect of Host Country Regulative Quality  
Models 2 and 4 in Table 6.1, examine the effect of regulative quality on FDI from 
developed and developing economies respectively. Model 2 includes time, industry 
and source-country effects while model 4 includes time and industry effects. In model 
2, the coefficient for regulative quality is negative and statistically significant (ȕ = - 
0.04180, p < 0.01) for FDI from developed economies. We find that a one percent rise 
in host country regulative quality is associated with a decrease in FDI from developed 
economies by 0.04 percent, thus suggesting that DCMNEs are attracted to low host-
country regulative quality. In model 4, the coefficient for regulative quality is negative 
and statistically significant (ȕ = - 0.06230, p < 0.01) for FDI inflows from developing 
economies. We find that a one percent increase in regulative quality decreases FDI 
from developing economies by 0.06 percent. This result suggests that EMNEs are 
attracted to African countries with lower levels of regulative quality.    
In the case of FDI from China, model 8 shows regulative quality to be a negative and 
statistically significant estimator (ȕ = - 0.15660, p < 0.05). After controlling for 
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industry effects, we find that a one percent increase in regulative quality decreases FDI 
from China by 0.16 percent, thus suggesting that CMNEs are attracted to African 
countries with low levels of regulative quality. This result means we find support for 
Hypothesis 2a ± predicting that CMNEs tend to be attracted to African countries with 
low regulative quality.    
Comparatively, we find that the negative influence of host country regulative quality 
on FDI from China is similar to the effect on FDI from developed and developing 
economies as the coefficients for regulative quality are also negative. However, the 
results show the magnitude of the negative effect of regulative quality on FDI by 
CMNEs is greater ȕ = - 0.15660 (Model 6, in Table 6.1) compared to DCMNEs ȕ= - 
0.04180 (Model 2, in Table 6.1) and EMNEs ȕ = 0.06230 (Model 4, in Table 6.1). 
Specifically, while a rise in host-country regulative quality decreases FDI from 
developed and developing economies by 0.04 and 0.06 percent respectively, FDI from 
China decreases by up to 0.16 percent.  
The greater size of the coefficient for FDI from China suggests that CMNEs are more 
inclined to invest in African countries with lower levels of regulative quality than 
DCMNEs and other EMNEs. Thus, with regard to the effect of host country regulative 
quality, we find the investment pattern of CMNEs as a particular case (regarding the 
magnitude of the effect) as they seem to be more willing to invest in conditions of 
lower levels of host-country regulative quality. 
Prior empirical studies have shown that the quality of the regulative institutions, i.e., 
stable macroeconomic policy, property rights guarantee, and less bureaucracy are 
attractive to MNEs (Pajunen  2008; Bevan & Estrin 2004; Meyer et al. 2009; Meyer  
2001). Our results suggest CMNEs are more attracted to lower levels of host-country 
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regulative quality. The soft budget constraints of CMNEs (Cull & Xu 2003) might 
explain the above result. Access to cheap capital means CMNEs investing in African 
countries can manage the risk of higher transactions costs associated with operating in 
host countries with inefficient and burdensome regulations. Also, CMNEs might be 
attracted to African countries with lower levels of quality in regulative institutions due 
to their experience in operating under a similar regulatory environment back home 
(Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). Therefore, rather than the case of engaging in FDI to 
HVFDSH WKH µUHJXODWLYH YRLGV¶ EDFN LQ WKHLU KRPH-country (Stoian & Mohr 2016), 
CMNEs might be engaging in FDI in African countries with low regulative 
institutional quality to leverage their experience in operating in the same regulative 
conditions back home.   
6.3. The Effect of Institutional DistanFHRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD&RPSDUHG
to OFDI from Developed and Developing Economies  
 
In this section, we report and discuss the effect of our distance variables regarding 
institutional quality. The section begins with a report and discussion of the institutional 
distance variable in section 6.3.1 and regulative distance in section 6.3.2. The results 
of the effect of these variables on FDI from developed, developing and Chinese 
economies are provided in Table 6.5.   
6.3.1. The Effect of Home-Host Country Institutional Distance  
 
Models 1 and 3 examine the effect of institutional distance on FDI from developed and 
developing economies respectively. Model 1 includes time, industry and source 
country effects while model 3 includes time and industry effects. Our results show that 
the coefficient for institutional distance is positive and statistically significant (ȕ = 
0.02064, p < 0.01 in Model 1) for FDI from developed and developing economies (ȕ
= 0.01609, p < 0.01 in Model 4). In model 1, we find that a one percent increase in 
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institutional distance increases FDI from developed economies by 0.02 percent. Model 
3 shows the same increase of 0.02 percent for FDI from developing economies when 
the institutional distance increases by one percent.  
For easy interpretation of results, it is worth reiterating that we measure the 
institutional distance as the absolute distance between the institutional quality in the 
home and host-countries (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013; Cezar and Escobar 2015). 
By and large, the institutional quality of the majority of the developed economies 
included in our study is higher than that of the majority of host countries. On the other 
hand, a greater number of host countries have a higher institutional quality than some 
of the developing countries included in our dataset. Thus in such cases, the institutional 
distance will have a negative value (positive institutional distance) meaning the 
institutional quality in the host country is better than in the home country of the 
investing firm. The positive and statistically significant coefficients in Model 1 and 3 
suggest that institutional distance does not deter FDI inflows from developed and 
developing economies but even has a positive effect. These results suggest that 
DCMNEs and EMNEs alike invest in African countries with either better or worse 
institutional quality than at home.  
For FDI inflows from China, model 5 shows the coefficient for institutional distance 
is positive and statistically significant (ȕ = 0.05661, p < 0.01) after controlling for 
industry effects. This result indicates that a one percent rise in the institutional distance 
increases FDI inflows from China by 0.06 percent. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient suggest that high institutional distance does not deter CMNEs 
as they invest in African countries with better or worse institutional quality than in 
China. This result means we do not find support for Hypothesis 3a ± predicting that 
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low home-host country distance in terms of institutional quality will attract Chinese 
FDI.  
Comparing the above result to FDI from developed and developing economies, we 
find that the sign for the coefficient of the institutional distance variable is positive for 
FDI from developed (Model 1 in Table 6.5) developing (Model 3 in Table 6.5) and 
China (Model 5 in Table 6.5). However, the magnitude of the coefficients for 
institutional distance is higher for FDI from China ȕ = 0.05661. We interpret that 
compared to DCMNEs and other EMNEs, CMNEs invest more in African countries 
with either much higher or much lower institutional quality than at home. This result 
might be because as latecomers to the African continent, CMNEs seek to invest 
wherever the investment opportunities arise ± investing in African countries with 
better or worse overall institutional quality than in China. The investments by CMNEs 
in African countries with worse overall institutional quality than in China suggest the 
exploitation of weak institutions in African countries by CMNEs. On the other hand, 
CMNEs may invest in African countries with better overall institutional quality than 
LQ&KLQDWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHVWDEOHDQGHIILFLHQWµUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶WKDW WKHVH
countries provide.       
6.3.1.1. The Impact of Positive and Negative Institutional Distance 
Overall, our results show that DCMNEs, EMNEs and CMNEs invest in African 
countries with either higher or lower institutional quality than at home. Thus, in the 
current setting, the use of the absolute value of the distance makes it impossible to 
examine whether it is better or worse institutional quality that encourages FDI inflows 
into Africa from China, developed and developing economies. To solve this issue, we 
disaggregate our institutional distance variable into the positive institutional distance 
and negative institutional distance. Positive institutional distance represents cases 
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when institutional quality in the host country is better than in the home country, that 
is, MNEs prefer better institutional quality. On the other hand, negative institutional 
distance represents cases where institutional quality in the host country is worse than 
in the home country, that is, MNEs prefer worse institutional quality (Aleksynska and 
Havrylchyk 2013).  
We adopt this approach of disaggregation of our absolute institutional distance 
variable because the effect of positive and negative institutional distance is not 
symmetric (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk 2013). Foreign firms might find investing in 
countries with much better institutional quality attractive. Although a larger 
institutional distance creates unfamiliarity due to high dissimilarities in the institutions 
in the home and host country, it could be attractive to investors when the institutional 
quality in the host country is better than in the home country (Aleksynska and 
Havrylchyk 2013; Cezar and Escobar 2015).  
Table 6.6 presents the results of the effect of the disaggregated variables (positive and 
negative institutional distance) for FDI inflows from developed, developing and 
Chinese economies. Firstly, in cases of positive institutional distance, model 1 in Table 
6.6 shows that the coefficient for positive institutional distance is positive and 
statistically significant coefficient (ȕ = 0.67467, p < 0.1) suggesting that DCMNEs 
seem to be attracted by better institutional quality in the host country. In contrast, 
superior institutional quality in African countries deters FDI by both EMNEs and 
CMNEs as suggested by the negative and statistically significant coefficients for 
positive institutional distance (see the coefficient on positive institutional distance in 
Model 2 and 3 in Table 6.6).  
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Secondly, in cases where the institutional quality in the host country is worse than in 
the home country of the firm (negative institutional distance), we find that DCMNEs 
appear to be discouraged by it (ȕ = - 0.67467, p < 0.1 in Model 4). For EMNEs we 
find that when the institutional quality in the host country is worse than in the home 
country, they are attracted by it (ȕ = 0.26042, p < 0.1 in Model 5). The results show 
this is also the case for CMNEs (ȕ= 1.20977, p < 0.01 in Model 6). However, as earlier 
mentioned, the magnitude of FDI flows from China into African countries with worse 
institutional quality than at home is very important for FDI from China. Overall, our 
regression results suggest that CMNEs tend to invest more in African countries with 
worse institutional quality than in China (larger negative institutional distance) than 
other EMNEs while DCMNEs prefer a much lower negative institutional distance.       
Studies of the role of institutional distance and FDI flows suggests a large institutional 
distance between the home and host country institutional environment discourages 
FDI inflows (Xu & Shenkar 2002; Ghemawat 2001; Pogrebnyakov & Maitland  2011). 
This relationship is based on the notion that a large institutional distance between the 
home and host country increases the costs of doing business abroad through a 
heightened LOF (Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997; Eden and Miller 2004). This 
increased LOF makes it difficult for foreign firms to achieve external legitimacy 
(Kostova & Zaheer  1999).  
Contrary to the above view of the role of institutional distance, our results show 
CMNEs are even more attracted to a larger negative institutional distance between 
China and host African countries. This result might be explained by the fact that the 
average dissimilarity between the overall institutional quality of China and the African 
countries in our study is relatively small (see section 5.2, for summary statistics). 
Therefore, CMNEs might be attracted to African countries with even worse 
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institutional quality than back home in China as they are more likely to encounter less 
LOF (when operating in countries with low institutional quality). Also, CMNEs may 
be more attracted to African countries with weaker institutional quality than in China 
because it might be easier to exploit the weakness or absence of strong institutions in 
such countries (Kolstad and Wiig 2011). 
Meyer et al. (2014) suggest SOMNEs are more likely to adjust their entry strategy in 
host countries with high institutional quality than those with low institutional quality 
as institutional pressures are much higher in the former countries than in the latter. The 
low institutional quality in African countries means there is less pressure to conform 
to the institutional environment in African countries than they might be in host 
countries in Western Europe or North America with high institutional quality. The lack 
of high institutional pressures for conformity in African countries means institutional 
distance as a determinant of organisational legitimacy (Xu & Shenkar 2002) might not 
matter in a conventional way to CMNEs when investing in Africa. 
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Table 6.5. OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: Institutional and Regulative Distance as Determinants of FDI from Developed, Developing 
Economies and China  
Log FDI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Developed Economies Developing Economies China 
Institutional Distance 0.02064***  0.01609***  0.05661***  
 (0.00412)  (0.00475)  (0.01636)  
Regulative Distance  0.03196***  0.03990**  0.17834*** 
  (0.01052)  (0.01721)  (0.05917) 
Log GDP -0.10537*** -0.08881*** -0.08076 -0.08061 0.10222 0.03783 
 (0.02964) (0.02932) (0.05827) (0.05921) (0.14850) (0.14658) 
GDP per capita growth 0.00066 0.00422 0.00572 0.01243 0.00988 0.04621 
 (0.00930) (0.00932) (0.02365) (0.02381) (0.05190) (0.05389) 
Ores and metals exports  0.00489** 0.00176** 0.00455 0.00168 0.00738 0.00310 
 (0.00204) (0.00187) (0.00336) (0.00307) (0.00629) (0.00630) 
Inflation -0.00052 -0.00014 -0.00170*** -0.00170*** -0.03729* -0.02366* 
 (0.00075) (0.00064) (0.00045) (0.00046) (0.02109) (0.02099) 
Foreign direct investment 0.00433 0.00286 0.00488 0.00495 0.06315** 0.05927** 
 (0.00521) (0.00518) (0.01379) (0.01354) (0.02475) (0.02401) 
Real effective exchange rate  -0.00153* -0.00171* 0.00069 0.00081 0.00415 0.00277 
 (0.00091) (0.00091) (0.00167) (0.00168) (0.00466) (0.00466) 
Trade balance 0.00200* 0.00138** -0.00380 -0.00463 -0.00365 -0.00113 
 (0.00190) (0.00200) (0.00404) (0.00419) (0.01010) (0.01007) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  0.01354* 0.00159* 0.04126*** 0.03674*** -0.04926* -0.05628* 
 (0.00774) (0.00708) (0.01199) (0.01216) (0.03099) (0.03115) 
Colonial links -0.27197*** -0.27926***     
 (0.07791) (0.07788)     
Constant 6.69510*** 6.61009*** 6.35711*** 6.43736*** 0.39878* 2.17874* 
 (0.77299) (0.77187) (1.51327) (1.53407) (3.98865) (3.93212) 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No No 
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Source country effects  Yes  Yes  No No   
Mean VIF 2.88 2.87 2.20 2.21 1.81 1.74 
Observations 3,869 3,869 984 984 197 197 
R-squared 0.28392 0.28050 0.33744 0.33251 0.40687 0.40909 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p
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Table 6.6. OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: The Effect of Positive and Negative Institutional Distance on FDI from Developed, Developing 
Economies and China  
 Log FDI  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Positive Institutional Distance Negative Institutional Distance 
Positive institutional distance  0.67467* -0.31881** -1.20977***    
 (0.40027) (0.12959) (0.30661)    
Negative institutional distance     -0.67467* 0.26042* 1.20977*** 
    (0.40027) (0.15679) (0.30661) 
Log GDP -0.10714*** -0.05736 0.23555 -0.10714*** -0.04257 0.23555 
 (0.02818) (0.05915) (0.15332) (0.02818) (0.05764) (0.15332) 
GDP per capita growth  0.01924** 0.00844 0.02089 0.01924** 0.00299 0.02089 
 (0.00858) (0.02358) (0.05223) (0.00858) (0.02134) (0.05223) 
Ores and metals exports  0.00031 0.00383 0.01006 0.00031 0.00297 0.01006 
 (0.00179) (0.00357) (0.00625) (0.00179) (0.00362) (0.00625) 
Inflation 0.00076 -0.00152*** -0.03947* 0.00076 -0.00174*** -0.03947* 
 (0.00056) (0.00044) (0.02093) (0.00056) (0.00041) (0.02093) 
Foreign direct investment  0.00132 0.00261 0.05882** 0.00132 0.01221 0.05882** 
 (0.00508) (0.01383) (0.02316) (0.00508) (0.01339) (0.02316) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  0.00678 0.03362*** -0.08667*** 0.00678 0.02708** -0.08667*** 
 (0.00633) (0.01198) (0.03239) (0.00633) (0.01173) (0.03239) 
Trade balance 0.00539*** -0.00332 -0.00666 0.00539*** -0.00134 -0.00666 
 (0.00176) (0.00404) (0.01022) (0.00176) (0.00389) (0.01022) 
Real effective exchange rate  -0.00232*** 0.00090 0.00267 -0.00232*** 0.00135 0.00267 
 (0.00088) (0.00167) (0.00474) (0.00088) (0.00167) (0.00474) 
Colonial links -0.28037***   -0.28037***   
 (0.07751)   (0.07751)   
Constant 7.27946*** 6.06430*** -1.87836 7.95413*** 5.04294*** -3.08813 
 (0.74698) (1.53171) (4.03196) (0.79798) (1.56010) (4.12660) 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Source country effects  Yes  No  Yes  Yes   
Mean VIF 2.30 2.20 1.81 2.30 2.20 1.81 
Observations 3,869 984 197 3,869 984 197 
R-squared 0.27175 0.33333 0.42350 0.27175 0.32304 0.42350 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively   
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The disaggregation of the overall institutional distance into regulative (formal) 
institutional distance can have a differing effect on the internationalisation of MNEs. 
Regulative institutional distance can have a different effect on the degree of LOF that 
a foreign firm faces when it invests in a foreign country. This is because the 
effectiveness and efficiency of formalised rules and regulations can differ between 
countries  (Eden and Miller 2004). Thus, we disaggregate our overall institutional 
distance variable into a subcategory of regulative distance. We report and discuss our 
results in the section below.   
6.3.2. The Effect of Home-Host Country Regulative Distance   
 
Models 2 and 4 in Table 6.5 examine the effect of regulative distance on FDI from 
developed and developing economies respectively. In model 2, we control for time, 
industry and source country effects, and the results show that the coefficient for 
regulative distance is a positive and statistically significant (ȕ= - 0.03196, p < 0.01 in 
Model 2) for FDI from developed economies. A one percent rise in the regulative 
distance increases FDI from developed economies by 0.03 percent. Model 4 shows 
that the coefficient for regulative distance is positive and statistically significant (ȕ= 
- 0.03990, p < 0.05) for FDI from developing economies after controlling for time and 
industry effects. This result means a one percent rise in regulative distance increases 
FDI from developing economies by 0.04 percent. These results suggest that high 
home-host country regulative distance attracts FDI from both developed and 
developing economies.   
In the case of CMNEs, model 8 shows that the coefficient of regulative distance is 
positive and statistically significant (ȕ = - 0.17834, p < 0.01). Controlling for industry 
fixed effects, we find that a one percent rise in the regulative institutional distance 
increases FDI from China by 0.18 percent. This result suggests that regulative distance 
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matters to FDI from China but rather than deterring CMNEs from investing in African 
countries, it seems to encourage them to invest. This result means we do not find 
support for Hypothesis 4a ± predicting that low home-host country distance in terms 
of regulative quality will attract Chinese FDI inflows into Africa.  
 
Compared to investors from developed and developing economies, we find that the 
coefficient for regulative distance is positive for all investors but much larger for FDI 
from China (ȕ = 0.17834 in Model 6). This result is in comparison to the coefficients 
for FDI from developed (ȕ = 0.03196 in Model 2) and developing economies (ȕ = 
0.03990 in Model 4). We interpret as high regulative distance attracts higher FDI 
inflows from China than from developed and developing economies. To examine 
whether it is, in fact, better or worse regulative quality that is stimulating Chinese FDI, 
we disagregate the absolute regulative distance into positive regulative distance and 
negative regulative distance. Positive regulative distance indicates when the regulative 
quality in the host country is better than in the home country while negative regulative 
distance indicates when the regulative quality in the host country is worse than in the 
home country.    
 
6.3.2.1. The Effect of Positive and Negative Regulative Distance   
Table 6.7 presents the results for the effects of positive and negative regulative distance 
for FDI inflows from developed, developing and Chinese economies. Firstly, the 
coefficient for positive regulative distance is negative but not statistically significant 
for FDI inflows from developed (model 1) and developing economies (model 2). 
However, as regards FDI inflows from China, the results show that the coefficient for 
positive regulative distance is negative and statistically significant (ȕ= - 0.70613, p < 
0.05 in Model 3) FDI inflows from China.   
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Secondly, we find that the coefficient of the variable negative regulative distance is 
positive but not statistically significant for FDI inflows from developed (model 4) and 
developing economies (model 5). However, the coefficient for this variable is positive 
and statistically significant (ȕ = 0.70613, p < 0.05 in Model 6) for FDI inflows from 
China. Thus, we find evidence that, for CMNEs, when the regulative quality in the 
host country is worse than in China, they are attracted by it.  
Overall, our regression results suggest that compared to DCMNEs and EMNEs, 
CMNEs are deterred by better regulative quality in the host country than in China. 
They also seem to have a preference of investing in African countries with worse 










Table 6.7. OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: The Effect of Positive and Negative Regulative Distance on FDI from Developed, Developing 
Economies and China 
Log FDI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Positive Regulative Distance  Negative Regulative Distance 
Positive regulative distance  -0.03438 -0.20243 -0.70613**    
 (0.16834) (0.15235) (0.29402)    
Negative regulative distance     0.03438 0.21129 0.70613** 
    (0.16834) (0.14974) (0.29402) 
Log GDP -0.07932*** -0.06545 0.10362 -0.07932*** -0.06646 0.10362 
 (0.02918) (0.05898) (0.15284) (0.02918) (0.05896) (0.15284) 
GDP per capita  0.00477 0.00917 0.04912 0.00477 0.00922 0.04912 
 (0.00933) (0.02376) (0.05201) (0.00933) (0.02376) (0.05201) 
Ores and metals exports  0.00051 0.00024 0.00264 0.00051 0.00021 0.00264 
 (0.00180) (0.00311) (0.00618) (0.00180) (0.00310) (0.00618) 
Inflation 0.00033 -0.00153*** -0.02332 0.00033 -0.00154*** -0.02332 
 (0.00052) (0.00044) (0.02037) (0.00052) (0.00044) (0.02037) 
Foreign direct investment 0.00265 0.00368 0.05134** 0.00265 0.00390 0.05134** 
 (0.00517) (0.01336) (0.02411) (0.00517) (0.01337) (0.02411) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  -0.00379 0.03239*** -0.08139** -0.00379 0.03264*** -0.08139** 
 (0.00713) (0.01212) (0.03302) (0.00713) (0.01211) (0.03302) 
Trade balance 0.00316* -0.00442 -0.00358 0.00316* -0.00446 -0.00358 
 (0.00191) (0.00417) (0.01082) (0.00191) (0.00416) (0.01082) 
Real effective exchange rate  -0.00166* 0.00110 0.00219 -0.00166* 0.00109 0.00219 
 (0.00091) (0.00167) (0.00486) (0.00091) (0.00167) (0.00486) 
Colonial links -0.29238***   -0.29238***   
 (0.07751)   (0.07751)   
Constant 6.71898*** 6.20151*** 1.09062 6.68460*** 6.01375*** 0.38449 
 (0.76923) (1.52988) (4.06768) (0.79179) (1.53690) (4.13997) 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Source country effects  Yes  No   Yes  No  
Mean VIF 2.82 2.18 1.77 2.82 2.18 1.77 
Observations 3,869 984 197 3,869 984 197 
R-squared 0.27863 0.33012 0.39715 0.27863 0.33026 0.39715 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively  
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Scholars have suggested that a large difference between the regulative constituents of 
the home and host country have a strong influence on the location decision of MNEs 
(Xu & Shenkar  2002; Eden & Miller 2004; Ghemawat 2001). This influence is 
because MNEs prefer to invest in countries with similar regulative environment to 
their home country as this ensures conformity to the host regulative environment 
making the achievement of market legitimacy easier (Kostova & Zaheer 1999). 
Furthermore, it also avoids discriminatory hazards on the part of local partners and the 
host country government (Zaheer 2002).  
Our results deviate from the above suggestion showing a positive link between 
regulative distance and Chinese OFDI, i.e. CMNEs invest in African countries with 
either better regulative quality or worse regulative quality than at home. After 
disaggregating the absolute regulative distance into positive and negative regulative 
distance, our results show that CMNEs are attracted to African countries with worse 
regulative quality than in China (negative regulative distance), i.e. low regulative 
distance. Strong and reliable enforcement mechanisms are necessary to provide market 
legitimacy to MNEs whereby conformity to the rules of the game is mostly through 
the coercive mechanism (Scott  2001; DiMaggio & Powell  1983).  
The fact that CMNEs possess the experience of operating in conditions of low 
regulative quality in their home country might explain their attraction to African 
countries with worse regulative quality than in China (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). 
Thus, due to the low regulative distance between China and African countries with 
worse regulative quality than in China, CMNEs may face a lower LOF when investing 
in African countries with worse regulative quality due to lower unfamiliarity and inter-
relational hazards (Eden and Miller 2004). This result is similar to the findings of Kang 
& Jiang (2012) that showed that CMNEs tend to be attracted to countries characterised 
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by high volatility and bureaucratic intervention mainly because the weak regulative 
institutions in China could be utilised as firm-specific advantages that provide them 
with the expertise in adapting to a similar regulative environment in African countries 
(Kang & Jiang 2012).   
 
Also, the lack of strong and reliable enforcement mechanisms in African countries as 
a result of low regulative quality might mean the institutional pressures faced by 
CMNEs in African countries might be considerably lower than they would experience 
in countries with high regulative quality (Meyer et al. 2014). For instance, due to the 
high regulative quality and consequently higher institutional pressures in the USA, 
Chinese SOMNEs, in particular, have faced strong resistance from policymakers in 
their bid to acquire US companies (Deng 2007). Therefore, the relatively lower 
institutional pressure in African countries might mean that CMNEs might not pay 
much attention to the regulative distance as a means of achieving market legitimacy 
(Meyer et al. 2014). On the other hand, the attraction to African countries with worse 
regulative quality than China could be explained by the fact that by investing in 
African countries with worse regulative quality than China, CMNEs may find that they 
can more readily achieve legitimacy in comparison to DCMNEs.               
6.4. Control Variables 
 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of our control variables based on the 
results in Tables 6.1 and 6.5. We report and discuss the effect of our control variables 
on FDI from developed, developing and Chinese economies. We present the results of 
the control variables as follows: We begin with the results of our market-seeking 
variables, followed by the results of the resource-seeking variables and finally, we 
present the results of the traditional macroeconomic factors included in all our models. 
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For our market seeking variables, we find that the variable Log GDP is consistently 
negative and significant for FDI from developed and developing economies and 
insignificant for FDI from China. GDP per capita growth is not statistically significant 
for FDI by any of the investors under investigation. These results suggest that 
DCMNEs and EMNEs are attracted to smaller economies measured by the GDP of the 
host economy while it does not seem to matter for FDI by CMNEs. These results are 
in contrast with the findings of numerous studies on the determinants of FDI flows 
showing a positive relationship between Log GDP and GDP per capita growth and 
FDI flows (Chakrabarti 2001).  
In the case of Chinese FDI in particular, research has shown that CMNEs carry out 
FDI for market-seeking purposes (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad & Wiig 2012). Our 
findings of a negative relationship between GDP and FDI from developed and 
developing economies might be due to the high number of relatively small economies 
(smaller markets) in the African continent both regarding GDP and GDP per capita 
growth. In the case of Chinese FDI, the statistical insignificance of our market seeking 
variables might be because the majority of Chinese investments in Africa are still in 
the highly capital-intensive extractive and construction carried out by large Chinese 
SOMNEs (Besada, Wang and Whalley 2008; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009).         
The coefficient for the resource-seeking variable (Ores and metals exports) is positive 
and statistically significant for FDI from developed, developing and Chinese 
economies. These results suggest that DCMNEs, EMNEs and CMNEs are all attracted 
to the presence of natural resource endowments in African countries during the period 
under investigation. This result is in line with previous studies that find a positive 
relationship between the presence of natural resources and FDI in Africa (Asiedu 2002; 
Asiedu 2006; Bartels et al. 2014) and Chinese OFDI into Africa in particular (Mario 
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Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009; Drogendijk and Blomkvist 2013). Thus, we find that 
natural resource-seeking in Africa is not specific to CMNEs in Africa but also a 
significant determinant for all other MNEs from both developed and developing 
economies.  
The results of our traditional macroeconomic variables show that the variable Inflation 
is negative and statistically significant for FDI from developing economies and China 
and statistically insignificant for FDI from developed economies. The results indicate 
that instability in the macroeconomic environment in African countries deters FDI by 
EMNEs and CMNEs while it does not seem to matter for DCMNEs. Unpredictable 
inflation rates deter mainly market seeking (manufacturing FDI) mainly due to 
difficulties in setting prices and uncertainty in profit expectations (Buckley et al. 
2007). Thus, the statistical insignificance of inflation on FDI from developed 
economies might be explained by the negative and statistical significance of the market 
seeking variable GDP.  
The variable fixed telephone subscription is consistently positive and statistically 
significant for FDI from developed and developing economies and negative and 
statistically significant for FDI from China. These results suggest that DCMNEs and 
EMNEs are attracted to the presence of high-quality physical infrastructure while 
CMNEs, on the other hand, are attracted to the presence of low quality physical 
infrastructure. The presence of high-quality physical infrastructure increases 
efficiency for firms and thus attracts FDI ± particularly efficiency-seeking FDI (Ali et 
al. 2010; Asiedu & Lien 2011; Du et al. 2008). Thus, the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of the variable fixed telephone subscriptions for FDI from China 
is contrary to the expected positive relationship between the presence of physical 
infrastructure and FDI flows. Such a finding might be explained by the increasingly 
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high number of investments in the construction sector carried out by large Chinese 
SOMNEs. The construction sector constitutes an important sector for Chinese 
investments in Africa as CMNEs have engaged in market-seeking FDI and won 
contracts in the construction of roads, railways and bridges across Africa (Zafar 2007; 
Corkin, Burke and Davies 2008; Foster 2009). These projects are carried out in a 
region that is highly in need of high-quality physical infrastructure (Foster and 
Briceno-Garmendia 2009). Thus, it is somewhat unsurprising that Chinese FDI seems 
to be attracted to low quality physical infrastructure in Africa.  
The variable foreign direct investment is positive and statistically significant for FDI 
from China and statistically insignificant for FDI from developed and developing 
economies. This result indicates an agglomeration effect for Chinese FDI in Africa 
whereby African countries that already attract a significant amount of FDI from China 
tend to attract more FDI from China. MNEs tend to agglomerate their foreign 
investments in particular regions or countries to benefit from network externalities and 
by co-locating with firms of the same nationality (Chang & Park 2005; Disdier & 
Mayer 2004). Such country-of-origin agglomeration can provide an effective channel 
for the sharing of important and tacit knowledge about the business environment of 
the host-country (Tan and Meyer 2011).  
CMNEs in particular exhibit such agglomeration tendencies notably because of their 
desire to rely on the existing Chinese firms in the host country to help them understand 
the local business environment. Also, data on the top destination countries in Africa 
for Chinese greenfield FDI (Section 2.2.1) shows that a small number of African 




The variable real effective exchange rate is negative and statistically significant for 
FDI from developed economies but positive and not statistically significant for FDI 
from China and developing economies. These results suggest that DCMNEs are 
DWWUDFWHGWRDGHSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHKRVWFRXQWU\¶VFXUUHQF\ZKLOHWKHH[FKDQJHUDWHGRHV
not seem to matter for MNEs from developed economies and China. The results for 
FDI from developed economies is in line with previous studies on the impact on FDI 
flows (Dunning 2006; Busse and Hefeker 2007). An undervalued host country 
currency makes exports cheaper and thus more likely to be attractive to market seeking 
and efficiency seeking type investments (Stevens 1998).  
The variable trade balance capturing the degree of openness of the host economy to 
international trade is positive and statistically significant for FDI from developed 
economies and negative and not statistically significant for FDI from developing 
economies and China. Thus, DCMNEs are attracted to host countries that are relatively 
open to trade while this does not seem to matter for EMNEs and CMNEs. The 
relationship between FDI and openness to trade is complex. For instance, if a country's 
openness to trade signifies its commitment to the free movement of capital goods and 
services it can be expected to impact FDI (Chakrabarti 2001) positively. On the other 
hand, restrictions on trade can attract FDI if it protects foreign investors from imports 
from international competitors, especially in the case of horizontal FDI (tariff jumping 
hypothesis) (Dunning 2006). Thus, the impact of trade openness might be positive or 
negative depending on the country sample (Busse and Hefeker 2007). The 
insignificance of this variable for FDI from China may be because the majority of 
CMNEs in Africa are SOMNEs that enjoy a high degree of protection and support 
from the Chinese government. Due to this protection and support, Chinese SOMNEs 
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might be less concerned than firms from developed economies about the increase in 
transactions costs associated with high levels of trade restrictions.     
The variable colonial link is consistently negative and statistically significant. This 
result indicates that the existence of colonial links between the home country of the 
investing firm and the potential host location of the firm deters FDI. Cultural 
similarities between countries can be traced as far back as during the period of 
colonisation whereby the language and religion of the colonial power are transferred 
to its colonies (Ghemawat 2001). After the achievement of independence, colonies 
often adopt the judicial system and constitutional frameworks of their former colonial 
power (Diouf 1998). The negative and statistically significant coefficient for the 
variable Colonial links indicates that although Western European MNEs carried out 
FDI in African countries due to post-colonial ties, other factors may be more important 
to these firms than just a colonial relationship with the host country. Considering the 
period of investigation in this study is from 2003 to 2015, it is perhaps possible for 
colonial links to have played a significant role immediately after the aftermath of 
LQGHSHQGHQFHRI$IULFDQFRXQWULHVLQWKH¶VDQG¶V 
Thus far, the focus of our study has been on the direct effects of our institutional 
variables on all Chinese OFDI into Africa in comparison with OFDI from developed 
and other developing economies.  
In the following section, we turn our attention to comparing the effect of our 
institutional variables on FDI inflows into Africa between Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs by splitting the Chinese investments in our dataset into investments carried 
out by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs.  
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6.5. The Effect of Institutional Quality on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs  
 
Previous empirical evidence on the investment motivations of Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs suggests differences between the two groups as Chinese SOMNEs tend to 
invest in countries with risky institutional environments while Chinese POMNEs a 
more risk-averse  (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Amighini et al. 2013). In this section, we 
perform a comparison of the determinants of FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs 
by investigating whether the effect of our independent variables differs between FDI 
carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. In this section, we begin with a report 
and discussion of the results of our variables related to institutional quality, i.e., 
institutional quality, and regulative quality. Table 6.9 provides the results of the effect 
of these variables on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs.  
6.5.1. The Effect of Host Country Institutional Quality on FDI by Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs 
 
Models 1 and 3 examine the impact of institutional quality on FDI by Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs respectively. In both models, we control for time and industry 
effects. The results show that the coefficient for institutional quality is negative and 
statistically significant (ȕ = - 0.09148, p < 0.01) for FDI by Chinese SOMNEs. In 
model 3 the coefficient for institutional quality is negative and statistically significant 
for FDI by Chinese POMNEs (ȕ= - 0.0720023, p < 0.05). These results suggest that 
institutional quality has a negative influence on FDI by both Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs. We interpret these findings as Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs are attracted 
to low levels of institutional quality in African countries. However, Chinese SOMNEs 
seem to be more attracted to African countries with low institutional quality than 
Chinese POMNEs as suggested by the larger coefficient (see the coefficients on 
institutional quality in Table 6.9). This result means we find support for Hypothesis 
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1b ± predicting that Chinese SOMNEs tend to be more attracted to African countries 
with low institutional quality than Chinese POMNEs.       
Prior empirical studies (e.g., Amighini et al. 2013; Ramasamy et al. 2012) on the 
determinants of Chinese FDI suggest that Chinese SOMNEs are indifferent to the 
institutional risk in the host countries while Chinese POMNEs are averse to 
institutional risk when choosing investment locations abroad. Our results show that 
when choosing investment locations in Africa, OFDI by Chinese SOMNEs, in 
particular, is more attracted to lower overall institutional quality in host countries. This 
result might be because Chinese SOMNEs benefit more than Chinese POMNEs from 
state financial and political support (Luo, Xue and Han 2010; Duanmu 2014).  
Capital market distortions in China can also benefit Chinese SOMNEs by providing 
favourable funding that can reduce the commercial and financial risk associated with 
operating in host countries with low institutional quality (Cull and Xu 2000; Cull and 
Xu 2003). Such benefits from the capital market distortions in China constitutes an 
ownership advantage which might enable Chinese SOMNEs to gain a comparative 
advantage over their counterparts in the private sector that lack such preferential access 
to cheap capital (Buckley et al. 2007; Dunning & Lundan  2008). Also, as a result of 
their close connection to the Chinese government, Duanmu (2014) find that Chinese 
SOMNEs are more likely to benefit from protection and political support from the 
Chinese government in the event of host country expropriation.  
6.5.2. The Effect of Host Country Regulative Quality on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs 
and POMNEs 
  
Models 2 and 4 examine the effect of regulative quality on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs 
and POMNEs respectively. We control for time and industry effects in both models. 
Model 2 shows the coefficient for regulative quality is negative and statistically 
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significant (ȕ= -0.229106, p < 0.05) for FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and negative but 
not statistically significant for FDI by Chinese POMNEs in model 5. These findings 
indicate that compared to their private counterparts, Chinese SOEs are attracted to low 
regulative quality in African countries. Thus we find support for Hypothesis 2b ± 
predicting that Chinese SOMNEs tend to be more attracted to African countries with 
low regulative quality than Chinese POMNEs.  
The above results might be explained by the soft budget constraints enjoyed by 
predominantly Chinese SOMNEs (Cull and Xu 2003; Cull and Xu 2000; Sun, Vinig 
and Hosman 2017) that helps these large SOMNEs to manage the risk of higher 
transactions costs associated with operating in host countries with low regulative 
quality. Also, Chinese SOMNEs might be more attracted to African countries with 
similar level of regulative quality based on their experience in operating in a similar 












Table 6.9. OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: The Effect of Institutional and Regulative on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs  
Log FDI (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Chinese SOMNEs Chinese POMNEs 
Institutional quality -0.09148***  -0.0720023**  
 (0.32710)  (0.37844)  
Regulative quality  -0.229106**  -0.1559001 
  (0.48268)  (0.54391) 
     
Log GDP 0.03690 -0.02431 -0.27724 -0.24971 
 (0.24668) (0.25603) (0.30476) (0.30819) 
GDP per capita growth  0.07008 0.11415 -0.05052 -0.02158 
 (0.07925) (0.07869) (0.11547) (0.11780) 
Ores and metals exports  0.01630** 0.00980 -0.02278 -0.03930** 
 (0.00722) (0.00725) (0.01865) (0.01803) 
Inflation -0.04459 -0.02605 -0.01231 -0.01661 
 (0.02971) (0.03019) (0.04139) (0.04361) 
Foreign direct investment 0.04753 0.03509 0.01806 0.01478 
 (0.07809) (0.08075) (0.02847) (0.02744) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  0.07893 0.04794 0.04508 -0.00193 
 (0.05846) (0.05751) (0.10494) (0.10044) 
Trade balance 0.01431 0.01369 -0.01669 -0.02586 
 (0.01631) (0.01666) (0.02927) (0.02949) 
Real effective exchange rate  0.00408 0.00239 -0.02095 -0.02246 
 (0.00706) (0.00717) (0.01318) (0.01400) 
Constant 6.18891 6.85084 14.55675* 12.93162 
 (6.55228) (6.99628) (8.37953) (8.46456) 
     
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mean VIF 2.95 2.91 4.16 4.06 
Observations 120 120 77 77 
R-squared 0.60208 0.58408 0.64738 0.63379 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively   
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Considering the difference in the magnitude of the effects of institutional quality, and 
regulative quality, for Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs we employ an independent 
sample t-test to determine if the mean of our dependent variable ± FDI inflows is the 
same between the two groups of firms. Specifically, we want to determine if the mean 
difference in FDI inflows between Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs is statistically 
significant. 
From Table 6.10, Chinese SOMNEs (N = 152) is associated with FDI inflows M = 
3.65 (SD = 1.76) while POMNEs (N = 89) is associated with FDI inflows M = 2.88 
(SD = 2.01). By comparison, Chinese SOMNEs (N = 152) is associated with a 
numerically higher FDI inflows M = 3.65 (SD = 1.76). We test the hypothesis that the 
mean FDI inflows for Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs are significantly different. The 
assumption of homogeneity of variance LV VDWLVILHG WKURXJK /HYHQH¶V WHVW IRU WKH
equality of variance. The independent samples t-test is associated with a statistically 
significant effect, t(239) = -3.08, p = .000. Thus, we find that Chinese SOMNEs have 
a statistically significantly higher mean FDI inflows than Chinese POMNEs.  
Table 6.10. Results of T-Test and for FDI Inflows from Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs  




 Chinese SOMNEs  Chinese POMNEs   
 M SD n  M SD n t df 
FDI inflows  3.65 1.76 152  2.88 2.01 89 -1.25,  -0.27 -3.08*** 239 
*** p<0.01.   
6.6. The Effect of Institutional Distance on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs   
 
In this section, we report and discuss the effect of our key variables related to 
institutional distance on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. We begin with a 
report and discussion of the results on the effect of institutional distance in section 
6.6.1, followed by the report and discussion of the results on the impact of regulative 
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distance in section 6.6.2. Table 6.11 provides the results of the effect of the institutional 
distance and the regulative distance on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs.  
6.6.1. The Effect of Home-Host Country Institutional Distance on FDI by Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs   
  
Models 1 and 3 in Table 6.11 examine the effect of institutional distance on FDI by 
Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs respectively. Model 1 includes time and industry 
effects. The results show that the coefficient of institutional distance is positive and 
statistically significant (ȕ = 0.0909564, p < 0.01) for FDI by Chinese SOMNEs. This 
result suggests that institutional distance has a positive influence on FDI by Chinese 
SOMNEs. Controlling for time and industry fixed effects, Model 3 shows that the 
coefficient for institutional distance is positive and statistically significant (ȕ = 
0.07200, p < 0.05) for FDI by Chinese POMNEs. We observe that overall institutional 
distance does not deter FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs, and even has a 
positive effect. We interpret these findings as Chinese SOMNEs invest more than 
POMNEs in African countries with either much better or much worse institutions than 
at home. This finding means we do not find support for Hypothesis 3b  - predicting 
that low home-host country distance in terms of institutional quality will attract more 
FDI by Chinese SOMNEs than by Chinese POMNEs.            
The above results suggest that Chinese SOMNEs invest more than Chinese POMNEs 
in African countries with better or worse institutional quality than in China. This result 
may be explained by the notion that Chinese SOMNEs, in particular, have a first-hand 
experience of direct government intervention and navigating political constraints 
(Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). Such an experience might explain their willingness 
to invest more in African countries as it provides them with an advantage over their 
private counterparts (considering the relatively low institutional distance) and a 
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relatively lower degree of LOF. Ramasamy et al. (2012) show that Chinese SOMNEs 
are more attracted to countries with low institutional quality than Chinese POMNEs. 
In the context of Chinese OFDI into Africa, their first-hand experience of navigating 
opaque political constraints might explain their attractiveness to African countries with 
very low institutional distance to China. Also, their attractiveness to countries with 
large reserves of natural resources might suggest a strategic intent on the part of 
Chinese SOMNEs (Amighini et al. 2013) such that institutional distance becomes less 
important in their locations decision but rather the presence of natural resources in the 
potential African country. Aleksynska & Havrylchyk (2013) find evidence of a 
moderating effect of the presence of natural resources in the host country on the effect 
of institutional distance on OFDI from developing economies.  
Chinese SOMNEs might also be less concerned about the legitimacy requirements in 
African countries as they are more likely to enjoy political backing by the home 
government than Chinese POMNEs (Duanmu 2014). Furthermore, although Chinese 
SOMNEs are subject to more complex institutional pressures than POMNEs, this is 
mainly in countries with high institutional quality due to their links to the Chinese 
government (Meyer et al. 2014). However, due to the relatively weak institutions in 
the majority of African countries, Chinese SOMNEs might face lower institutional 
pressures to conform to the external institutional environment of the host country to 
be granted organisational legitimacy.  
In conditions of weak institutional environments such as those in African countries, 
the main and the most powerful legitimating actor is the host government. Thus, a 
close bilateral relationship or political interaction between the host government and 
the Chinese government (as owners of Chinese SOMNEs) might mean Chinese 
SOMNEs benefiting from such a relationship by being granted legitimacy by the host 
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government. Kostova et al. (2008) suggest that in some cases the MNE can gain 
organisational legitimacy by engaging in direct negotiation with powerful legitimating 
actors in the host country. Chinese SOMNEs might benefit from or rely on other means 
of achieving organisational legitimacy in Africa such as through the political 
interaction between its home government and the government of the host country. For 
instance, during an opening event of a Chinese built railway in the central Ethiopian 
city of Adama in 2015, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn said the 
following about Chinese companies:   
³,DPVRPXFKKDSS\DQGJODGWKDWWKLVSURMHFW is completed on time. It was the fastest 
even by Chinese standards, so I am so much appreciative of the companies involved 
who have shown that the Chinese companies are capable of discharging their 
responsibilities especially in developing countries. This has remarkably brought about 
an image of Chinese companies working abroad, in that they work in a quality, timely 
























Table 6.11. OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: The Impact of Institutional, and Regulative Distance on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs  
Log FDI (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Chinese SOMNEs  Chinese POMNEs 
Institutional distance       0.09096***     0.07200**  
 (0.02726)  (0.03154)  
Regulative distance      0.229106 **  0.15590 
  (0.09654)  (0.10878) 
Log GDP 0.03690 -0.02431 -0.27724 -0.24971 
 (0.24668) (0.25603) (0.30476) (0.30819) 
GDP per capita growth  0.07008 0.11415 -0.05052 -0.02158 
 (0.07925) (0.07869) (0.11547) (0.11780) 
Ores and metals exports      0.01630** 0.00980 -0.02278 -0.03930** 
 (0.00722) (0.00725) (0.01865) (0.01803) 
Inflation -0.04459 -0.02605 -0.01231 -0.01661 
 (0.02971) (0.03019) (0.04139) (0.04361) 
Foreign direct investment 0.04753 0.03509 0.01806 0.01478 
 (0.07809) (0.08075) (0.02847) (0.02744) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  0.07893 0.04794 0.04508 -0.00193 
 (0.05846) (0.05751) (0.10494) (0.10044) 
Trade balance 0.01431 0.01369 -0.01669 -0.02586 
 (0.01631) (0.01666) (0.02927) (0.02949) 
Real effective exchange rate  0.00408 0.00239 -0.02095 -0.02246 
 (0.00706) (0.00717) (0.01318) (0.01400) 
Constant -0.13256 2.20190 9.55259 9.76815 
 (6.35724) (6.54970) (7.34623) (7.58981) 
Time effects  No  No  No  No  
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Mean VIF 1.20 1.29 2.31 2.43 
Observations 120 120 77 77 
R-squared 0.60208 0.58408 0.64738 0.63379 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively  
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6.6.2. The Effect of Regulative Distance on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs 
 
In models 2 and 4 (Table 6.11), we examine the effect of home-host country regulative 
distance on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs respectively. We control for time 
and industry effects in both models. The result shows that the coefficient for regulative 
distance is positive and statistically significant (ȕ = 0.229106, p < 0.05 in Model 2) for 
FDI by Chinese SOMNEs but positive but not statistically significant for FDI Chinese 
POMNEs. Thus, we observe that high regulative distance does not deter FDI by 
Chinese SOMNEs and even has a positive effect while it does not matter for Chinese 
POMNEs. We interpret the above findings as Chinese SOMNEs invest in African 
countries with either much better or much worse regulative quality than at home while 
it does not seem to matter for Chinese POMNEs. This result means we find no support 
for Hypothesis 4b ± predicting that low home-host country distance in terms of 
regulative quality will attract more FDI by Chinese SOMNEs than by Chinese 
POMNEs.  
The investments in African countries with worse institutional quality than in China 
might be explained by the fact that Chinese SOMNEs originate from a relatively 
similar regulative environment to the majority of African countries. Chinese 
SOMNEs, in particular, might possess more experience than Chinese POMNEs in 
dealing with the challenging regulative environment in African countries due to the 
presence of state equity which can lead to excessive government regulations. Such an 
experience might mean they might face an even lower LOF and thus more equipped 
in dealing with the regulative environment in African countries than their private 
counterparts. Also, Chinese SOMNEs, in particular, might be more equipped in 
operating in conditions of low regulative quality primarily due to their preferential 
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access to loans compared to Chinese POMNEs. As a result, the soft soft-budget 
constraints of Chinese SOMNEs might be capable of offsetting the high transactions 
costs in operating in host countries with low distance in terms of regulative quality 
(Bai and Wang 1998; Cull and Xu 2003; Liu and Sun 2005). On the other hand, the 
suggestions that Chinese SOMNEs may invest in African countries with much better 
regulative quality than China (high regulative distance) might be explained by the 
desire to seek a stable regulative environment and low transactions costs. Furthermore, 
the results also suggest that Chinese SOMNEs invest in any African country 
irrespective of regulative distance, i.e. Chinese SOMNEs invest where the investment 
opportunity exists considering their latecomer status as investors in African countries 
compared to DCMNEs in particular.    
 
6.7. Conclusion 
The aim of this was to present and discuss the results of the direct effect of both 
institutional quality (i.e. institutional quality, and regulative quality) and institutional 
distance (i.e. institutional distance, and UHJXODWLYH GLVWDQFH RQ &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR
Africa. Firstly, we compared the effect of our key variables on FDI inflows into Africa 
from developed and other developing economies with FDI inflows from China. Our 
results show that the sign of the coefficients of our key institutional variables of interest 
is broadly the same for all investors (developed, developing and Chinese investors). 
However, in the case of CMNEs, our results consistently show that the magnitude of 
the effect of our key variables is larger compared to investments by DCMNEs and 
EMNEs.  
We separate the Chinese investments in our dataset into investments carried out by 
Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs to investigate any potential differences in the 
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locations decision between the two groups. Overall, we find that the effect of 
institutional quality have a negative effect on investments by Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs while regulative quality has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
Chinese SOMNEs only. However, our results also show that although the effect of the 
above variables is similar for both Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs, they appear to 
have a higher effect on Chinese SOMNEs than Chinese POMNEs.  
As regards the effect of institutional distance, we find that institutional distance is a 
positive and significant estimator for FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs while 
regulative distance has a positive and significant influence on FDI by Chinese 
SOMNEs only and not for Chinese POMNEs. Similar to our results on institutional 
quality, we find the effect of our institutional distance variables is often higher for FDI 
by Chinese SOMNEs than POMNEs. We summarise the findings in Tables 6.12 and 
6.13 below.   
In the following chapter, we report and discuss the results on the role of Chinese 
development aid as a moderator of the effect of our key institutional variables on 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDThe use of aid in Chinese FDI projects captures another 
DVSHFWRIWKH3(GLPHQVLRQRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDZKHUHWKHUROHRIWKH&KLQHVH
government as the provider of development aid (mainly in the form of loans and 








Table 6.12. Summary of Results and Hypotheses on FDI from Developed, Developing 
and Chinese Economies   
Variables   Developed 
Economies  
Developing 
Economies   
China  Hypothesis  
Institutional 
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Table 6.13.  Summary of Results and Hypotheses on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs and 
POMNEs  
Variables   Chinese 
SOMNEs  
Chinese POMNEs Hypothesis  

























Positive and not 
significant  








This chapter aims to empirically investigate the moderating effect of Chinese 
development aid on the relationship between our key institutional variables and 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD&KLQD¶VGHYHORSPHQWDLGWR$IULFDQFRXQWULHVLVDQLQWHJUDO
part of its investments in Africa as Chinese aid tends to accompany large-scale FDI 
projects in the continent, making it a rather distinctive feature of its investments in 
Africa (Mario Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009; TanǦMullins 2010). This close integration 
of aid with FDI projects is because the majority of Chinese aid to African countries is 
mostly in the form of concessional loans (Parks and Strange 2014) geared towards the 
economic development of African countries rather than simply as an issue of morality 
(Alden and Hughes 2009). Furthermore, whereas aid from the West is granted with 
conditions on the improvement of the domestic institutions, Chinese aid to African 
countries is granted with no conditions on the improvement of domestic institutional 
capacity (Pehnelt 2007; Holslag 2011).  
We organise the chapter as follows: in section 7.2, we report and discuss the results of 
the moderating effect of Chinese development aid inflows on the impact of host 
country institutional and regulative quality on &KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD6HFWLRQ
reports and discusses the results of the moderating effect of Chinese aid inflows on the 
impact of home-host country institutional, and regulative distance on &KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa. Section 7.4 provides a conclusion of the chapter.    
7.2. The Effects of Institutional Quality and ALGRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
   
The main results of the analysis of the moderating effect of Chinese aid on the 
relationship between institutional quality and Chinese FDI in Africa are presented in 
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Table 7.1. Models 1 and 2 contain the main effects of our main independent and 
moderating variables ± institutional quality, regulative quality, and aid alongside our 
control variables. Models 3 and 4 are complete models including all our control 
variables and the interaction effects of each of our independent variables with aid.  
The inclusion of interaction terms in regression models can cause problems of 
multicollinearity that can lead to spurious regressions. To reduce the risk of 
multicollinearity, we create the standardised values of institutional quality, regulative 
quality, and aid before creating their interaction terms. Standardised variables are 
rescaled variables that have a mean of 0, and a standard deviation of 1 and their use is 
recommended for the analysis of interaction variables mainly to address the likely 
problems of multicollinearity (Aiken et al. 1991; Min & Smyth 2014). The lack of 
multicollinearity in our models is confirmed by the average variance inflation factor 
(VIF) which we report.  The mean VIF values range from 1.94 to 2.14 which is well 
below the cut off threshold of 10, (Cameron and Trivedi 2009; Doane and Seward 
2005) indicating no serious problems of multicollinearity in all our models. We include 
industry effects in all models. We report and discuss the results in the following way: 
firstly, we report and discuss the results of institutional quality followed by the results 
of regulative quality. 
0RGHOWHVWVWKHPDLQHIIHFWVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\DQGDLGRQ&KLQD¶V2FDI into 
Africa. The coefficient for institutional quality is negative and statistically significant 
(ȕ = - 0.81074, p < 0.01). This result suggests that Chinese OFDI into Africa is 
attracted to low levels of host country institutional quality. The coefficient for aid is 
negative but not statistically significant in model 1. We test the moderating effect of 
Chinese aid on the relationship between host country institutional quality and Chinese 
OFDI into Africa by including the interaction term Institutional quality*Aid  in model 
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3. The interaction effect Institutional quality*Aid is negative but not statistically 
significant. The coefficient for institutional quality remains negative and statistically 
significant while the coefficient for aid remains negative and not statistically 
significant. A negative coefficient of the interaction term would imply that the higher 
the levels of Chinese aid inflows, the stronger the effect (more negative) the effect of 
institutional quality on Chinese FDI (Jaccard, Wan and Turrisi 1990).       
Although there appears to be no overall moderating effect of aid on the effect of 
institutional quality on Chinese OFDI into Africa, scholars (e.g. Brambor et al. 2005; 
Brambor et al. 2007) believe that we need to perform a conditional test that examines 
the marginal effects (MEs) of the independent variable across the entire range of the 
moderating variable. Such an approach ensures that the researcher eliminates the 
SRWHQWLDO RI µRYHUVWDWLQJ¶ WKH PRGHUDWLQJ HIIHFW LQ WKH condition of statistical 
VLJQLILFDQFHRI WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ WHUPDQGµXQGHUVWDWLQJ¶ LQ WKHcondition of statistical 
insignificance (Kingsley, Noordewier and Bergh 2017).  
We follow the above approach by performing a conditional test that examines the 
standard errors of the MEs of institutional quality across the entire range of our 
moderating variable ± Aid. In other words, the effect of institutional quality on Chinese 
OFDI is contingent on the value of Aid. Figure 7.1 presents a plot of the average 
marginal effects (AMEs) of institutional quality on Chinese OFDI over the entire range 
of the standardised values of aid. The upper and lower exterior lines are 95% 
confidence intervals, and the horizontal bars show the observation frequency of the 
number of observations included in our analysis. The red horizontal line shows the 




While the coefficient for the interaction term Institutional quality*Aid is not 
statistically significant (Model 3), figure 7.1 shows that there is nevertheless a range 
of values for the standardised values of aid (-0.6 to 1.9) over which we find evidence 
of a moderating effect. Table 7.2 shows the MEs of institutional quality at increasing 
levels of Aid. We observe that increasing the levels of Chinese Aid increases the 
negative HIIHFWRILQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\RQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD7KXV&KLQHVH$LG
appears to have an enhancing effect on the relationship between institutional quality 
and Chinese OFDI into Africa, suggesting that CMNEs are more attracted to low 
institutional quality when Chinese investments are closely integrated with Chinese 
Aid. 
Figure 7.1. Marginal Effect of Institutional Quality with 95% CIs 
Frequency Distribution of Aid ± left-hand scale 
 
Approximately 95% of the observations in our sample have values of Aid less than or 
equal to 1.9 standard deviations (see a histogram of aid in figure 7.1). Each bar of the 
histogram represents the number of observations in percentages of Aid in that range of 
values. The concentration of the values of Aid at lower levels explains why there is a 
rapid increase in the errors represented by the widening of the lower and upper 95% 
228 
 
confidence bands. This finding means we find support (at least partial) for Hypothesis 
5a ± predicting that Chinese aid negatively moderates the relationship between 
institutional quality and Chinese FDI such that the effect is stronger when aid is present 
in Chinese FDI. The close integration of aid with Chinese FDI projects with no 
conditions on the improvement of domestic institutions in host countries (Sanfilippo 
2010) might explain why we find evidence of an interaction effect between 
institutional quality and aid.  
The no conditionality approach by the Chinese government to the provision of loans 
suggests that CMNEs that accompany Chinese aid might not be deterred by low 
institutional quality but instead be more attracted to African countries with low 
institutional quality. This attractiveness to African countries with low institutional 
quality is due to the long-standing policy of non-interference of their home government 
(Holslag 2011). Furthermore, the investments in projects that include Chinese loans 
might also be more attractive to Chinese firms as they will have the full political and 
economic backing of the Chinese government as the provider of loans to the host 
countries.  
In the following sections, we report and discuss the results of the moderating effect of 
Chinese aid on the effects of regulative quality on Chinese OFDI into Africa.  
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Table 7.1. OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: The Effects of Institutional Quality and Aid on Chinese OFDI into Africa  
Log FDI   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Institutional quality -0.81074***  -0.85105***  
 (0.22580)  (0.22642)  
Regulative quality  -0.62832  -0.56326 
  (0.40367)  (0.41413) 
Institutional quality*Aid   -0.13188  
   (0.19303)  
Regulative quality*Aid    0.25394 
    (0.27504) 
Aid  -0.93007 -0.12421 -1.63750 -1.53122 
 (0.24533) (0.34191) (0.65147) (0.55074) 
Log GDP 0.09370 0.06538 0.10395 0.00040 
 (0.18630) (0.18668) (0.18453) (0.20048) 
GDP per capita growth  0.04412 0.07224 0.04165 0.08593 
 (0.06163) (0.06433) (0.06209) (0.06832) 
Inflation -0.03174 -0.02398 -0.03241 -0.02976 
 (0.02053) (0.02202) (0.02053) (0.02455) 
Ores and metals exports 0.00744 0.00003 0.00807 -0.00001 
 (0.00638) (0.00629) (0.00660) (0.00627) 
Foreign direct investment 0.04865* 0.03377 0.05599* 0.02754 
 (0.02837) (0.02782) (0.02831) (0.03014) 
Real effective exchange rate 0.00487 0.00366 0.00486 0.00360 
 (0.00526) (0.00535) (0.00528) (0.00534) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  0.00478 -0.02162 -0.00084 -0.00831 
 (0.03786) (0.04034) (0.03835) (0.04143) 
Trade balance -0.00633 -0.00542 -0.00608 -0.00242 
 (0.01231) (0.01233) (0.01249) (0.01197) 
Constant 4.62151 3.96729 4.62611 5.31811 
 (5.03911) (5.36208) (5.06672) (5.51732) 
Time effects  No No No No 
Industry effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Mean VIF 1.97 1.94 2.08 1.99 
Observations 128 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.52047 0.48631 0.52172 0.49205 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 7.2. Marginal Effects of Institutional, and Regulative Quality on Chinese OFDI 
Moderating Variable  (1) (2) 
Standardised values of Aid  Institutional Quality Regulative Quality  
   
1.  at              -0.6 -0.544*** -0.415** 
 (0.196) (0.211) 
2._at               0.4 -0.676*** -0.161 
 (0.188) (0.251) 
3._at               1.4 -0.808** 0.0930 
 (0.327) (0.482) 
4._at               2.4 -0.940* 0.347 
 (0.503) (0.744) 
5._at               3.4 -1.072 0.601 
 (0.688) (1.013) 
6._at               4.4 -1.204 0.855 
 (0.877) (1.284) 
7._at               5.4 -1.335 1.109 
 (1.067) (1.557) 
   
Observations 128 128 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.2.1. The Effects of Regulative Quality and the Moderating Effect of Aid on 
Chinese OFDI into Africa  
 
Models 2 and 4 in Table 7.1 present the results of the main and interaction effects of 
UHJXODWLYHTXDOLW\DQGDLGRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD,QPRGHOZHH[DPLQHWKH
PDLQHIIHFWVRIUHJXODWLYHTXDOLW\DQGDLGRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD7KHFRHIILFLHQW
of regulative quality and aid are both negative and not statistically significant.  
We then test the moderating effect of aid on the relationship between host country 
regulative quality and Chinese OFDI into Africa by including the interaction term 
regulative quality*Aid in model 4. The coefficient of the interaction effect regulative 
quality*Aid is positive and not statistically significant. The coefficient of regulative 
quality and aid remain negative and not statistically significant. To avoid understating 
this effect, we calculate the AMEs of regulative quality across the range of the 
standardised values of aid. We find evidence of moderation at very low levels of aid, 
i.e. when the value of aid is -0.6 (Figure 7.2).  
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Figure 7.2. Marginal Effect of Regulative Quality with 95% CIs 
  
Model 2 in Table 7.2 shows the AMEs of regulative quality at increasing levels of 
standardised values of aid. Although we find no evidence of moderation at higher 
amounts of aid due to lack of statistical significance, we observe an antagonistic 
interaction effect of aid on the effect of regulative quality on Chinese OFDI into 
Africa. From model 2 in Table 7.2, we can observe that at higher amounts of aid, the 
coefficients of the AMEs of regulative quality changes from negative to positive. This 
result means we find no support for Hypothesis 5b - predicting that Chinese aid 
negatively moderates the relationship between regulative quality and Chinese FDI 
such that the effect is stronger when aid is present in Chinese FDI.   
The positive coefficient for the interaction term Regulative quality*Aid might be 
explained by the fact that Chinese development aid is in the form of concessional loans 
with terms that are wholly or part commercial in nature (Parks and Strange 2014). In 
this regard, the existence of strong and reliable regulative institutions is very important 
for the enforcement of contractual loans signed between the Chinese government and 
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the governments of the recipient country (Palthe 2014). The provision of loans to 
countries with weak regulative institutions such as an effective legal system might be 
risky in circumstances of default, or the recipient country fails to honour the agreement 
at a later period (Parks and Strange 2014). However, our results show no statistical 
significance of the above positive interaction effect with greater amounts of aid 
inflows.  
The lack of statistical significance may be because in a circumstance whereby the 
government of the host country fails to honour its contractual obligations, the Chinese 
government will bear the risk (as provider of the loans) of any future failure on the part 
of the government of the host country to honour the terms of the loans. Moreover, 
Chinese SOMNEs are more likely than their private counterparts to invest in projects 
in African countries that have been financed by loans from the Chinese government. 
(Foster 2009; Corkin and Burke 2006). Thus, the close links between Chinese 
SOMNEs and the Chinese government as the provider of loans might mean this firms 
might not pay much attention to the regulative quality of the host countries that receive 
Chinese loans.   
7.3. The Effects of Institutional Distance and the Moderating Effect of Aid on 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
 
Table 7.3 provide the main results assessing whether aid moderates the relationship 
between LQVWLWXWLRQDO GLVWDQFH DQG &KLQD¶V 2)', LQWR $IULFD ,Q both models, we 
control for industry effects. We create all interaction terms using standardised values 
of our independent and moderating variables to avoid problems of multicollinearity. 
We test all models for multicollinearity through the VIF test for multicollinearity 
which we report in Table 7.3.   
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In model 1, we test the direct effects of institutional distance and aid on Chinese OFDI 
into Africa. The coefficient of institutional distance is positive and statistically 
significant (ȕ = 0.64827, p < 0.01) while the coefficient for aid is positive but not 
statistically significant. We observe that overall institutional distance does not deter 
Chinese OFDI into Africa and even has a positive effect, thereby suggesting that 
CMNEs invest in African countries with either much better or worse institutional 
quality than at home. Chinese firms in Africa are relative newcomers in comparison to 
MNEs from Western European countries that possessed colonies in Africa (Alden and 
Davies 2006). These firms have an advantage over Chinese firms in operating in 
African countries due to their long-standing connections and relationships in African 
countries accumulated over an extended period.  
Figure 7.4 Marginal Effects of Institutional Distance with 95% CIs 
Frequency Distribution of Aid ± left-hand scale 
 
In model 2, we test the moderating effect of Chinese aid on the relationship between 
institutional distance and Chinese OFDI into Africa. The coefficient of the interaction 
term institutional distance*Aid is negative and not statistically significant. We perform 
234 
 
a conditional test that examines the standard errors of the MEs of the institutional 
distance across the entire range of aid.  
Figure 7.4 presents a plot of the AMEs of institutional distance on Chinese OFDI over 
the entire range of the standardised values of Aid. While the coefficient for the 
interaction term Institutional distance*Aid is not statistically significant (Model 2), 
figure 7.4 above shows that there is a range of the standardised values for aid (from -
0.6 to 0.4) over which we find evidence of a moderating effect. This result means we 
find support (at least partial) for Hypothesis 6a ± predicting that Chinese aid 
negatively moderates the relationship between institutional distance and Chinese FDI 
such that the effect is stronger when aid is present in Chinese FDI. Model 1 in Table 
7.4, shows a slight reduction in the size of the coefficients of the MEs of institutional 
distance from ȕ = 0.534 significant at the 0.01 level to ȕ = 0.512 significant at the 0.05 
level. This result suggests that when aid is closely integrated with Chinese FDI, 
CMNEs appear to prefer to invest in African countries with similar institutional quality 
(lower institutional distance).  
This preference to invest in African countries with lower dissimilarity in institutional 
quality to China is not surprising. The use of Chinese loans with non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of African countries has been used by the Chinese government as 
a means of securing investment opportunities for Chinese firms in African countries 
with the lowest levels of institutional quality (Alden and Davies 2006). The explicit 
willingness on the part of the Chinese government to do business with any African 
country regardless of the quality of its political and economic institutions provides 
Chinese firms with a competitive political advantage ± especially in African countries 




Table 7.3. OLS Models with Robust Standard Errors: Institutional Distance and Aid as Determinants of Chinese OFDI into Africa  
Log FDI (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Institutional distance  0.64827*** 0.64248***   
 (0.20721) (0.21926)   
Regulative distance    0.54583* 0.40421 
   (0.30268) (0.30055) 
Institutional distance*Aid   -0.02201   
  (0.24414)   
Regulative distance*Aid    -0.59498** 
    (0.23984) 
Aid  0.73005 0.97072 1.28051 -1.79700 
 (0.73812) (0.43464) (0.77729) (0.47005) 
Log GDP 0.20056 0.19936 0.12830 0.00214 
 (0.18837) (0.18934) (0.18519) (0.19494) 
GDP per capita growth  0.03984 0.04011 0.06560 0.09053 
 (0.06089) (0.06082) (0.06337) (0.06372) 
Ores and metals exports  0.00506 0.00501 -0.00052 0.00067 
 (0.00617) (0.00613) (0.00617) (0.00599) 
Inflation -0.04326** -0.04338** -0.03127 -0.05900** 
 (0.02159) (0.02135) (0.02147) (0.02471) 
Foreign direct investment 0.04902* 0.04768 0.03473 0.00804 
 (0.02838) (0.03081) (0.02792) (0.02935) 
Fixed telephone subscriptions  -0.02662 -0.02593 -0.03557 -0.01565 
 (0.03754) (0.03814) (0.03811) (0.03906) 
Trade balance -0.01368 -0.01379 -0.00862 -0.00589 
 (0.01254) (0.01258) (0.01243) (0.01231) 
Real effective exchange rate  0.00608 0.00610 0.00409 0.00442 
 (0.00521) (0.00524) (0.00537) (0.00529) 
Constant -2.18693 -2.16180 0.08081 3.39971 
 (5.15483) (5.17574) (5.06432) (5.31920) 
Time effects  No  No  No  No  
Industry effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  
Mean VIF 1.98 1.95 1.97 2.13 
Observations 128 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.50979 0.50982 0.48644 0.51588 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
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Table 7.4. Marginal Effects of Institutional, and Regulative Distance on Chinese OFDI  
Moderating Variable  (1) (2) 
Standardised Values of Aid  Institutional Distance  Regulative Distance  
   
1_at           -0.6 0.534*** 0.564*** 
 (0.191) (0.193) 
2._at           0.4 0.512** -0.0306 
 (0.229) (0.194) 
3._at           1.4 0.490 -0.626 
 (0.433) (0.392) 
4._at           2.4 0.468 -1.221** 
 (0.665) (0.620) 
5._at           3.4 0.446 -1.816** 
 (0.903) (0.854) 
6._at           4.4 0.424 -2.411** 
 (1.144) (1.091) 
7._at           5.4 0.402 -3.006** 
 (1.386) (1.329) 
   
Observations 128 128 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
7.3.1. The Effects of Regulative Distance and the Moderating Effect of Aid on 
&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD 
 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 7.3 provides the main results assessing whether aid moderates 
the relationship between regulative distance and Chinese OFDI into Africa. Both 
models include industry effects. We create all interaction terms using standardised 
values of the independent and moderating variables to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity. We test all models for multicollinearity through the VIF test for 
multicollinearity which we report in Table 7.3.   
In model 3ZHH[DPLQH WKHPDLQHIIHFWVRIUHJXODWLYHGLVWDQFHDQGDLGRQ&KLQD¶V
OFDI into Africa. The coefficient of regulative distance is positive and marginally 
significant (ȕ = 0.54583, p < 0.1). Thus, we observe that regulative distance does not 
deter Chinese OFDI into Africa and even has a positive effect suggesting that CMNEs 
invest in African countries with either better or worse institutional quality than at 
home. The coefficient for aid is positive but not statistically significant.  
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In model 4, we test the moderating effect of aid on the relationship between regulative 
distance and Chinese OFDI into Africa by introducing the interaction term between 
regulative distance and aid Regulative distance*Aid. The coefficient for the interaction 
term Regulative distance*aid is negative and statistically significant (ȕ = - 0.59498, p 
< 0.05). The coefficient for regulative distance remains positive but not statistically 
significant while the coefficient for aid is negative and not statistically significant.  
Figure 7.5 Marginal Effects of Regulative Distance with 95% CIs 
Frequency Distribution of Aid ± left-hand scale 
 
 
The result of the interaction term Regulative distance*Aid suggests that CMNEs are 
more attracted by a low dissimilarity in home-host country regulative institutional 
quality when host countries are recipients of Chinese aid as implied by the coefficient 
of the interaction term Regulative distance*Aid.  
Similar to previous analyses, we calculate the AMEs of regulative distance over the 
entire range of values of aid. As is apparent from inspection of Figure 7.5., regulative 
distance has a statistically significant negative effect on FDI over two range of the 
values of aid from -0.6 to -0.1 and from 2.9 to 5.4. The confidence interval bands do 
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not cross 0 for values of aid greater than -0.1 and less than 2.9, meaning we find 
evidence that the MEs are statistically different from zero over the range of values of 
aid from -0.6 to -0.1 and from 2.4 to 5.4.    
Model 2 in Table 7.4 shows that regulative distance negatively moderate the 
relationship between regulative distance and Chinese OFDI into Africa as the 
coefficient of the MEs of regulative distance increases at higher amounts of aid. These 
results suggest that CMNEs are discouraged by a high regulative distance as they 
prefer to invest in African countries that are similar regarding regulative quality as 
implied by the negative coefficients on the MEs of regulative distance. This result 
means we find support for Hypothesis 6b ± predicting that Chinese aid negatively 
moderates the relationship between regulative distance and Chinese FDI such that the 
effect is stronger when aid is present in Chinese FDI. The willingness to provide loans 
to African countries with no preconditions on the improvement of the domestic 
regulative institutions in the host country might suggest why CMNEs that accompany 
Chinese aid tend to invest in African countries with similar regulative quality to China.  
7.4. Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to investigate empirically how Chinese development aid 
inflows moderate the effect of institutional quality and institutional distance on 
Chinese FDI inflows. The provision of development aid mostly in the form of 
concessional loans to African countries based on a long-standing foreign policy of 
non-interference. The Chinese government has helped Chinese firms win new markets 
and open up investment opportunities in Africa (Alden and Davies 2006; Patey 2007). 
The Chinese approach to development assistance in Africa does not require the 
improvement of institutional quality as a pre-condition to the granting of aid compared 
to the conditions-based approach of the West (TanǦMullins 2010; Taylor 2006). The 
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strategic integration of aid and FDI mean such an approach that disregards the level of 
quality of institutions in the host-country (political and economic institutions) can 
make CMNEs be less cautious to risk in circumstances where development aid is 
integrated with FDI.   
In this chapter, we tested a series of interaction terms between our main independent 
variables and aid to assess our claim that the integration of Chinese development aid 
moderates the relationship between these institutional factors (institutional quality and 
institutional distance) and Chinese FDI. Our findings suggest that when Chinese Aid 
interacts with the institutional quality of the host country the negative relationship 
between the overall institutional quality and FDI is greater (more negative) due to the 
non-interference in institutional development, involvement and backing of the Chinese 
government in investments integrated with aid. We also find that the interaction of aid 
with institutional distance weakens the positive influence of institutional distance such 
that the positive effect is less (CMNEs prefer similar institutional quality) due to the 
non-interference approach to the improvement of domestic institutions in host 
countries.   
With regard to the relationship between regulative quality and FDI, we find evidence 
of moderation of aid for the relationship between regulative quality and aid at very low 
levels of aid inflows. When distinguishing between overall institutional distance and 
regulative distance, we find evidence of a moderating effect of aid on the relationship 
between overall institutional distance and regulative distance and FDI. Our findings 
have important theoretical and policy implications considering the increasing political 
and economic ties between China and the African continent. We discuss these 







In this chapter, we summarise the main arguments of the thesis and the findings of our 
research. We also explain the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study as 
well as the implications for domestic policy in African countries and managers of 
MNEs planning on investing in African countries. Finally, we discuss the limitations 
of our study followed by a discussion of ideas for future research.  
8.2. Thesis Overall Argument: A Summary 
The literature on the impact of institutional quality and FDI flows examines this 
relationship strictly from an economic lens and rarely from social or political one 
(Busse & Hefeker 2007; Meyer & Nguyen 2005; Ali et al. 2010; Pajunen 2008; 
Buchanan et al. 2012). Furthermore, the literature also examines this relationship 
between institutional quality and FDI mainly in the context of DCMNEs investing in 
EMs while little or no attention has been paid to the impact of institutions on FDI from 
EMs into developing economies (South-South FDI) (Bailey 2018). This approach 
limits our understanding of the location decisions of MNEs from EMs and particularly 
China where a close relationship between business and the state is strong (Ramamurti 
and Hillemann 2018).  
On the other hand, the literature on the impact of institutional distance pays more 
attention to the effect of this variable on firms from mainly developed economies and 
stresses the importance institutional isomorphism as the only mechanism through 
which organisational legitimacy is achieved. At the moment we are not aware of any 




Africa firstly through its role as the owner of Chinese SOMNEs and secondly through 
its provision of aid that is integrated with FDI without any conditions. Thus an 
approach that first examines separately the impact of institutions on FDI carried out 
by both Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs and secondly accounts for the close 
integration of aid with FDI is currently lacking in the literature.  
We believe that the influence of the Chinese government on Chinese FDI in Africa in 
its capacity as owner of Chinese SOMNEs and its provision of development aid are 
both nested within a PE dimension that is needed to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the location decision of CMNEs in Africa. This PE dimension captures 
the influence of the Chinese government in the FDI location decision of CMNEs. 
Firstly, as the owner of Chinese SOMNEs, the Chinese government may influence the 
location decision of large SOMNEs to carry out FDI in accordance with the needs and 
objectives of the Chinese state. Secondly, as the provider of development aid ± closely 
integrated with FDI projects ± and based on a policy of non-interference, the Chinese 
government might influence the FDI location decision of CMNEs in Africa through 
its willingness to do business with any African country irrespective of the level of 
domestic institutional quality. Therefore, we develop a multi-disciplinary conceptual 
framework in which we propose that Chinese OFDI into Africa is attracted to low host 
country institutional quality and regulative quality. We also propose that low home-
host country institutional distance and regulative distance will attract Chinese OFDI 
into Africa. We further propose that the aforesaid relationships will differ between 
Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs and would strengthen when Chinese aid is included 
in Chinese investments.    
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With regard to host country institutional quality, we argue that CMNEs in general and 
Chinese SOMNEs, in particular, will be more attracted to African countries with low 
institutional quality. This investment pattern is mainly due to the PE of Chinese FDI 
in Africa that makes CMNEs in Africa more willing and likely to invest in African 
countries with low institutional quality. Due to their close affiliation to the Chinese 
government, Chinese SOMNEs have access to cheap capital and benefit from financial 
support from the Chinese government that is capable of offsetting the high transactions 
costs associated with operating in countries characterised by low institutional quality.  
Chinese SOMNEs are also likely to invest in African countries with very low 
institutional quality due to the political support provided by the Chinese government 
in circumstances where the risk of expropriation exists. CMNEs are also willing to 
invest more resources in African countries with low institutional quality due to the 
provision of and close integration of development aid and FDI with no conditions on 
the improvement of domestic institutions. Such an approach suggest that in 
circumstances where Chinese development aid is closely integrated with FDI, potential 
low levels of institutional quality in African countries will attract CMNEs from 
investing in the target location due to the non-interference policy of the Chinese 
government.  
We also argue that CMNEs rely on other mechanisms of achieving legitimacy rather 
than from the process of institutional isomorphism alone. Specifically, we argue that 
high institutional distance as a determinant of the degree of institutional pressure for 
legitimacy does not apply to CMNEs in general and Chinese SOMNEs in particular. 
This is because the low institutional quality and lack of reliable enforcement 
mechanisms in African countries mean that Chinese SOMNEs face lower institutional 
pressure to conform to the institutional environment in these African countries. 
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Furthermore, due to this low institutional quality and lack of reliable enforcement 
mechanisms, legitimating powers rest mainly in the executive branch of government 
± that is the political regimes of African countries.      
By creating good political relations with African countries, the Chinese government 
can negotiate the legitimacy of Chinese SOMNEs with African governments that 
consequently grant legitimacy to these firms. We further argue that one important 
mechanism through which the Chinese government secures the legitimacy of Chinese 
SOMNEs in African countries is through the provision of development aid with no 
conditions on the improvement of domestic institutions. This is particularly attractive 
to African governments as such an approach of non-interference is contrary to the 
conditions-based approach of the OECD and Western donors to development aid in 
Africa whereby transparency, respect for human rights, democratic accountability are 
all but a few conditions often demanded by Western donors. Based on the above 
discussion, this study seeks to answer the following research questions:  
1. What is the impact of the host country institutional quality on Chinese OFDI 
into Africa?  
2. How does the institutional distance between China and the host country 
DIIHFW&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD" 
3. To what extent does the impact of the host-country institutional quality and 
the home-host country institutional distance differ between Chinese SOMNEs 
and POMNEs?  
In the subsequent section, we present a summary of our research findings 
8.3. Summary of Research Findings 
In this section, we summarise the key findings of our research. We present the key 
findings of our research in relation to our research questions. Conceptually we 
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identified four factors that may have an effect on the FDI location decisions of CMNEs 
in Africa ± institutional quality, institutional distance, ownership type, and Aid. Firstly, 
we seek to investigate the impact of institutional quality on the FDI location decisions 
of CMNEs in Africa using FDI from developed and developing economies as 
benchmarks. In this respect, the theoretical perspective of NIEs underpins our view. 
Secondly, we examine the effect of institutional distance on the location decision of 
CMNEs in Africa using FDI from developed and developing economies as 
benchmarks. In this respect, we employ the theoretical perspective of NIT acts as our 
theoretical underpinning. We then account for a PE perspective of Chinese FDI in 
Africa that constitutes the role of the Chinese government in its influence in the FDI 
activities of Chinese SOMNEs and its provision of Chinese aid that is closely 
integrated with FDI projects. We do this by disaggregating Chinese FDI into 
investments carried out by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs and by examining the 
moderating effect of Chinese development aid on the relationship between our 
independent variables and Chinese FDI. By empirically testing our hypotheses 
formulated earlier (Chapter 4), we obtained a number of findings. The summary of our 
main findings are as follows:  
RQ 1. To examine the impact of host country institutional quality on Chinese FDI in 
Africa, we test our hypotheses formulated in our conceptual framework against data 
on Chinese FDI inflows from 2003 to 2015. We find that CMNEs are attracted to 
countries with low institutional and regulative quality. Our first empirical examination 
± the benchmarking analysis (Chapter 6) confirmed that CMNEs are attracted to low 
institutional, and regulative quality. We also found evidence that compared to 
DCMNEs and EMNEs, CMNEs are more willing to invest in countries with low 
institutional and regulative quality. In other words, CMNEs are more attracted to 
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African countries with low institutional, and regulative quality than DCMNEs and 
EMNEs.   
RQ 2. We find that higher institutional distance attracts FDI from China. After 
disaggregating the institutional distance into the regulative distance, we found that 
high regulative distance attracts Chinese FDI. We also found that compared to 
DCMNEs and EMNEs CMNEs are more attracted to and invest more where a high 
institutional, and regulative distance exists between the home and host country.  
RQ 3. The third research question relates to the extent to which the impact of both host 
country institutional quality and institutional distance differs between FDI carried out 
by Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. Regarding this question, we find that Chinese 
SOMNEs are more willing to invest in African countries with low institutional quality 
than Chinese POMNEs. On the effect of regulative quality, we find evidence that 
Chinese SOMNEs are attracted to low regulative quality while this does not seem to 
matter for Chinese POMNEs. Regarding institutional distance, the results show that 
Chinese SOMNEs are more attracted to high institutional distance than Chinese 
POMNEs. The disaggregation of the institutional distance variable into regulative 
distance shows that Chinese SOMNEs are attracted to high regulative distance while 
this does not matter for Chinese POMNEs.  
8.3.1. Summary of Findings of the Moderating Effect of Aid   
 
We summarise the findings regarding the moderating effect of aid on the relationship 
between our independent variables and Chinese FDI as follows. For the moderating 
effect of aid on the relationship between institutional quality and Chinese FDI, we find 
that aid negatively moderates the relationship between institutional quality and 
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Chinese FDI. The results on regulative quality show that aid positively moderates the 
relationship between regulative quality and Chinese FDI.  
For the moderating effect of aid on the relationship between institutional distance and 
Chinese FDI, we find that aid negatively moderates the relationship between 
institutional distance and Chinese FDI. Regarding regulative distance, we find 
evidence of a negative moderating effect of aid on the relationship between regulative 
distance and Chinese FDI.    
8.4. Research Limitations   
Our study has some limitations. Firstly, our data is limited to greenfield investments 
in Africa. Therefore our empirical analysis does not account for other investment entry 
modes such as joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions. Although greenfield 
investments account for the majority of investments in Africa (UNCTAD 2017), it is 
possible that the determinants of the FDI location decisions of CMNEs might differ 
for different modes of entry.  
Secondly, due to the lack of data, our choice of variables was limited, which continues 
to be a particular problem for scholars studying the determinants of FDI inflows into 
Africa. In our case, we would have liked to examine the effect of the distance in the 
cultural-cognitive element of the institutional environment between the home and host 
country of the firm. However, data commonly used to measure this aspect of the 
institutional environment (Dow & Karunaratna 2006) is not available for the majority 
of African countries.   
Considering our data is limited to greenfield investments, future research should 
examine the impact of institutional quality and distance on alternative modes of entry 
by CMNEs in Africa. Future research might examine the effect of cultural-cognitive 
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distance on the location decision of CMNEs in Africa. Also, future research might 
examine the moderating effect of Chinese development aid on the relationship between 
institutional quality and institutional distance on FDI by Chinese SOMNEs compared 
to Chinese POMNEs.    
8.5. Research Contribution  
Although research has been performed on the FDI location decision of CMNEs in 
Africa and specifically the impact of host-country institutional quality (e.g., Jiang 
2009; Biggeri & Sanfilippo 2009; Cheung et al. 2012; Drogendijk & Blomkvist 2013), 
some scholars have pointed out the gaps in previous research on this phenomenon. 
Kolstad & Wiig (2011) call for a closer consideration of the close integration of aid 
DQG)',DVWKLVZLOODVVHVVWKHIXOOLPSDFWRI&KLQD¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHFRQWLQHQW
Cheung et al. (2012) call for an examination of the effect of the non-conditionality 
approach to the provision of aid on the location decision of CMNEs in Africa. The 
relative increase in the number of Chinese POMNEs investing in Africa in recent years 
(Shen 2015) has led to calls for research on whether the investment pattern of Chinese 
POMNEs differs from that of Chinese SOMNEs (Drogendijk & Blomkvist 2013).   
The literature review provided earlier in this dissertation (Chapter 3) shows that an 
investigation of the GHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDWKDWDFFRXQWVIRUILUP
ownership and the effect of the integration of aid and FDI has not been investigated. 
To the best of our knowledge, the effect of institutional distance on the location 
decision of CMNEs in Africa has not been investigated. Thus, we not only follow the 
calls from the aforementioned scholars but also believe that empirical research that 
accounts for firm heterogeneity and the effect of Chinese aid on the location decision 
of CMNEs in Africa is needed to establish a comprehensive and understanding of 
Chinese OFDI in Africa.  
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In this dissertation, we view the influence of the Chinese government in Chinese FDI 
in Africa from two aspects 1) through its role as the owner of large Chinese SOMNEs 
and 2) through its provision of aid (closely integrated with FDI) with no conditions on 
institutional development in African countries. We purport both aspects constitute a 
PE perspective of Chinese FDI in Africa that has not been examined in extant research 
on WKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD7RDFFRXQWIRUWKLV3(GLPHQVLRQRI
Chinese FDI, we construct a conceptual framework on which we specify an empirical 
model that captures our research questions.  
The contribution of this study is the following: our first and main research contribution 
is an interdisciplinary conceptual framework that investigates that explains how 
Chinese SOMNEs invest differently from their counterparts from the private sector. 
Our conceptual framework also accounts for the nature of the effect of Chinese 
development aid on Chinese OFDI into Africa through the non-interference 
mechanism. Thus, the core contribution of this thesis is two-fold. The first core 
contribution is the comparison between OFDI carried out by SOMNEs and POMNEs 
and the second core contribution is the inclusion of the effect of Chinese development 
aid on the location decision of CMNEs in Africa.    
Secondly, we use FDI from developed and developing economies as benchmarks to 
investigate whether CMNEs invest differently from DCMNEs and EMNEs. Thirdly, 
besides the traditional motivations of FDI, we pay particular attention to host country 
institutional quality and the institutional distance between home and host countries. 
Finally, having examined the effect of the absolute institutional distance between these 
investors (CMNEs, DCMNEs, and EMNEs), we disaggregate the absolute institutional 
distance into positive and negative institutional distance to inquire into the effect of 
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these variables on the location decision of CMNEs compared to DCMNEs and 
EMNEs.    
8.6. Theoretical and Empirical Contributions 
This study makes a theoretical contribution to ± the NIEs approach to IB. Our 
conceptual framework extends NIEs in the following ways. Firstly, we extend this 
strictly economic approach by accounting for the effect of political cost on the strict 
transactions costs analysis of the location decision of MNEs. We do this by accounting 
for the influence of the Chinese government through its ownership of SOMNEs and 
provision of development aid that means Chinese MNEs face a lower political cost 
than other investors in Africa. This lower political cost is capable of offsetting any 
transactions costs associated with operating in countries with weak institutions and 
provide CMNEs in Africa with a competitive political advantage over other investors 
in Africa.  
Secondly, our conceptual framework extends NIEs by accounting for political and 
strategic objectives of FDI rather than simply for profit maximisation and cost-
economising perspective. The influence of the Chinese government on the location 
decision of CMNEs may result in investments being carried out for political and 
strategic objectives. 
Our conceptual framework extends NIT by conceptualising a legitimising mechanism 
that Chinese MNEs employ when carrying out FDI in African countries. This 
legitimising mechanism is non-conditional development aid offered by the Chinese 
government to the governments of the target African markets of CMNEs.    
8.6.1. Empirical Contribution    
 
)RURXUHPSLULFDOFRQWULEXWLRQSULRUVWXGLHVRQ&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFD(Blomkvist 
and Drogendijk 2013; Cheung et al. 2012; Mario Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009; Kolstad 
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and Wiig 2011) PHDVXUHVWKHLPSDFWRILQVWLWXWLRQVRI&KLQD¶V2)',LQWR$IULFDE\
using a single indicator. This use of a single indicator can underestimate the full effect 
of institutions ± a multifaceted aspect of a country that is difficult to capture by using 
a single indicator. MNEs make decisions on whether to enter a foreign market based 
on a combination of institutional factors rather than a single one (Pajunen 2008).  
 
Our first empirical contribution is the use of a composite measure of institutional 
quality, and regulative quality and the distance between the home and host country in 
these characteristics. This measure provides an overall effect of our independent 
YDULDEOHVRQ&KLQD¶V2)DI into Africa. Secondly, we construct a novel dataset that 
comprises of institutional, macroeconomic and aid data that we collect from a number 
of different databases for 37 African economies, 11 developed economies and 8 
developing economies between 2003 and 2015.  
 
Thirdly, we employ a two-tier research methodology to empirically test our data firstly 
through a benchmarking analysis using the OLS method (Chapter 6) and secondly 
through a moderation analysis of the effect of aid on the effects of our institutional 
YDULDEOHVRQ&KLQD¶V2)', LQWR$IULFD &KDSWHU )RXUWKO\ UHO\LQJRQ RXUQRYHO
dataset, we investigate whether Chinese SOMNEs invest differently from POMNEs. 
Finally, we disaggregate the absolute value of institutional distance into positive and 
negative institutional distance because investing in countries with better institutional 
quality could be attractive to foreign investors.    
8.7. Policy and Managerial Implications  
Our research shows that higher levels of institutional quality and institutional distance 
do not deter CMNEs when deciding to invest in Africa. Our findings also show that 
Chinese SOMNEs, in particular, are more attracted to African countries with low 
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institutional quality and a high institutional distance than Chinese POMNEs. Another 
crucial factor further increasing the attractiveness of CMNEs in Africa to the low 
institutional quality of African countries is the close integration of aid and FDI. 
Specifically, the absence of conditionality on the improvement of domestic institutions 
in the provision of Chinese development aid means the CMNEs might not view the 
low institutional quality in African countries as problematic. This attractiveness to low 
institutional quality implies that Chinese FDI in Africa can be detrimental to the long-
term development of the domestic institutions in African countries ± and also 
H[DFHUEDWHWKHSUREOHPRIµUHVRXUFHFXUVH¶LQ$IULFDQFRXQWULHVZLWKvast reserves of 
natural resources. However, although CMNEs are more attracted to African countries 
with low institutional quality, this behaviour is not specific to CMNEs alone as 
DCMNEs and EMNEs also seem to be attracted to weak institutions in Africa.  
Although our results show a negative relationship between institutional quality and 
Chinese FDI, this does not mean policymakers in African countries should pay less 
attention to the improvement of the quality of their domestic institutions as a means of 
attracting FDI. It should be noted that our results also suggest that access to natural 
resources is a key motive for all types of investors while FDI in the construction sector 
is also key for CMNEs in particular. Thus, to enhance FDI flows beyond the extractive 
and construction sectors, policymakers in host African countries should focus on 
improving the overall quality of their institutions to attract more value-adding and 
technology-intensive FDI. These sort of knowledge-intensive FDI usually originates 
from high-quality locations with a high distance in institutional quality between the 
home and host country of the firm. Also, low quality in the domestic institutions in 
African countries does not only affect inward FDI but also problematic to local firms 
as it increases uncertainty, transactions and productions costs and consequently the 
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overall performance of local firms (Ngobo and Fouda 2012), which in turn can reduce 
the quality of FDI inflows.  
Overall, the African continent as a whole is already attracting a high amount of FDI in 
the extractive sectors. FDI in the construction sectors is also on the rise mainly due to 
a rise in Chinese investments in this sector (Corkin and Burke 2006; Foster 2009). The 
growth in investments in the construction sector from China is highly needed in a 
continent with very low levels of quality in physical infrastructure (Foster and Briceno-
Garmendia 2009). CMNEs in general and Chinese SOMNEs, in particular, do not 
consider the presence of high-quality institutions as a factor when investing in Africa. 
However, to broaden the type of FDI African countries attract (e.g., FDI in the high-
tech sectors), African governments must strive to improve the overall quality of their 
domestic institutions. The attraction of high-quality FDI alongside FDI from 
traditional sectors is crucial for sustainable long-term economic development ± the 
ultimate objective for African countries.  
Regarding managerial implications, our findings primarily suggest that CMNEs would 
value African countries with the very lowest institutional quality provided they have 
political and economic backing from their home government. CMNE managers are 
thus more likely to establish strong connections with the political regimes in African 
countries to avoid potential expropriation of assets. These connections point to an 
important role international relations plays between the governments of African 
countries and the Chinese government in influencing the locations decisions of 
CMNEs in Africa. Managers of MNEs from developed economies can lobby their 
home governments to improve relations with potential target locations in Africa and 
demand more support when they carry out investments in African countries.    
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Past research has argued that locations with highly profitable FDI and weak institutions 
tend to attract investors who aim to stabilise dictatorships (Aidt and Albornoz 2011). 
This, in turn, could give them access to a more stable and expropriation-free local 
environment. Intuitively, it can be argued that CMNEs use the support of their home 
country and the autocratic political regimes in African countries as an efficient way to 
deal with the complex, underdeveloped and weak institutional systems. This 
relationship further pushes firms to establish political connections and non-market 
transactions with African governments. However, such a practice can potentially have 
detrimental effects regarding the improvement of the quality of domestic institutions 
of many African countries.  
 
8.8. Recommendations for Future Research 
 
7KLVVWXG\RSHQVDYHQXHVIRUIXWXUHUHVHDUFKRQWKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRI&KLQD¶V2)',
into Africa in several dimensions. Firstly, this thesis has not examined the phenomenon 
from the new organisational institutionalism (NOI) approach to IB ± that focuses on 
the institutional pressures MNEs face to conform to the external institutional 
environment of their host location through isormpohism as a way of achieving host 
country legitimacy. Particularly it would be interesting to examine how CMNEs 
achieve and maintain legitimacy in host African countries ± and if the institutional 
pressures and ways of achieving host country legitimacy differ between Chinese 
SOMNEs and POMNEs.  
Secondly, due to data limitations, this study does not examine the effect of normative 
institutions on the location decision of CMNEs and therefore opens an avenue for 
future research where the effect of normative (informal) institutions and the distance 
in this characteristic are examined. Thirdly, future research can also examine the effect 
of the distance in the cultural-cognitive element of the institutional environment 
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between the home and host country of the firm on the FDI location decision of CMNEs 
in Africa. Data commonly used to measure this aspect of the institutional environment 
(Dow & Karunaratna 2006) is not available for the majority of African countries.   
Also, Chinese development aid and its role in Chinese FDI projects will continue to 
represent an important strategy of the Chinese government in its quest to increase 
&KLQD¶VLQIOXHQFHLQWKH$IULFDQFRQWLQHQW ± and for large Chinese SOMNEs to win 
investment contracts in Africa. Thus, due to their close affiliation with the Chinese 
government future research may examine whether the moderating effect of Chinese 
development aid on the relationship between host country institutional quality and 
institutional distance on Chinese FDI differ between FDI projects carried out by 
Chinese SOMNEs and POMNEs. Such an investigation may become feasible as 
investments by Chinese POMNEs in Africa reach the current levels of Chinese 
















Appendix 1. List of Countries included in Analyses 
Host Countries  Source Countries   
 Developed Economies Developing  Economies 
Algeria  Australia  Brazil 
Angola  Canada  China 
Botswana  France  India  
Burkina Faso  Germany  Russia  
Cameroon  Italy  Saudi Arabia  
Congo (DRC)  Japan  South Korea   
&RWH'¶,YRLUH Netherlands  Turkey  
Egypt  Portugal  United Arab Emirates  




Gabon  United Kingdom  
The Gambia  United States  
Ghana   
Guinea  












Republic of the Congo 
Senegal  
Sierra Leone  
Somalia 
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